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A bstract
This study analyses the significance of Algeria’s associative sphere in the context of the 
state’s attempts to retain legitimacy. Starting from a critique of portrayals of Algerian ‘civil 
society’ as a force conducive to democratization, and by framing the period under study in a 
broader historical perspective, the thesis examines the changing relationship of the state to 
voluntary associations in both the colonial and post-colonial eras. It considers the place of 
associational life in the political economy of economic reform, investigating the role it 
played in facilitating the state’s retreat from service provision. Consideration of the notion 
that civic associations shape people's propensity towards cooperation and collective action, 
facilitating democratic politics through the injection of trust and social capital, provides the 
starting point for analyzing their internal dynamics and the incentives driving their 
functioning. A further examination of the social bases of the associative sphere then leads to 
questioning its independence from the state, and highlights the role of the associative sector 
in tempering the fracture between the state and those social groups that most suffered from 
the collapse of Algeria’s post colonial political framework. A critical examination of the 
proposition that civil society organisations legitimate and strengthen representative political 
institutions such as parties and parliament provides the opportunity to show how the 
associative sphere contributed to preserving the dominance of the executive in the political 
system despite the introduction of multi-partism. Finally, the study analyses donors’ use of 
advocacy and service-delivery associations in democracy-promotion programmes, arguing 
that their focus on the country’s ‘civil society’ contributed to the state’s efforts to preserve its 
international legitimacy. In this light, rather than a driver of democratic change, the 
associative sphere appears as one of the elements of conservation used by a weakened state 
to reacquire legitimacy and reinforce its capacity to secure voluntary acquiescence in its rule.
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To Alice, 
fo r  the grey areas, 
and all that ensued.
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Chapter 1. Civil society in weak states
“An association is an army...talk is needed to count numbers and build up 
courage, but after that, they march together against the enemy”.
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America
Introduction
Between the mid-1980s and 2005 Algeria went through a failed political liberalisation 
process and reversal into authoritarianism, a protracted economic slump leading to a 
massive fall in living standards, and a decade long conflict between the army and Islamist 
guerrillas which claimed some 150,000 lives. During this same period, the country also 
experienced a sustained multiplication of voluntary associations and grassroots groups 
which, according to official figures, today make Algeria one of the most ‘association dense’ 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa.1 Despite the puzzling concomitance of 
protracted wide scale violence, political turmoil and associative growth, there is to this day a 
striking lack of information about and in-depth analysis of Algeria’s associational life, 
which leaves it as one of the most elusive elements of the country’s recent political 
trajectory. This study aims to fill the gap.2
This introductory chapter takes four preliminary steps towards this goal. First, I describe the 
premises of Algeria’s weak state, clarifying how the issue of legitimacy defines the main 
questions inspiring this study. Second, I frame this perspective within the broader debate on 
the nature and fate of Arab liberalisation reforms, showing how this literature is leading to a 
reconsideration of the functional role of civil society in democratisation processes. Third, I 
outline the structure of the discussion, and spell out the way the argument is organised. The 
final part of the chapter describes the material on which the research is based, as well as the 
methodology used during fieldwork.
1 According to government figures cited in El Watan 14 January 2006, by 2006 Algeria counted 
73000 associations present in the country. Though low by Western standards (in France, around 
75000 associations are created every year), this figure is high compared to the Arab region. See 
Denoeux and Gateau,1995; Marzouk,1997; BenNefissa, 2000;Yom, 2005.
2 The main works on the subject (Dahak,1982; Babadji,1989) are dated, and do not cover the period 
considered here. In his contribution to Kazemi & Norton, 1995 -  one o f the seminal studies on civil 
society in the Middle East - Entelis notes the exuberance o f Algeria’s associative sector and draws a 
number o f conclusions regarding its impact on the country’s prospects for democracy, without basing 
his analysis on empirical observations. This is a general trait o f the views on Algeria’s civil society 
which appeared in the literature through the 1990s. None o f the recent studies, collections or review 
articles on civil society in the Middle East -  such as Ben Nefissa [2000; 2004], Sajoo [2004] and 
Yom [2005] - mentions the Algerian case.
Civil Society in Weak States
Algeria’s weak state
Political instability has been one of the main features of Algeria’s recent political 
development. Since at least the riots which shook the country in October 1988,3 the state has 
endured sustained levels of political violence manifesting itself in a variety of forms. These 
include: a) a decade long conflict between the army and the Islamist insurgents -  a conflict 
which the army had clearly won by 2005, but which at more than one point during the 1990s 
seemed to be tipping in favour of the guerrillas, raising the prospect of the outright collapse 
of the Algerian state [Zartman,1995;Nicholson,1998];4 b) low intensity violence which 
continued in residual form well beyond the army’s declared victory and the government’s 
amnesty initiatives;5 c) Mass upheavals such as the one exploding in Kabylia in the spring 
of 2001, itself a reminder of the turmoil shaking the region in 1980; and d) recurrent 
episodes of localised rioting persistently punctuating local political life in virtually every 
comer of the country.6 Algeria appears to represent an example of political instability as 
described by Buzan - a scenario where significant sections of the population challenge the 
institutions that uphold the state, or in some cases the very idea of stateness, in the form of 
anti-systemic groups who in the worst of cases decide to express themselves through 
violence [Buzan, 1983:45-61], In this sense, the Algerian state consequently represents an 
example of a weak state, one that turns to violence in its efforts to penetrate society, shape 
social relationships and extract resources [Migdal, 1988].
Indeed, explanations of the origins of Algeria’s violence abound, but apart from those that 
questionably link the violence to Algerians’ peculiarities -  such as a specific propensity to 
engage in conflict [Martinez, 2000] -  the vast majority point to the collapsing connection 
between the state and an increasingly disaffected society [Layachi, 1995; Zartman, 1995;
3 Between 5-10 Ocotober 1988 massive demonstrations against the government erupted all over the 
country. On the 10th of October, the army fired on the rioting crowd in Algiers, killing several 
hundred people.
4 Few observers o f Algerian affairs remained firm in dismissing the possibility o f  an Islamist victory. 
A notable exception is Roberts, who since the early stages o f  the conflict stressed that “the 
Islamists...have little prospect o f coming to power in their own right” [1993, 2003].
5 On 29 September 2005, Algerians approved President Bouteflika’s Charter for Peace and National 
Reconciliation through a referendum, thus allowing legislation that pardons individuals convicted o f  
armed terrorist violence, approved on 22 February 2006. The new Charter builds upon the previous 
1999 Civil Concord initiative and the 1995 Rahma (pardon) law. In 2005, Algeria still counted an 
average o f 40-50 killings monthly. Although this represents a transformation o f remnants o f a 
politically motivated insurgency into wide-scale banditry, it nevertheless shows the state’s failure to 
completely restore internal order, and prevent spillover effects in the region and Europe. On 14 
September 2006, A1 Qaeda announced its alliance to the Saiafist Group for Preaching and Combat 
(GSPC) - the most prominent guerrilla group still active in Algeria -  as a way o f targeting Western 
interests in the Magreb.
6 On Algeria’s ‘civil war’ see Martinez [2000; On the the Kabyle riots, see Roberts, [2001b], while on 
riots in general in Algeria see Gallissot [1991].
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Joffe, 2002:30; Hirst, 2001], Perceived in turn as fragile, dysfunctional or even approaching 
total meltdown, at more than one point since 1992 the state has seemed incapable of 
fulfilling some of the most basic functions of statehood, such as ensuring security and 
maintaining the monopoly of the use of force [Leveau, 1995; Martinez, 1998; Carment, 
2003: 414]. Henry notably described the Algerian state as “a bunker state” no longer 
“hold[ing] durable arrangements with ... society” [1999: 2], while Volpi stressed the 
“persisting mistrust between an elitist regime and its subject population”. Silverstein 
explained Algerians’ penchant for conspiracy theories by referring to the same “climate of 
political mistrust” and “lack of communication” between rulers and ruled [2000: 8], whereas 
Roberts found in the ubiquitous usage of the word hogra7 the linguistic evidence of “the 
rupture between the state and the people [lying at the origins of] the breakdown of the 
Algerian polity” [2002:1].
Yet, as the inventory of the causes and effects of state weakness kept growing, collapse as 
feared by so many observers did not happen. Indeed, today’s Algeria remains ruled by the 
same groups -  in fact by some of the very individuals - who gained power 40 years ago, at 
the time of the country’s independence. What accounts for the resilience of the Algerian 
state? To answer this question one has to start from an examination of the process leading to 
the decline of Algeria’s postcolonial state.
Since at least the death of Houari Bouemedienne in 1978,8 the Algerian state has 
progressively sunk into a legitimacy crisis whose origins are rooted in the decay of the post­
colonial political system. For almost 30 years after independence, the state claimed to be the 
sole representative of a unified and consensual society. The interfacing of state and society 
was ensured by the party of the National Liberation Front {Front de Liberation Nationale) 
and the network of mass organisations linked to it.9 The prime function of this 
organisational machinery was to absorb, articulate, and channel social demands and respond
7 ‘Hogra’ (or hagra) means ‘contempt’, ‘scorn’. It is usually associated with the attitude o f the state 
vis-a-vis the people.
8 Houari Boumedienne (real name, Mohamed Ben Brahim Boukharouba) became President of 
Algeria on 19 June 1965 and remained in power until his death on 27 Decemberr 1978. He fought in 
the war o f liberation against the French since 1955, becoming chief o f  staff o f  the FLN army in exile, 
and then Minister o f Defense in the first Ben Bella government. His strong political base in the army 
allowed him to orchestrate the 1965 bloodless coup which deposed Ben Bella
9 Mass organisations represented all social categories: professional activity, such as labour — the 
General Union o f Algerian Workers ( Union Generale des Travailleurs Algeriens — UGTA); women’s 
interests - General Union o f Algerian Women {Union Generale de Femmes Algeriennes); education 
the General Union o f Algerian students {Union Generale des Etudiants Algeriens); and, most 
importantly, fighters’ o f the national liberation war -  National War Veterans’ (Organisation 
(Organisation Nationale des Moudjahidine -  ONM).
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by combining the ideological capital which the state had gained from the liberation war with 
the financial capital derived from the oil and gas rent [Leca & Vatin, 1975; Hudson, 1977].
The legitimacy crisis faced by the Algerian state can be attributed to the parallel emergence 
of a set of internal and external factors which together came into play in the period between 
the mid to end 1980s. Internally, the ideological bases of the regime were fractured by the 
dynamics of a rampant demography, which made the millions of Algerians bom after 1962 
find it increasingly difficult to relate to a system which held the revolution as the only 
source of legitimacy [Roy, 1994:275]. As the rapid urbanisation and population boom was 
already putting the system of rent distribution and the patronage networks it supported under 
strain, the collapse of the hydrocarbon prices in the mid-1980s dealt it a fatal blow. The 
growing fiscal imbalances in turn led first to a rapid deterioration in the quality of public 
services, and then to a massive downscaling of the state’s role as service provider. State 
withdrawal was carried out under an unpopular economic policy of partial liberalisation 
further affecting falling living standards and compounding the effects of the generalised 
economic downturn in the eyes of the citizenry.10 Externally, the collapse of the Soviet 
bloc aggravated the situation by eliminating what Roberts called “the principal external 
premises...of the substantive sovereignty of the Algerian state” [Roberts, 2003:349].
Besides leading to a progressive alienation of society from the state -  a configuration 
reminiscent of the way rulers ruled relations developed during Algeria’s earlier experiences 
of state formation under the Ottoman and French colonial endeavours [Quandt, 1998:109]11 
- the crisis of the Algerian state also sparked the first experiment of political liberalisation in 
the Arab world. The state responded by dismantling the post-colonial legitimacy system
10 Algeria provides a perfectly fitting empirical actualisation o f  the cycle o f legitimacy loss and state 
weakness described by Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan in their theoretical discussion on state-building 
[2005]: “Loss o f legitimacy is the key to the fragility and failure of states. The vicious circle begins 
with the loss o f trust by citizens in the ability o f  their state to create an inclusive political, social, and 
economic order made predictable by rule o f law. Some o f  the markers o f the process o f loss o f  
legitimacy are: an increase in illegality, informality, and criminality in the economy; ineffective 
delivery o f basic services, such as health, sanitation and education; failure to maintain or expand 
essential infrastructure; increase in corruption; and appropriation o f public assets for private gain. As 
a result, administrative control weakens and the bureaucracy is seen as an instrument o f abuse o f  
power, in turn leading to a crisis in public finances -  where both revenue and expenditure become 
unpredictable and budgeting becomes an exercise in emergency management. The ultimate marker is 
loss o f  legitimate use o f violence by the state and emergence o f  armed groups that through recourse 
to violence openly mock the authority o f  the state and gain control o f various areas o f the country”.
11 The Ottomans ruled over parts o f Algeria (the Constantinois, the Algerois and part o f the Mitidja 
plain) between 1525 and 1830, when they were overthrown by the French (1830-1962). Colonial rule 
established some of the main features o f Algerian state. Laroui argues that the image o f a state 
‘disembedded’ from society pervades the Maghrebi political imagination , which never emancipated 
itself from the colonial experience. For other examples o f  analogy between the reciprocal alienation 
o f state and society in contemporary and colonial Algeria see Martinez, 1998; Ernest Gellner, Muslim 
Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981 and Ruedy,2005. For a snapshot o f the long 
literature on the breakdown of state society relations and its manifestations, see also chapter 5.
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centred on the representational primacy of the FLN and then proceeding to a rapid opening 
up of the political system. In the brief time between the October 1988 riots and the January 
1992 military coup, the swift introduction of a new constitution, political pluralism and free 
local and national elections seemed to transform a single party political regime into a liberal 
democracy, and provide an answer to the legitimacy crisis affecting Algeria’s postcolonial 
state.
The 1992 coup and the ensuing conflict reversed this impression, but only to a point. 
[Quandt, 1998; 2005]. Besides sending Algeria’s political system into a decade long flux, 
the introduction of pluralist politics also changed the course of Algerian studies. The 
framework central to the study of the Algerian polity built around the investigation of state 
building and the related issues of legitimacy, stability and political order gave way to an 
almost unique attention to the problematic of democratic change, only partly obscured, for 
the whole duration of the conflict, by a focus on violence. The issue of whether democracy 
could ever be brought back to the country often hid the tendency -  not unique to Algerian 
studies -  to consider democracy as the only solution to crisis, thus neglecting a rounded 
analysis of the way the Algerian state tried to surmount its weakness. As William Zartman 
put it in 2005, “much of the current discourse on Algeria seems to be stuck in 1992, when 
the sudden democratisation process was snuffed out” [2005: 216]. This book seeks to show 
how one of the casualties of this bias has been a correct understanding of the development 
of the country’s associative sector and the role it played in the political economy of 
Algeria’s weak state.
Civil society in liberalised autocracies
The global rise of voluntary associations during the 1990s has fuelled a vast literature on the 
contribution of civil society to political development. Although the notion of civil society 
has notoriously been characterised by a degree of definitional ambiguity, its mainstream 
variants are generally articulated around the view of associationalism in 19th century 
America made popular by Alexis de Tocqueville [Whittington, 1998; Lewis, 2002: 571]. 
This view revolves around the idea of an associative realm, independent of the state, which 
occupies the space between the latter and the individual. [Walzer, 1991,1992; Perez-Diaz, 
1993; Hall, 1995; Comaroffs, 1999; Pease, 1999; Bormeo & Nord, 2000].12
12 For a penetrating critique o f the Tocquevillian revival both in historical perspective and its 
contemporary application to its original context, the US, see Berman [1997] and Shapiro [1997]. For 
a more articulated view see Kaviraj [2003]
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There are two applications of this Tocquevillian view of civil society. The first is analytical. 
In it, associational life becomes a conceptual device to investigate state-society relations. As 
put by White, civil society can be used as a tool to “interpret the generalised contestation 
between state and society” or a framework that “leads one to focus on the balance of power 
between state and society and to investigate the ways in which members of society act to 
protect themselves from [the] state” [White, 1996]. In its second use civil society represents 
a normatively charged research object. Particularly when applied to authoritarian contexts, 
the focus here lies on the functional role played by the associative sphere as a precondition 
of democracy. The rise of associational life is viewed as a mechanism for expanding 
political freedoms through collective empowerment and popular participation, an arena 
capable of rolling back the repressive state [Gellner, 1994:5], and eventually sparking 
democratic change [Diamond, 1996].
It is in this dual capacity - epistemological and normative - that the focus on civil society has 
gradually shifted from the role played by voluntary organisations and grassroots groups in 
the demise of authoritarian regimes in Latin America [O’Donnel & Schmitter, 1986] and 
Eastern Europe [Keane, 1988] to the democratisation processes in Africa [Bratton, 1989; 
Chazan, 1992], and then the Middle East and North Africa [Hudson, 1991; Beilin, 1994; 
Norton, 1993 & 1995; Schwendler, 1995; Marzouk, 1996],13 thus becoming a prevailing 
assumption of global political analysis. Despite the fact that the idea of a positive, universal 
connection between associational life and democracy has been questioned from various 
angles, both in general [Armony, 2005] and with specific reference to the Middle East, 
[Gellner, 1991; Sadosky, 1993; Wiktorowitz, 2002; Abdel Rahman, 2005; Yom, 2005], to 
this day the ‘civil society in democracy perspective’ remains the dominant paradigm for 
understanding the emergence of the associative sphere in the South.
The scant literature mentioning the remarkable rise of associational life in Algeria is no 
exception to this rule. With Algeria being perceived as an exemplary case of failed 
democratisation and reversal into repressive authoritarianism [Entelis, 1994; Zoubir, 1995; 
Djebaili, 1996], for years observers of Algerian politics have saluted the associative sector’s 
rapid expansion as an encouraging sign of the country’s democratic prospects. At the same 
time, state authoritarianism has been singled out as the main obstacle to its consolidation 
[Layachi, 1995]. Drawing parallels with the blossoming of associational life in Eastern 
Europe and its role in resisting the Communist regimes, Constance Stadler for instance
13 This vast literature can hardly be fully represented here. A number of monographic studies and in- 
depth articles focus on other countries, most notably Yemen [Carapico, 1998], Egypt [Bianchi, 1989; 
Singerman, 1995; Abdel Rahman, 2005], Morocco, [Denoeux and Gateau, 1995]; Jordan 
[Wiktorowicz, 2000; 2002]; Tunisia [Alexander, 1997].
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portrayed the associative sphere as growing out of the dialectical confrontation with the 
state, and saw it as “the germination of a counter-hegemony in Algeria” [1994]. By striking 
the same chord, Kazemi and Norton highlighted the democratic prospects raised by the 
“impressive array of rights-oriented groups [who] emerged...especially in Algeria”, but at 
the same time regretted “the failure of the regime in Algiers...to foster rather than repress 
civil society” [1996:114]. In 1999, Zoubir claimed that “the indisputable existence of an 
increasingly resolute civil society provides the potential for genuine democratisation”[1999: 
29].
In addition to questioning the extent to which associational life has really contributed to 
Algeria’s democratisation process, this book tries to reframe its significance for the 
country’s political development according to a different perspective. The very notion of 
democratisation as the main framework for the analysis of political development has in fact 
recently been subject to increasing scepticism, following the realisation that in many 
developing countries what initially had appeared as democratic change often turned out to 
be something else altogether. As noted by Carothers [1999:14] several countries formerly 
presumed to be undergoing a democratic transition ended up “in a grey middle zone [...] 
having neither moved rapidly and painlessly to democracy nor fallen back into outright 
authoritarianism”. For the Middle East and North Africa, the “end of the transition 
paradigm” [Carothers, 2002] bears particular relevance: despite the introduction of measures 
of political liberalisation, in terms of substantial democratisation the region has lagged 
behind most of the countries initially included in the Third wave of democratisation 
[Huntington, 1993]. Indeed, since at least the mid 1990s, guarded optimism concerning the 
prospects for democratic change in the region has given way to concerns about the obduracy 
of authoritarian politics, and rising doubts about the capacity of Arab political transitions to 
achieve democracy [Salame, 1994; Hudson, 1996; Beilin, 2004; Ghalioun, 2004; Posusney 
& Penner, 2005].
From perceptions of ‘slow’ democratic transition, the attention has therefore turned to the 
possibility that Arab regimes’ subsequent attempts at opening up the economy {infitah), and 
introducing political pluralism (ta ‘addudiya) - without losing overall control of the political 
process - have given rise to new types of regime shaped around autocratic cores hidden 
under formally democratic features. Attempts at capturing the features of this new wave of 
hybrid regimes have brought about a distinctive terminology.14 The outcome of political
14 Zakaria’s ‘Illiberal democracy’ [1997] and Brumberg’s "Liberalised Autocracy’ are the most well 
known examples. This terminological flurry often neglects that already in 1989, Bernard Badie had 
described the outcome o f the first experiences of political opening in the Middle East as ‘pluralized
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reforms in Algeria was defined as a form of “pluralism without enfranchisement” [Roberts, 
2000, 2003: 263 et seq], Zakaria described Arab democratisation efforts as an experience in 
the establishment of ‘illiberal democracy’, whilst Robinson [1998] saw in the reforms 
implemented in Jordan a process of ‘defensive democratisation’. With reference to Yemen, 
Schwedler [2002] talked of ‘tactical liberalisation’, i.e. subsequent moves performed by 
rulers aimed at opening and closing the political system at convenient times, a term later 
utilised by Diamond [2003] to describe the outcome of liberalisation reforms more broadly 
in the region.
Daniel Brumberg’s definition of liberalised autocracy is by far the soundest formulation of 
these attempts. Brumberg distinguishes between, on one hand, full autocracies (i.e. regimes 
which do not tolerate even the smallest degree of pluralism, such as Syria, Libya, Saudi 
Arabia and Iraq before the US intervention) and on the other, liberalised autocracies - i.e. 
regimes that due to “a set of interdependent institutional, economic, ideological, social and 
geostrategic factors [have] created an adaptable ecology of repression, control and partial 
openness”. Liberalised autocracies, he writes, “provide a kind of virtual democracy” 
whereby the promotion of “a measure of political openness in civil society, in the press, and 
even in the electoral system” is coupled with the state’s unrelenting control over the security 
establishment, the media and patronage networks [2003: 3]. In the set of countries chosen to 
support his argument, and in addition to Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt, Brumberg includes 
Algeria [2002: 57].
The contribution of this literature to a better understanding of Arab political reform is still in 
its infancy. Although the identification of liberalised autocracies has led to a re-examination 
of the expectations raised by the transition paradigm, it has not however transcended the 
latter’s overall framework [Armony and Schamis, 2005]. For instance, by describing 
liberalised autocracy as “a type of political system whose institutions, rules, and logic defy 
any linear model of democratisation” [2002: 56], Brumberg still uses on the one hand ‘full 
autocracy’, and on the other ‘real democracy’, as yardsticks for his definition. As Armony 
and Schamis make clear, “the major empirical finding of this latter research has been that, 
while the majority of these new regimes exhibit democratic features such as free and fair 
elections, a significant number deviate from the standards and practices that are inherent to 
the very idea of democratic rule” [2005: 13]. The weakness of Brumberg and co. relates to 
their failure to provide a novel perspective with which to interpret political change.
authoritarianism’, whilst Clifford Geertz had talked o f Moroccan regime’s efforts to liberalise the 
economy whilst retaining the upper hands on the political process as ‘authoritarian liberalism’ [1979].
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Yet, the analytical value of this literature goes beyond the mere acknowledgement of the 
failure of the transition framework. Besides questioning the democratic content of Arab 
regimes, the liberalised autocracy view unveils the rationale of political reforms in the 
region. It reveals that formal moves towards liberalisation have enriched the repertoire of 
rulers’ survival strategies, providing a set of antidotes to the legitimacy crisis pervading the 
relationship that Arab states entertain with their societies, rather than a real remedy to the 
destabilising causes and effects of state weakness. Contrary to ‘pacted transitions’, where 
challenges to autocrats generally result in the official incorporation of opposition groups, 
and a consequently broader enfranchisement of the citizenry, liberalised autocracy results 
from “a protracted cycle in which rulers widen or narrow the boundaries of participation and 
expression in response to what they see as the social, economic, political and geostrategic 
challenges facing their regimes” [Brumberg, 2002: 57]. According to Robinson [1998: 387] 
the process of “defensive democratisation” is best understood “as a series of pre-emptive 
measures designed to maintain elite privilege ... while limiting the appeal of more 
fundamental political change”. “Uncertain about its ability to survive a deepening crisis”, 
continues Robinson, “the regime undertakes sufficient reforms to assure its political 
longevity, but without altering the core structures of power”. The best example is provided 
by the instrumental use of elections to portray an appearance of democratic 
institutionalisation abroad, whilst in truth establishing an ‘official political society’ in 
which elections are used to reward or sanction friendly or innocuous political parties, whilst 
opposition groups posing a real threat are generally excluded from the competition.15
The way the liberalised autocracy literature treats the development of associational life in 
Arab countries also represents an emancipation from the Tocquevillian framework. On the 
one hand, the focal point is still the questioning of the assumption of the associative sphere 
as a precondition of democracy which exposes the introduction of associative pluralism as 
having no significant effect on the advent of democracy. If Brumberg for instance makes the 
general point that “civil society organisations [have not] been able to pierce the armour of 
liberalised autocracy” [2002: 3], Wiktorowicz [2002] highlights the ‘limits of NGOs’ in 
breaking state control, whilst Yom denounces the general failure of civil society to bring 
forward democracy [2005]. On the other hand though, the significance of associational life 
is more explicitly analysed in the context of rulers’ survival strategies. The literature 
identifies three main functions played by the associative sphere in making up for the effects 
of state weakness. The first is the safety valve function, whereby associational life is a way
15 For the Algerian case, see Roberts, 2003, op. cit.
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for governments to allow “opposition groups a way to blow off steam [without] 
undermining the regime’s ultimate control [Brumberg, 2003: 6]. The second is the divide 
and rule function. Here, the associative sphere becomes the battleground used for the 
“juggling act central to regime survival” to weaken opposition groups, through divisional 
and cooptation tactics [Brumberg, 2002: 61 & 2003: 5; Yom, 2005]. The third is the social 
control function. “Civil society organisations -  writes Wicktorowitcz - remain “embedded in 
a web of bureaucratic practices and legal codes which allow those in power to monitor and 
regulate their activities” and those of the individuals and groups populating the associative 
realm [2000].
Despite the range of perspectives it opens up, ultimately there are two problems with the 
way this literature treats associational life. The first is the still limited attention paid to it. 
The associative sphere is generally mentioned in passing, neglecting a more focused 
exploration of its functional role within liberalised autocracies. Secondly, this literature 
tends to remain stuck in a top-down perspective. From a tendency to treat the associative 
sphere as a realm where citizens could work towards ‘democratisation from the bottom up’, 
civil society becomes a tool in the hands of the state to control society from the top.
Taking Algeria as a case study, this study aims to add to our understanding of the role 
played by associational life in the political economy of liberalised autocracies. The approach 
taken maintains the double use of civil society as interpretative tool and research object, but 
it reverses the perspective used and the questions asked. Instead of a tool to explore the 
dynamics of “contestation between state and society”, civil society becomes a prism for the 
analysis of movements of appeasement, reconciliation and adjustment between the two. 
Rather than a framework to “investigate the ways in which social groups act to protect 
themselves from [the] state”, associations are analysed as the sphere where certain elements 
of society actively seek the protection of the state.
If this involves distancing the analysis from a classic Tocquevillian framework, it does not 
at all mean abandoning the way civil society has been conceptualised by other strands of 
Western political theory. The revival of the idea of civil society has made a selective use of 
Tocqueville’s views on political development. It has focused on the concerns made popular 
by Tocqueville in his Democracy in America, but neglected those he expressed later, which 
went in somewhat different directions. In the analysis of the newly conquered territory of 
Algeria made in his capacity of Member of the French Chamber of Deputies, in which he 
described the place as less propitious to civilised government than any he had ever seen, 
Tocqueville’s preoccupation was no longer the limitation of central power, but the
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establishment of a functional political order built on a centralised modem state capable of 
acquiring legitimacy in the eyes of the ‘natives’ [Klausen, 2002, Pease, 1999].
In very much the same way, contemporary mainstream definitions of civil society tend to 
neglect the earliest usages of the term. This explicitly included the ideas of political order, 
legitimacy and centralised power - ideas finding their roots in Hobbes’ conceptualisation of 
civil society as the basis of state sovereignty. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, where civil 
society represents at once the ‘outer bulwarks’ of the state through which the ruling class 
maintains its dominance over society, but also the sphere where different social groups 
perform a war of attrition to position themselves within or against the hegemonic field, is 
the latest manifestation of this view [Gramsci, 1975].
It is by embracing this reading of civil society that this study asks a) to what extent has 
Algerian associational life contributed to democracy and b) what role has it played in the 
political economy of the legitimacy crisis affecting Algeria’s weak state. By highlighting the 
extent to which associational life has hindered - rather than boosted - Algeria’s 
democratisation process, the study shows some of the functions the associative sphere has 
performed in addressing the causes and effects of state weakness. The discussion examines 
whether the blossoming of civic associations - normally presumed to be a sign and a vector 
of political change -  actually represents an element of conservation of some of the 
institutional arrangements regulating state-society relations and at the same time a vehicle 
for the joint responses put in place by sectors of the state and society to mend their broken 
relation.
The political functions o f associational life
The revival of the neo-TocqueviIlian notion of civil society is built on a series of more or 
less explicit assumptions assigning voluntary associations a functional role in promoting 
democracy. The articulation and questioning of these assumptions provides the backbone of 
the book. By adopting the idea of “plausible rival hypotheses” as explanatory strategy, each 
chapter tests the application of these assumptions to the Algerian case and tries to develop 
alternative explanations. The argument therefore aims at seeking rival explanations for the 
same set of events [Campbell, 1989: 7] by comparing each theory with the actual course of 
events, or the same set of events with a different hypothesis and possibly a different theory 
[Yin, 1989: 16].
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Chapter 2, drawing on limited available sources, provides an introductory overview of the 
development of the associative sphere in colonial and post-colonial Algeria. The aim of the 
chapter is to frame the period under study (1987-2005) in broader historical terms, and 
clarify why 1987 is taken as cut off date for the start of the more in-depth analysis. The 
discussion identifies a number of continuities and discontinuities in the state’s relation to the 
associative sphere which are important to understanding the latter’s subsequent 
development. More specifically, it shows that that the contemporary identification of the 
associative movement as a source of opposition to the authoritarian state neglects, or indeed 
misinterprets, the substantially different role it played at other stages of the process of 
political liberalisation.
The functions played by associational life in the political economy of economic reform are 
dealt with in chapter 3. According to mainstream civil society frameworks, the presence and 
activity of voluntary associations are consequences of and at the same time provide a 
solution to the effects of the state’s retreat from the public space, and more specifically from 
its service-provision roles. This argument has been at the centre of a global agenda aimed at 
going beyond the binary division of state and market by ‘empowering civil society’, an 
agenda which has been termed as a ‘post-Washington consensus’ [Fine, 1999, 2001]. The 
argument developed tries to -  in Yom’s words - question this “zero-sum logic, whereby 
more civil society means less state, and a strong civic sector means a weaker regime” [Yom, 
2005]. The discussion shows that rather than contributing to fill the gap in public service 
provision left by the retreating state, the associative sphere became instrumental in 
alleviating the pressures placed on the authorities for failing to deliver.
The idea that civic associations shape people’s moral dispositions, and that this has direct 
and indirect consequences for democratic politics, is the Tocquevillian theme from which 
chapter 4 starts. In addition to questioning the image of Algeria’s dense associational life 
conveyed by academic portrayals, donor reports and media accounts, the chapter asks 
whether associations are indeed the product of high levels of social capital and trust present 
in Algerian society, or whether more material incentives are at play, incentives which 
emerge from the consequences of political and economic decay pervading the country in the 
1990s.
The limits of the contemporary identification of the associative movement as an engine of 
democratisation are further tested in chapter 5, which considers whether the associative 
sphere constitutes a realm for the activation of political participation, opposition and 
contestation. The chapter analyses the social bases of associational life to question the
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degree of autonomy of the associative sphere from the state and shows the role this played 
in tempering the fracture between the state and some of the social groups which had 
constituted the main beneficiaries of the post colonial political framework, and the main 
victims of its collapse.
Chapter 6 tests the proposition that civil society organisations legitimate and strengthen 
representative political institutions, such as parties and parliament. The 2004 Presidential 
confirmation of Abdelaziz Bouteflika through elections which the internationally 
community deemed as ‘fair by regional standards’16 appeared to break a decade long period 
of electoral rounds rigged in the procedures and doctored in the results. The start of 
Bouteflika’s second term also coincided with an apparently more restrained political role of 
the military since the aborted elections of 1992. The discussion questions the extent to 
which this can be considered as a positive sign for a return to democracy in the country. By 
looking at the interplay between the associative realm and the party sphere, the discussion 
highlights a key function played by the associative movement - preserving the dominance of 
the executive in the political system despite the introduction of multi-partism.
Donors’ use of civil society organisations in democracy promotion programmes and the 
more general idea that cross-border civic interactions between non governmental 
organisations (NGOs) from the North and South gives rise to pressures for change in 
authoritarian settings is analysed in chapter 7. The discussion shows that rather than limiting 
the sovereignty of the Algerian state, the donor community’s focus on the country’s 
associative sphere has contributed to the state’s efforts to preserve its international 
legitimacy.
Researching Algerian associational life
In Algeria - and in other countries whose regulatory framework is modelled on or derived 
from the French system -  ‘association’ (jam ‘iyyat) means a private, generally non-profit 
organisation independent of the state, whose establishment and operations are nonetheless 
regulated by law. In Algeria, as in the course of this study, terms such as ‘associational life’,
16 The statement was made by Bruce George o f  the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly during a press 
conference held immediately after the closing o f polling stations. Together with Anne-Marie Lizin, a 
Belgian Senator also part o f the delegation, George expressed the opinion that the elections had been 
carried out in a proper manner. For an opposite view, see Steven A. Cook, “Algeria’s Elections: No 
Democratic Turning Point,” Carnegie Endowment fo r  International Peace, Arab reform Bulletin 2, 
no. 4 (April 2004).
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‘associative sphere’, and ‘associative movement’ are equally used to refer to the set of 
associations active in the country, and at the same time the institutional space they occupy 
as well as the social and material practices characterising their activities. Debating societies, 
Islamic charities, development NGOs, consumers’ organisations, members’ clubs, 
foundations and advocacy organisations such as human rights and women’s groups all fall 
under the broad category of associations, and all are regulated by the same law.17
This vast reservoir of organisational activity has constituted the main object of this study, 
which draws on research undertaken between October 2000 and January 2006 based on 
primary and secondary sources. Primary material mainly derives from a) semi-structured 
and unstructured key informant interviews; b) mainly unpublished material produced by 
various associations; c) unpublished donors’ reports; d) classified records concerning some 
150 associations held by the wilaya (govematorate) of Algiers. This material was collected 
during eight months field research carried out between July 2001 and February 2002 in 
Algiers, Oran, Tizi Ouzou, GhardaTa, complemented by additional research trips in October 
2002 and November -  December 2004.
The interviews primarily targeted associations’ members and representatives, Algerian 
government officials, politicians, donors’ representatives, and Western NGO workers, as 
well other entrepreneurs, public sector employees, and other types of informants orbiting 
around the associative sphere.18 Informants were identified via a classic snowball technique: 
a restricted set of actors was selected mainly through secondary sources and initial 
exploratory contacts. During the interview, each actor was encouraged to reveal their ties to, 
or opinions of, other actors. These new actors were in turn contacted, and a new focal group 
formed from which a new cycle began. One of the benefits of this method is that it allows 
for the triangulation of both the information and the perspectives acquired during each 
interview, leading hopefully to a more balanced interpretation.
17 Law 90-31, 04 December 1990
18 A detailed list o f people interviewed is included in the Annex.
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Chapter 2. From repression to instrumental use: associational life through colonial 
and postcolonial times
Introduction
In 2004, Ali Fawzi Rebaine -  the leader of a small opposition party called Ahd ’54 {The 
Oath o f 1954) - surprised observers of Algerian politics by successfully gathering enough 
signatures to take part in the Presidential elections. A clear outsider, Rebaine ended up with 
less then one percent of the vote, and joined the chorus of those questioning the fairness of 
the electoral procedures and Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s victory. Here is how, a couple of years 
before, he remembered his political upbringing:
I come from a family involved in politics. My mother and father, my brothers and even my aunts, 
all took part in the liberation war. Not all o f them were involved in politics later on. My father 
had been in the unions. My granduncle wrote the Soumman platform,19 and became a minister 
[under Ben Bella] but retired from politics after the [1965] coup. In the 1980s I had friends in the 
Berber Cultural Movement. Around 1984/85 when I was about to get out o f prison for some 
demonstrations -  some o f them told me they had constituted an association o f Enfants des 
Chouhadas [Children o f the Martyrs o f the Revolution] and that they wanted to set up a network 
o f associations at national level, but they were stuck in Tizi [Ouzou]. What we wanted was to 
defend the memory o f the martyrs, to prevent the state from speaking in the name o f our fathers. 
We decided to stop the official commemorations o f the dates o f  the revolution -  the 5th o f July, 
the 1st o f November etc. Some o f these people were also involved in the creation of the first 
league o f  human rights. The day they arrested us, on the 5th o f  July 1985, there were 300 o f us. 
Despite the climate o f fear back then, and the reluctance to meet up in public, we were many. 
From Algiers, Boumerdes, Chief, Blida.20
The period from the mid-1980s to the army coup in 1992 can be called the time of Algeria’s 
‘associative spring’, a time when groups representing a range of diverse political interests 
started emerging from the widening cracks of the state’s faltering legitimacy. It was also the 
time when long-lasting views of Algeria’s associative sphere were formed. Drawing on the 
oppositional stance that members of underground groups like Rebaine’s held towards the 
state, these views combined with mainstream notions of civil society and democratisation to 
influence the interpretation of the associative sphere’s impact on Algeria’s political
19 The Platform o f the Soummam Congress o f the FLN in August 1956 provided a political manifesto 
calling for a free, independent and democratic Algeria. It was drafted by a small team supervised by 
Abane Ramdane and including in particular Amar Ouzegane, Ali Fawzi Rebaine’s great uncle.
20 Interview with Ali-Fawzi Rebaine, President o f Ahd 54, Algiers 15 January 2002
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development for years to come. This interpretation though is as limited as the period on 
which it draws.
The following discussion lays the ground for a reinterpretation of the relationship between 
state and associative sphere by taking a longer view. By looking at the period between the 
emergence of the associative sphere in colonial Algeria and the start of the political 
liberalisation process in the 1980s, it reveals a number of continuities and discontinuities in 
the state-associations relationship which have been neglected by the more recent literature on 
the impact of “civil society” on the country’s politics.
Cafes, nadis, and sport clubs in the demise o f colonial Algeria
Although Algerian society has been characterised by forms of autonomous organisation 
active outside the sphere of the state and independent of the government long before the 
colonial period, such as corporations, religious lodges (zaouias), brotherhoods (turuq) or 
village assemblies (jama'dt), the beginning of associational life in its modem form takes 
place with the French conquest, and more explicitly with the enactment of the 1901 law on 
freedom of association. From then on, associational life flourished under French rule, 
becoming a characteristic feature of colonial society and reflecting at the same time its more 
general features. Though not exceptional, the presence of Algerians in settlers’ associations 
was in fact rare,21 and the associative sphere in its initial development generally reflected the 
central dynamic of colonial rule: the separation of coloniser and colonised [Ageron, 1968].
This though did not prevent Algerians from establishing their own associations. As noted by 
Carlier [1995: 43-65], particularly since the 1920s, the country experienced the 
multiplication of associations called nadi -  Arabic for ‘circle’ or ‘society’. Appearing around 
1910 in conjunction with the emergence of the Young Algerians movement (Mouvement des 
Jeunes Algeriens), the popularity of the nadi reached its apogee around the time of the 
Muslim Congress in 1936. Often characterised by multiple (sporting, philanthropic, cultural, 
etc.) objectives, nadis generally found their recruits from the ranks of the newly formed 
Algerian elite (liberal professions, teachers, intellectuals, public servants and Muslim clergy) 
[Carlier, 1995: 43]. Moreover, though characteristic of the major Algerian cities (Algiers, 
Oran, Constantine, Tlemcen), nadis appeared even in middle and small towns in the interior.
21 For example, during the course of its entire history, from its foundation in 1878 to independence in 
1962, the Oran Geographical Society accepted 86 Algerians as members, an average o f one a year. In 
1939 the association counted 689 members. [Benkada, 1999: 124]
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By the end of the thirties, the nadi had become the main centre of socialisation for the 
Algerian intelligentsia, and radically transformed the political opportunities of upper middle 
class Muslims.
Although the colonial administration tried to keep ‘native’ associations under tight control, 
the associative movement soon became central not only to the socialisation of the elites, but 
also to their politicisation. The evolution of the Association of Muslim Ulama is interesting 
in this respect. Created on 5th of May 1931 in Algiers by Abdelhamid Ben Badis [1889- 
1940], the Association was initially characterised by a religious and ethical agenda which 
later became increasingly loaded with pro-independence stances. In the same way, from a 
vehicle for resisting colonial hegemony, the associative sphere became central to the 
organisation of the nationalist movement which led the liberation war against the French 
[Lacheraf, 1967]. Both the Etoile Nord Africaine and Messali Hadj’s Algerian People’s Parti 
(PPA) -  the two main political formations preparing the ground for the emergence of the 
National Liberation Front {Front de Liberation Nationale -  FLN) - benefited from an 
extensive network of associations. To exploit their revolutionary capacity though, the elites 
gathering around the nadi had to meet with the masses.
The popular counterpart to the nadi was the cafe. It constituted the aggregating centre for the 
masses: the city’s workers and traders met up there and there welcomed the newcomers, 
people that had left the interior to find a job in the urban centres. In the cafe, the newly 
urbanised exchanged news from home regions, and rumours about events in the capital and 
the country in general. Newspapers were exchanged, and with them the popular commentary 
on the news. For many the cafe’s chairs constituted the first opportunities for talking politics. 
Both the result of urbanisation, nadi and cafe were geographically close, but socially 
separated: the nadi was highly exclusive and structured, the cafe on the other hand was 
inclusive and disorganised. Yet, in a dialectic twist typical of much late colonial history, 
these two separate worlds were to be connected by those against whom they would rise, the 
French.
Particularly during the period immediately preceding and following the 2nd World War, the 
two worlds of the elite {khassa) and those of the mass ( ‘amma) did to some degree find a 
common ground in the associative experiences set up by the colonial power, most notably in 
French professional and trade unions, mass organisations, cultural societies, music and sport 
associations [Entelis, 1995; Carlier, 1995: 45]. As Entelis [1996: 55] points out “politicised 
Algerian civil society owes its origins to the pre-revolutionary period, when it absorbed 
much from the French notions of associational life and state-society relations”. While based
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on colonial cultural values, these organisations provided places of exchange for those who 
came from the nadi and those who belonged to the cafe More interestingly, they 
increasingly provided a meeting point for the Algerian youth of different social backgrounds, 
the same youth that in 1954 would start the war of liberation. So, although at the time of its 
appearance in Algerian cities the nadi was limited to Muslim cultural, intellectual and 
commercial elites, its combination with proto-associative spaces (the cafe) and with colonial 
associative experiences (the sport club, the union, etc), contributed to mobilise the people 
fighting for the liberation war. Liberation in turn produced a completely different elite, 
forged through war, in which the social categories that had belonged to the Muslim urban 
circles -  professionals, intellectuals, bureaucrats -  and that had formed a vanguard in 
mobilising support for the war -  no longer had a place.22 Equally, during most of 
independent Algeria there was no place for nadis, clubs or civic associations either.
Independence, incorporation and repression
Immediately after the war of liberation associations began to flourish again, but already 
under the Ben Bella presidency (1962-1965) the regime’s attitude towards them was one of 
tolerance rather than enthusiasm. A first law on freedom of association was promulgated 
immediately after independence, on the 31st December 1962, with the aim of officially 
reinstating the 1901 law on freedom of association. Nevertheless, through a series of decrees, 
circulars and ordinances the authorities subsequently reinterpreted the law, restricting its 
liberal character. A 1964 administrative circular by the Ministry of Interior instructed the 
walis (prefects, governors) to carry out thorough investigations on the “real aims” of any 
newly formed association and prevent the constitution of any group “that under the cover of 
social, cultural or artistic activities, could constitute a threat to the state’s internal or external 
security23 [Dahak,1982]. One notable casualty of this was Jam ‘iyyat Al-Qiyyam al-Islamiyya 
(The Islamic Values Association), a conservative Islamic grouping established in 1964.24 
The association was first disbanded in 1966, and then dissolved in 1970 [Moore, 1999; 
Roberts, 1988 and 2003], together with another Islamic association, Djourtoud Allah.25
22 Leca and Vatin (469-470) discuss how intellectuals and bourgeois strata were excluded by the core 
combination o f leading elites after 1965, with the fall o f Ben Bella. The consequences o f the liberation 
war on the bourgeoisie and its relation to the newly established pouvoir are further explained in 
Etienne (1977: 56-60).
23 Ministry o f  Interior Circulaire 2 March 1964, see Dahak,1982 annexes 8-14
24 On al-Qiyyam, see Hugh Roberts, ‘Radical Islamism and the Dilemma o f Algerian Nationalism: 
The Embattled Arians of Algiers’ Third World Quarterly, 10, 2 (April 1988): 556-89, Hugh Roberts 
North African Islamism’, for a specific reference to al-Qiyyam’s position vis-a-vis women, see Knauss 
[1992]
25 Algerie-Actualite N o .U 2 2 ,16 April 1987.
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In an attempt to depoliticise social divisions under the unifying flag of Algerian socialism, 
the state established a system of supervision structured around a number of mass 
organisations carrying out its mobilisation project, and took a progressively harder stance 
towards independent associations. The 1971 ordinance26 crystallised and reinforced the 
authorities’ bridling tactic, by hardening the procedures for granting official recognition to 
associations. Art 2 of the 1971 ordinance put in place a system of ‘double recognition’ 
whereby, in addition to requesting the consent of Wali (for local associations) or the Ministry 
of Interior (for national associations), any newly created association had to request a 
preliminary agreement of the Ministry overseeing the sphere of activity covered by the 
association itself- health, youth, culture, etc [Babadji, 1989:229]. According to Dahak [1982], 
this restrictive ordinance and its applicative decree were primarily motivated by the hostility 
expressed by certain religious brotherhoods towards the objectives of the Agrarian 
Revolution, which was started a month before the introduction of the ordinance.27
Following Boumediene’s death in 1978, the size and features of the associative field 
changed, as did the attitude of the state vis-a-vis independent associations. This process went 
hand in hand with the beginning of the demise of one of the premises of the state’s 
legitimacy -  the notion of Algeria’s unanimous society. The riots exploding in Kabylia in 
1980 following the cancellation by the authorities of a university lecture in the capital Tizi 
Ouzou signalled the problematic integration of the Kabyle region in the process of Algeria’s 
state formation. The 1980 ‘Berber spring’ -  as it came to be known -  saw the birth of the 
Berber Cultural Movement (Mouvement Culturel Berbere -  MCB), a loose organisation 
calling for the recognition of the Berber identity (Amazighite) and language (tamazight) and 
based on the clandestine associative network which had developed in Kabylia [AYssani, 
2001].28 From being rooted essentially in the greater Kabylia and Algerois regions, over the 
course of the years the Berberist associative sector expanded as myriads of associations 
mushroomed in Algeria’s coastal towns.29 Although their stated purpose was often the 
simple propagation of the Berber identity and culture, these associations were fundamental in 
providing the ideological material and human capital feeding opposition parties such as the
26 Ordinance 71-79, 3 December 1971; Journal Ofificiel de la Republique Algerien, p.678
27 This appears as a striking parallel to the debate around the introduction o f the 1901 law on freedom 
o f association in France, in which the Interior Minister Waldeck Rousseau was accused o f  using it as 
an instrument against religious congregations in the fight for la laicite (see Le Monde editorial on the 
centennial of the Law o f 01/07/01 ‘Long vie aux associations’ in Le Monde 20/06/01).
28Most notably the Amugas association founded in Algiers by Mouloud Mammeri et Ben Mohamed, 
and the Twizi association in Tizi-Ouzou [AYssani, 2001]. For the tension between the cultural and the 
political in Berber associations, see Chaker, 1989.
9 Haut Commissariat a I’Amazaghite ‘le r  Annuaire des Associations Culturelles Amazighes’ Algiers 
2000
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Socialist Forces Front {Front des Forces Socialistes -  FFS) and, later, the Rally for culture 
and Democracy {Rassemblement pour la culture et la Democratie — RCD) [Chaker, 1989].
The first women’s rights groups to be established in Algeria also appeared during the early 
1980s. Their birth was spurred by the government’s attempts to pass discriminatory 
legislation concerning the legal status of women and their role in society, legislation which 
later became commonly known as the Family Code.30 The first independent women’s 
committee was created in 1981, in Algiers and Oran, followed by an association called Isis, 
which fought against the promulgation of a draft Family Code [Daoud, 1992: 174]. The 
universities provided the milieu where groups including Egalite, Triomphe, and Ahlan were 
subsequently created.31 As with Berberist associations, the women’s movement was 
fundamental in the constitution of the most secular elements of Algeria’s party sphere,32 
supplying it with a political agenda and charismatic young leaders such as Louisa Hanoune 
(later leader of the Parti des Travailleurs - PT ), Khalida Messaoudi (RCD) and Nacera 
Merad. [Knauss, 1992:161; Gadant & Harbi, 1995; Daoud, 1996; Lazreg, 2000].
But by far the most important section of the associative movement growing in the 1980s was 
that of religious associations. Limited to a few hundreds in the 1970s,33 during the following 
decade Algeria experienced an explosion of religious associations, whose mission often 
revolved around the construction of mosques or the organisation of the hadj, to the extent 
that by 1987 the country counted several thousand religious associations scattered over the 
entire territory [Sgrena, 1997: 26]. These organisations provided much of the mobilisation 
network that allowed for the sudden emergence and immediate vigour of the Islamic 
Salvation Front {Front Islamique de Salut) in 1989.
Comprehending the position of these groups vis-a-vis the authorities is important to 
understanding the impact Algeria’s associative spring had on the country’s political 
development in the following decades. Despite their own distinct outlook and objectives, 
what was common to religious, women’s and Berber associations was their challenge to the 
state, which they felt lacked the legitimacy it ostensibly enjoyed due to its increasingly 
apparent failure to deliver on the promises of the revolution. As the story of generational 
divide depicted in Rebaine’s account points out, those active during Algeria’s associative 
spring defined themselves as much in terms of the competing images of society that their
30 Under the impact o f the demonstrations, President Chadli Benjedid withdrew the Family Code, only 
to present it again to the National Assembly in 1984, when it was approved.
31 Chapter 4 and 6 contain more details on the birth o f these associations and the way they evolved.
32 Gadant Monique et Harbi, Mohamed (1995) ‘Quel pole d£mocratique’ Esprit n.208 Jan.
33 In April 1980, the wilaya o f Algiers included a total o f 187 religious associations.
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associations advocated and pursued as of their strained relationship to the state which had 
raised, but now was abandoning, them. Formally illegal, but if innocuous generally tolerated, 
women’s groups, Berber grassroots and Islamic charities lived for years in constant tension 
with the state, in a juridical limbo where their existence depended on the mood of the 
authorities, until finally this mood changed.
From repression to instrumental use
Far from being straightforward, the authorities’ reaction to the emergence of autonomous 
associations beween the mid-1980s and 1992 sheds light on the way the state has related to 
the associative sphere ever since. Besides a number of repressive measures involving the 
disbanding and dissolution of dozens of associations and the imprisonment of their members, 
the state started co-opting the discourse of the most vocal and combative groups. The mass 
organisations were its first tool to this end. To contrast the emerging women’s groups, the 
state proceeded to placate the Union Nationale des Femmes Algeriennes, which had long 
constituted an internal source of conflict for the government as much as a tool for 
mobilising women’s support. In turn, the UGTA set up its own women’s section, as did the 
Union Nationale des Etudiants. When the mass organisations were of no use, the authorities 
proceeded to the outright creation of friendly groups - the story of the two leagues of human 
rights is a case in point.34 And finally, as the legitimacy crisis of the Algerian state was 
rapidly spiralling out of control, repression gave way to encouragement.
Consciously motivated as a means to smooth the way for state disengagement from service 
provision (health, culture etc) in the aftermath of the fiscal crisis provoked by the 1985 drop 
in oil prices, the start of the Algerian debate around freedom of association in the mid-1980s 
coincided with the years in which the FLN came to experience generalised disrepute in the 
eyes of the population, and increasing questioning of its monopoly of political 
representation. There are various and yet largely converging interpretations of why the 
authorities decided to proceed to the introduction of the first law on freedom of association 
in 1987.35 According to Harbi [1989: 138], the 1987 law was part of a general strategy 
recommended by the military and approved by the presidency and aimed at reformulating the 
state’s relation to society by using means different from the discredited FLN and its satellite
34 The motives and events accounting for the almost simultaneous creation o f two human righs 
associations in Algeria at the end o f the 1980s are explored in chapter 6.
35 Law 87-15 21st July 1987. A second law was enacted in 1990, and remained in force until 2005.
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organisations [Babadji, 1989: 238].36 This interpretation coincides with Kapil’s view that 
through the 1987 law, the political aim of the president and his reformist allies in the army 
and higher technocratic echelons of the administration was to allow the growth of an 
“associational field strictly controlled by the state, but completely autonomous from the 
FLN” [1990: 510]. As Roy explains, the state’s crisis of political legitimacy, which 
materialised in the crisis of political representation and in the crisis of the party of the FLN, 
made it necessary to invent new intermediaries between the state and society and new forms 
of political legitimation [Roy, 1994: 276]. Through the introduction of freedom of 
association, a seemingly minor political move, the pouvoir -  or more specifically certain 
elements of it -  was seeking novel bases for its legitimisation through the “representation of 
[new] social links with the national community” [Carlier, 1989: 129].
This is how Khalida Messaoudi, women’s rights activist in the 1980s, Member of Parliament 
for the opposition party of the Rally for Culture and Democracy (Rassemblement pour la 
culture et la Democratie - RCD) in the 1990s and finally Minister in Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s 
governments after 2000, remembered the emergence of the first groups of activists as a 
dialectical development of the single party’s hegemony, while hinting at the same time at the 
instrumental reasons behind the state’s new attitude vis-a-vis these groups in the 1980s:
“I’m now 43 years old, and 70% of Algerians are less then 30 years old. Back then the freedom 
to meet was not yet there, there was the singly party, a party-state and mass organisations 
attached to the party. We were the generation in which all hopes were placed. They had liberated 
the country; we had to develop it. For the political rhetoric we were 7es forces vives de la  
nation'. And when I compare myself to my nieces, they cannot understand what it was. My 
experience does not resemble theirs. They might perhaps own a pair of trainers that I could not 
have. But we had something more solid, like the quality o f teaching, and we were considered to 
be precious. And it was our teachers - mainly feminists - that shaped us, that helped us convince 
ourselves that the single party was the real cause o f our misfortunes. And therefore it was clear to 
us that in order to take things forward we had to organise autonomously. My father was a small 
secretary general o f my town, and my mum a housewife with 8 kids to take care of. I had access 
to the university because education was free, and o f high quality. Hence a little elite o f students, a 
little vanguard. We were the consequence o f all that. But we were naive, because back then we 
did not understand that the state was using us”. 37
36 On the circumstances surrounding the introduction of the 1987 law, see chapter 3.
37 Interview with Khalida Messaoudi, Minister o f Communication, former President o f Rachda,
Algiers 23 January 2002
36
From repression to instrumental use
Understandably, the FLN strongly opposed the opening up of the corporatist system to the 
new associations, fearing to lose the benefits accrued by its monopoly in the utilisation of its 
satellite organisations. Harbi [1989:137] suggests that the FLN’s harsh defensive reaction to 
the new law was further enhanced by the climate of economic instability generated by 
increasing talk of impending economic reforms: the prospect of the free market seemed to 
not only jeopardize labour, but also endanger party cadres’ stable political careers at the top 
of the state, and the political capital accrued from privileges and connections. But there were 
far more important reasons for the FLN to oppose the 1987 law, which in the corridors of 
power was clearly perceived as a means to do away with the single party, through “the 
regularisation of an associative movement of a religious bent, the actual political reservoir of 
Islamic parties” [Musette,2000:103]. According to Ministry of Interior figures, by 1987 
Algeria counted more than 11,000 religious associations.38 In letting the Islamist associative 
field grow, the Chadli government was going against the earlier post colonial tradition - 
evident since the disbandment of al-Qiyam - of severity vis-a-vis organised Islam, in line 
with what Roberts described as the “hegemony of Algerian nationalism over Algerian 
Islamism” [2003:23]. This change in attitude derived not only from a strategic 
reconsideration of the state’s relationship with society, but also from the shifting institutional 
equilibria between party and presidency, and the balance of influence affecting the different 
factions within the power structure -  including the army -  as a whole. In addition to being 
meant as a general disassociation from the discredit affecting the Party of the FLN, the 
Presidency’s support to associations was part of a longer term strategy of appeasement 
towards the religious wing of the party, and its increasing following in society, which in part 
aimed at counterbalancing the party’s internal opposition to Chadli’s neo-liberal reform 
agenda.
The Chadli Presidency defined the premises of the state’s relation to the associative 
movement for the decades to come. It marked a turning point for the authorities’ stance 
towards associations, which shifted from sheer repression to a more discerning, and at times 
conciliatory, position. This position was accentuated after Chadli’s resignation in 1992 
following the army’s intervention to cancel the second round of national elections that was 
going to assign a large majority of parliamentary seats to the Islamic Salvation Front. As the 
networks of religious associations and leagues supporting the FIS were being disbanded, 
those sections of the associative movement representing those social groups which had 
identified the FIS as a threat to their very existence, sided with the military junta which took
38 El Moudjahid 12 May 1988.
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control of the state to legitimise the new political order.39 In the aftermath of the 1992 coup, 
observers of Algerian politics concerned with the fate of the political reforms in the country 
saluted the attitude of the state vis-a-vis associations as a positive development in the 
democratisation of the country [Garon, 1996:153], thus opening the way to the application of 
neo-tocquevillian perspective to Algerian associational life. Layachi [1995:187] for instance 
wrote: “the spring of 1993 could be rightly called the spring of civil society because it 
witnessed relatively intense interaction between elements of this nascent civil society and the 
state”. The way this interaction has evolved into something completely different from 
democracy has yet to be told.
Conclusions
The changing attitude of the state vis-a-vis the associative sphere can be read as a footnote in 
the history of colonial and post colonial Algeria, or used as an interpretative lens to better 
understand state-society relationships. In the years preceding the introduction of political 
pluralism, the authorities’ repressive stance vis-a-vis associations typical of the years of 
Boumedienne Presidency years gave way to a more ambivalent attitude. This attitude still 
marks state-associations relations today.
In both colonial and post-colonial Algeria the associative movement has given birth to anti- 
systemic oppositions. The networks of cultural associations, and debating societies in 
colonial Algeria provided the main intellectual hub for the development of Algerian 
nationalism. The revolutionary ideas of the intelligentsia combined with the mobilisation 
potential of the less elitist trade unions and sport clubs to produce the intellectual and human 
capital which eventually brought colonial rule down. In post-Boumedienne Algeria, the 
thousands of Islamic charities and mosque building societies which mushroomed in the 
1980s produced the same revolutionary threat, materialising first in the possibility of a 
landslide victory by the FIS, and later in the political violence which fuelled the conflict 
between army and guerrillas. As we shall see, this configuration produced something entirely 
different from the image of confrontation between civil society and the state so often 
portrayed by the literature. Menacing both the state and the social groups opposing the FIS, 
the Islamist threat laid the foundations of a bartering game involving support and legitimacy 
on the one hand, and security and protection on the other.
39 Chapter 6 explores this episode in more detail.
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Chapter 3. Outsourcing failure: state insulation and scapegoat politics in Algeria
Introduction
Between Friday 9th and Saturday 10th November 2001, the Algerian coast was struck by 
prolonged and intense storms which caused death and damage in various parts of the 
country. Nowhere else was the toll higher than in the capital itself. On the dawn of Saturday, 
a chunk of land collapsed from the Bouzareah hill on Algiers’ heights transforming itself 
into a mudslide which submerged the main highway and followed it right into the city’s 
western districts, taking anything to be found on its course into the sea. The way the 
authorities responded to the calamity provides a case study of the role played by the 
associative sector in Algeria’s process of economic reform and state retreat.
Since the incorporation of ‘civil society’ into the 1990s development agenda [Evans, 1996], 
considerable attention has been paid to associations’ role as a remedy to the ‘ineffective 
state’. As the Comaroffs show [1999], the very roots of Western re-appropriations of the 
notion of civil society coincided with the emerging evidence of the manifold shortcomings of 
state-led development in Eastern Europe. Since then the idea of associational life as a 
solution to the failure of the state has accompanied mainstream views of civic associations’ 
role in the processes of economic and political development of countries in the South. 
[Lewis, 2002: 571]. In addition to being identified as actors smoothening state-downsizing 
through the occupation of the service-provision vacuum left by the failing state [Robison, 
1997;], civic associations became identified with forces able to ‘keep the state in check’ and 
bring about the demise of authoritarian politics [Bratton, 1989; Chazan, 1992; Khan, 1997: 
114].
As a piece of UN-sponsored research shows, analyses of civic associations in the Middle 
East reflect these assumptions: “given the gradual retreat of the state from its traditional 
social responsibilities [...] in the Middle East experience ‘pressure from below’ is highly 
relevant to development” [UNSRID, 2000:v]. The emerging associative sectors of the region 
appeared as an opportunity to roll back the failing state as well as strengthen participatory 
forms of political organisation by providing an alternative to top-down processes of 
economic change [Singerman, 1995; Sullivan; Norton, 1994 & 1995; Schwindler, 1995; 
Entelis]. Today, as Jenkins and Goetz notice, “the accepted position is that social networks 
are most likely to solidify into agents for change when the state is in retreat” [1999: 44].
Outsourcingfailure
A closer examination of how voluntary associations provide support to the state is important 
to qualify the validity of these views. The role Algeria’s associative sector played during the 
process of economic reform needs to be assessed against the political conditions 
characterising the inception of the reforms. Until the end of the 1990s, Algeria’s track record 
of economic adjustment and failed democratisation made it appear as a typical case of ‘failed 
state insulation’. In Algeria though, a degree of insulation was effectively achieved, and 
through means different from those normally explored by the literature. As shown by the 
emergence of a discourse which focused on the inefficiencies of Algeria’s associative sector 
and made it complicit in the failures of state retreat from service delivery, associational life 
successfully provided one such means.
Structural disadjustment as insulation failure
At the end of the 1990s, for its initial success at redressing the fiscal imbalances haunting 
macroeconomic stability, Algeria was praised as one of the best pupils of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) [Henry, 1999]. Yet, very clearly the accomplishments on the 
budgetary and debt management sides were not achieved without paying a harsh price 
[Dillman, 1998]. The reform package impinged directly on the economic well-being of the 
population at large, with austerity measures hitting both the demand and supply sides of the 
economy - such as dramatic and unending currency devaluation, massive public sector 
downsizing, subsidies reductions and government spending cut backs in all social and 
cultural domains. Moreover, Algeria’s reacquired balance in its main macroeconomic 
indicators was not matched by resumed growth. A progressive downturn in industrial 
production encouraged years of economic decline, made visible by GDP growth stagnating 
at an average of 1.7% between 1992 and 1999 - 80% lower than the level recommended by 
the World Bank to stabilise unemployment rates at current levels (WB, 2000).
The social and political effects of this process have to be assessed not only in terms of their 
depth, but also in relation to the time span which they occupied. Algeria’s economic 
adjustment was in fact a protracted affair which began well before the signing of the loan 
facility agreement with the IMF in 1994 allowing for debt rescheduling. Economic reforms 
were initiated under the presidency of Chadli Benjedid in the early 1980s, and hastened by 
the collapse of oil prices in the mid 1980s. The consequences for the kind of paternalistic 
welfarism characterising Algeria’s social contract were dramatic and so was the fall of 
Algerians’ living standards. In 2002, facing real GDP per capita falling back to 1975 levels 
and the comeback of hyperinflation, Algerians entered the third decade of economic decline.
40
Outsourcingfailure
This track record prompted the Economic and Social National Council (CNES) - a think tank 
composed of government-appointed members - to define the achievements of the reform 
programme as a prime example o f ‘structural disadjustment’.40 What had gone wrong?
A wide body of literature explains the success and failures of economic adjustment by 
focusing on the political conditions prevailing at the inception of the reforms. One strand 
asserts that a condition of ‘state insulation’ is necessary to carry out effective 
macroeconomic restructuring. Drawing on David Easton’s framework of political system 
[1965], state insulation can be defined as a condition by which the organisations of 
government -  which in Easton’s terms mean the decision-making departments of the state, 
such as the executive, the parliament, or the military -  are able to retain power after 
decreasing the amount of resources allocated. Despite a demand overload, the protection 
from the pressures of public demands make it possible to avoid a reshaping of the political 
system.
The literature points to three preconditions for effective insulation and successful 
adjustment. The first concerns the presence of a core coalition dominating the decision 
making departments of the state and preventing both inner conflicts and external opposition 
from hampering the effective implementation of reforms. Such conditions in turn allow for 
the second prerequisite - a long-term political horizon allowing the core coalition to develop 
a durable strategy for carrying out the reform and to link its political survival to the 
successful implementation of such reforms. [Nelson, 1989 & 1990]. The third precondition 
concerns the presence of an efficient bureaucracy gifted with a well-defined esprit de corps 
and led by a technocratic, change-driven elite [Hirschman, 1999].
Chile and Ghana’s experiences provide two clear examples of adjustment via insulation. 
Economic reforms were started under military-backed presidential regimes which closed the 
political space and reduced opportunities for voicing dissent. In each case, the reform 
policies were implemented by a closed policy making group with strong technocratic 
inclinations (Ghana had her own version of Chile’s ‘Chicago boys’). In carrying out 
adjustment, both countries benefited from bureaucracies with a capacity for quick adaptation 
to new plans or at least which allowed for little or no opposition to new practices, like those 
central to the developmental experiences of Japan and South Korea [Robinson, 1996; Toye,
40 Kamel C. ‘Bilan sans complaisance du CNES’ El Watan 12/06/02. A detailed and concise account 
o f  the mismanagement o f the reform process can be found in Dillman [1998]
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1991; Luckham, 1996: 161].41 In accounting for Ghana’s success story, Callaghy [1990: 277] 
highlights Rawlings’s Provisional National Defence Council’s narrow organisational base, 
and stresses its “insulation” from “important socio-political veto groups”. Haynes [1993: 
455] underlines the closure of the political field achieved through the state’s sheer autocratic 
nature -  hence its insulation from pressures coming from both ‘elite’ and ‘popular’ forces. 
The main conclusion of the state insulation literature is that in the absence of such conditions 
at the inception of reform, preventive measures of political adjustment need to precede 
economic ones.
At the time of the implementation of economic reform Algeria hardly met any of these three 
fundamental conditions. First, instead of being firmly controlled by a core coalition devoted 
to and capable of implementing economic reform, Algeria’s institutions of government were 
ravaged by stalemating divides.42 The nature of these divides was widely portrayed by 
western observers to be centred on the question of economic reform itself -the hardliners in 
favour of the status quo against the group of technocrats gravitating around the presidency. It 
was also believed to be impinging purely on the single party’s internal balances. In reality, 
such divisions went deeper and further than the FLN. Economic reform was in fact just one 
of the many issues on which the state’s inner alliances were being reshaped through the 
interplay of army, party and bureaucracy [Roberts, 1994].
Second, instead of constituting the driving policy around which the reformers’ attention and 
political survival revolved, the prospective implementation of adjustment raised distracting 
scenarios. According to Kapil [1990: 511], in the second half of the 1980s, following the 
collapse of oil prices, policymaking did revolve around the awareness of having to solve the 
state’s financial crisis. The outcome of this awareness though was not the efficient tackling 
of the crisis, but three new aims including a) the realisation of the opportunities for personal 
enrichment emerging from the reforms, especially through the granting of import licenses 
and opportunities to partake in the benefits of the privatisation schemes [Tlemfani, 1999]; b) 
scenarios of factional conflict aggravated by the reforms themselves, which pushed state 
actors at all levels to devote vast political energies to their solution; and c) the necessity to
41 It is interesting to note how these very experiences have recently attracted ample interest in Algeria. 
South Korea’s developmental state’s role constituted the central issue o f the conference ‘Quel 
D^veloppement Pour I'Alg^rie?’ organised by the FORUM des Chefs d'Entreprises and held in 
Algiers on 19th January 2002 (See Lettre du Forum, n.8, Feb. 2002), while the comparison o f  
Algeria’s adjustment with Pinochet’s Chile often recurs on the economic columns o f  various 
newspapers. For a primary example see the insert dedicated to this point in El Watan 30/07/01.
42 On the divisions between reformers and conservatives, see Ahmed, Kaci ‘Des luttes des classes aux 
luttes de clans’ La Tribune, 3/10/02
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adjust the economy itself, in order to avoid financial collapse. Thus, the political process 
became influenced by day to day considerations which disrupted the quest for a long-term 
strategy to solve the state’s impending financial collapse.
The features of Algeria’s bureaucracy constitute the last missing precondition for insulation. 
In 1990, commenting on the capacity of the last reformist prime minister to conduct the 
reforms, Lahouari Addi maintained that “nobody believes that Mr Hamrouche can 
implement a policy change by relying on the same administrative personnel responsible for 
the preceding stagnation”.43 At the inception of the adjustment efforts, Algerian bureaucrats 
seemed far from the well-trained, dutiful and efficient machine envisaged by the state 
insulation model.44
But besides factional divides, lack of a long-term strategy, and bureaucratic slack, there is 
one fundamental factor motivating Algeria’s insulation failure. It concerns the very decisions 
made by the reform-oriented coalition to open up the political space at a time when social 
discontent was at its height.
Insulation revisited
The interplay between bottom up pressures generated by economic discontent and the 
institutional changes produced in response has been identified as key to explaining Algeria’s 
brisk democratic experience and its following shift to authoritarianism. [Leca & Leveau, 
1993]. This observation can be framed in the literature on the sustainability of democracy in 
times of economic restructuring, exemplified by the works of Adam Przeworsky [1991: 136- 
187; 1995; Robinson, 1996]. Thus, the October 1988 riots have been widely perceived as 
‘bread’ riots pushing political reform [Owen, Murphy, 1998: 79, Sadiki, Seldon & 
Watson].45 Accordingly, the decision to carry out the 1989 democratic opening is interpreted 
as an attempt by Chadli’s clique of reformers to maintain support, by granting democratic 
representation in exchange for a reformulation of the social contract, doing away with the 
paternalistic welfarism of the oil bonanza years [Alexander, 2000: 480; Owen, 1998]. In 
turn, the opening of the political space during the brief democratic interlude rendered the
43 L. Addi ‘Vide de Pouvoir et intolerance. Le Monde Diplomatique, June 1990
44 See for instance various dossiers and articles appearing since at least 1987 on Algerie Actualite, 
attacking Algerian bureaucrats for their slackness, inefficiency and underperformance. These attacks 
continue today.
45 For an opposing view on the significance o f the October 1988 events and their characterisation as 
bread riots, see Roberts [2001b]
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state unable to cope with the demand overload, itself generated by increasing social 
grievances and the necessities of adjustment. This made it prey to the populist rhetoric of the 
electoral contender -  the Islamic Salvation Front. The necessity to correct this mistake 
became the motive for the drastic re-closure of the political space carried out through the 
1992 coup. The story often told in the literature is that Algeria’s sequence of economic and 
political reforms became a paradigmatic case of how “simultaneous democratisation and 
structural adjustment proved unworkable” [Dillman, 1998: 5] and of how Algerian political 
elites “got the politics wrong” [Quandt, 1998]. Therefore, according to these views, rather 
than being due to its missing the preconditions for appropriate insulation, Algeria’s 
stalemated political change was due to the fact that its government actually failed to seek 
insulation, implementing instead a totally opposite policy of political opening, with the fatal 
consequences that we know.
These conclusions need revision. By paying closer attention to the conditions under which 
adjustment was carried out, a different set of strategies and opportunities allowing for 
insulation emerge. The first can be defined as a ‘demands swap’ opportunity. Due to 
increased levels of insecurity, public preferences are altered and experience a substitution in 
favour of more demands for security and less for welfare. Demands for the allocation of 
services and material resources decrease, with no need to directly repress dissent. Clement 
Henry forcefully puts this analysis forward by arguing that the enduring climate of violence 
offered an opportunity for the Algerian state to reformulate the social contract. “By 
empowering insecurity [thus] increasing the value of security, the bunker state...revised the 
tacit contract offering welfare” [1999: 1]. In Henry’s words, Algeria’s “paradigm of 
adjustment” is one in which “insulation [was achieved through] the mindless massacres of 
thousands of civilians, enabling] the regime to carry out draconian economic policies”. 
Instead of being the result of failed economic reform, Algeria’s violent stalemate constitutes 
the means towards its very achievement.
A second insulation strategy assumes the features of political diversion. In order to maintain 
legitimacy and authority, the core coalition diverts public attention away from the causes and 
consequences of economic failure by creating and focusing on a new problem. Designating 
an enemy and embarking on a war is the foremost example of political diversion [Hess & 
Orphanides,1995].46 Testas [2002: 170-174] applies the diversionary hypothesis to the
46 It is worth noticing how the very beginning o f French rule in Algeria was itself a form o f diversion. 
Ageron writes: “The expedition o f Algiers was not connected with the colonial policy o f  the 
Restoration Bourbon monarchy, but was a makeshift expedient for internal political consumption, 
carried out by a government in difficulty seeking the prestige o f  a military victory” [1991:5].
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Algerian scenario, by maintaining that the FIS was used as “an internal enemy...in the 
democratic game played by Chadli...to maintain legitimacy and authority” in times of 
economic crisis, a claim supporting Roberts’s view that the FIS was used by Chadli & Co as 
an ally or auxiliary, at least at first [1994]
A subtler version of diversionary politics is achieved through the misrepresentation of 
dissent. In this variant, social discontent is recognised but its causes are diverted from socio­
economic grievances and relegated to realms where solutions can be found or political 
damage can be limited. The riots which started in the spring 2001 in Tizi Ouzou and shook 
the region of Kabylia for several months provide a recent example of dissent 
misrepresentation. Instead of being acknowledged as the long repressed product of mass 
unemployment, overcrowded housing and inadequate social services, the Kabyle riots were 
treated by the government and by the Kabylia-based Rally for Culture and Democracy in 
terms of ‘the Berber identity question’. This enabled the regime to isolate ‘Berber’ Kabylia 
from the rest of the country and to avoid tackling real policy issues, such as the economy 
[Roberts, 2001a].
A third and yet unexplored form of diversionary politics was played through associational 
life. In this scenario, service-delivery failures and economic breakdown are acknowledged, 
but responsibility for them is diverted from the state and positioned on individuals or 
organisations whose function - in the economy of adjustment - is to face discontent and take 
(part of) the blame. In turn, the diversion of responsibility away from the state drives 
sentiments of abandonment, helplessness and uncertainty in the public, thus transferring 
conflict to the level of society and participating in the politics of “empowered insecurity” 
depicted by Henry.47 To explore this, we need to go back to the very moment when the 
discourse on economic reform started being promoted, in conjunction with the state’s 
vigorous endorsement of voluntary associations.
Introducing the scapegoats
Well before civil society became a mainstay of the international development agenda, 
Algeria was already pioneering a discourse promoting the benefits of associational life.48 The
Obviously, neither of the strategies seen above (demands swap and diversionary politics) is confined 
to colonial times, nor to developing countries alone.
47 On uncertainty as a consequence o f ‘social demoralisation’, see Jordan, Bill [2002] 
‘Demoralisation, Exit, and Mobility’ Paper presented for a conference on Demoralisation, Power and 
Authority, Cardiff University, 5th, 6th April.
48 For a discussion o f  the role played by these issues in transforming the 1980s development agenda 
into the post-Washington consensus, see the introduction, and Fine [1999].
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peculiarity of the Algerian case lies not only in the timing, but also in relation to what was 
happening in neighbouring countries. While in Egypt, for instance, service-oriented 
voluntary associations and self-help community groups were undergoing state repression 
[Singerman, 1995; Sullivan, 1994], in Algeria, an emerging discourse on associational life 
was providing a gateway for the introduction of new ideas of democracy and citizenship.
In July 1987, just a month after his nomination as interior minister, El Hadi Khediri -  a man 
with a tough reputation gained during the previous decade spent as director of the police -  
prominently entered President Chadli’s reformist circle by presenting a bill on associative 
freedom49 to the lower house (Assemblee Populaire Nationale, APN). Compared to previous 
regulations, the new bill appeared extremely liberal in character. It proposed to replace the 
previous ordinance of 1971 requiring any association to receive provisional authorisation 
from both the ministry of interior and the ministry concerned with the association’s area of 
activity, with one demanding merely a declaration of creation, without ex-ante recognition.
The bill was portrayed as marking a sea change in state-society relations. In presenting it to 
the Assembly, Khediri emphasised the differences with the ‘previous’ authoritarian order. He 
depicted the creation of associations as “spaces of freedom”, as a way “to seriously 
guarantee the deepening of the democratic process engaged by [the] country”. He went on to 
explain that associational life would allow for the transformation of “workers” into 
“citizens”, and the transition from a conception of citizenship ‘under state tutelage’, to one in 
which citizens enjoyed full capacity to fulfil their own initiatives as well [Babadji, 1987: 
100].
The relevance of Khediri’s speech to the development of state-associations relations in the 
coming years has to be assessed on three levels: a) the way sectors of the state welcomed the 
emergence of freedom of association; b) the reaction from parts of the intelligentsia; c) the 
discourse emerging from the (still) state-controlled press. The bill in fact faced enormous 
resistance, not only from inside the party apparatus but also from MPs in the APN. Thirty- 
three interventions marked the parliamentary debate on freedom of association, thirteen of 
them overtly maintained that the party had to retain control over old and newly created 
associations [Babadji, 1987: 109]. Thus, in order to avoid defeat and give the impression of 
overcoming the stalemate, a new law was passed that kept the requirement of preventive 
recognition for regional and national associations. Moreover, its decree of application50 
stipulated that local associations involved in activities that could be performed by public
49 Later approved as Law 87-15, 21 July 1987.
50 Decree 88-16, 2 February 1988.
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services had also to acquire government recognition. So, in 1987, restrictions were still 
active on three levels: the object of the association, the preventive control and the ex-post 
control. Any association that did not receive the ex-ante recognition from the ministry could 
not open a bank account, rent an office, own a post-box or meeting room, publish material, 
or entertain any relations with the authorities.
As it became clear that the state was going to retain control over the activities of new 
associations, the atmosphere of democratic change initially brought about by the whole affair 
soon faded. To the section of the new intelligentsia who at the time interpreted the new bill 
as the beginning of a democratic opening, it soon appeared clear that what was at stake was 
not freedom of association per se, but rather the use the state was going to make of it. 
According to Babadji, the final product of the entire debate within and outside parliament 
signalled that the introduction of voluntary associations was not so much aimed at 
guaranteeing the right of citizens to group according to common interests - as Khediri 
initially put it - but “rather at introducing new tools for relaying the action of the state” and 
controlling society. “If there is a retreat of the state -  he wrote - it is prudently carried out 
and nothing prevents us from believing that it is only transitory” [Babadji, 1987:109]. These 
views though proved only partially correct.
In the months preceding the presentation of the bill, coverage of the previously ignored issue 
of associative freedom started generating a plethora of articles and commentaries in the state- 
controlled press. Here though, a different angle on the functions of associational life was 
being taken, which emphasised the linkages with the process of state disengagement from 
service provision. In truth, during his speech Khediri himself briefly mentioned this very 
issue as a way of convincing the APN to pass the bill [Kapil, 1990:509-510].51 Yet, what 
initially appeared to be a nuance in the government’s plan gradually gained more 
prominence in the press, almost becoming the heart of the matter. Nowhere more than in the 
columns of Algerie Actualite - the ‘liberal weekly’ appealing to the young intelligentsia52 -
51 For the full text o f Khediri’s communication as well as the MPs interventions, see Journal Officiel 
des debats d e l ’APN, troisieme legislature, premiere annee, n°5, (6 July 1987)
52 At the time Algerie Actualite’s columns hosted a range of academics and journalists who were later 
to become ‘Algeria’s consciousness’ abroad, either because they left the country in the wake o f the 
conflict to teach in French universities, or because they were recruited as freelance journalists by 
Western newspapers to cover the country’s events. Among them, Bachir Dahak and Babadji 
themselves belong to the first group, while Ghania Mouffouk, and Baya Gacemi to the second. The 
sway the weekly held on the young intelligentsia is well portrayed by Khalida M essaoudi: “More 
than the clandestine (communist) party - that they were able to repress whenever and in whatever way 
they wanted - it was the cinematheque that played a marking role for my generation ...Algiers was at 
the capital where Mahmud Derwish, Kateb Yacine, Gillo Pontecorvo met up...Luckily we had the 
cultural pages o f Algerie Actualite’....Can you imagine what Algerie Actualite meant for us ? From 
the cultural point o f view there was an atmosphere that had a big role in defining an elite -  we are the
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the enthusiasm for the still meagre associative sector53 was taken as an opportunity for 
exploring intermingling ideas of new citizenship, democracy and unbearable budget deficits, 
in ways closely anticipating donors’s prescriptive stance on civil society emerging in the few 
years to come [Hearn, 2001]. M.Khellifi for instance wrote: “associations come to breathe a 
new dynamic into social life, liberating the citizens from the bureaucratic yokes blocking all 
individual and collective initiatives [...] [By] inducing new habits, associative practice is a 
form of enlargement of the national democratic field. [...] Associations crystallise the need 
of self expression and the desire to be helpful [and] they propose themselves as tools that 
disengage the state from a certain number of tasks”54. For Dahak, writing in the same 
columns during the weeks preceding the presentation of the new bill, this point was central: 
“the new state vision on associations -  he wrote - is dictated by the imperatives of the crisis, 
obliging the state to stop its investments in the socio-cultural sectors.55 By 1989, when 
Fadela Benabadji was overtly tackling the issue by titling her article "To disengage the state: 
associational life', the king was naked.56
Nevertheless, driven by Chadli’s constitutional reform, the newly enacted law57 stressed the 
democratising aspect of associative freedom -  not its welfare provision role. The political 
aspirations of the young intelligentsia, not the economic necessities of the state, seemed to be 
fulfilled:
For people like me, and all those pushing for the [1990] law, it was inconceivable that on the
one hand we had a hyper liberal framework concerning political parties, and on the other an
58extremely restrictive law for apolitical associations. It didn’t make sense.
consequence o f all this [Interview with Khalida Messaoudi, MP, President o f RACHDA. Former RCD 
vice president, counsellor to President Bouteflika and Minister o f Communication. Algiers, 23 
January 2002
53 At the end o f the 1970s there were 2185 associations in Algeria, o f which more than half were 
composed o f pupils’ parents associations (609) and sport associations (687) [Dahak, 1980]. An 
approximate estimate o f the number of associations in 1988 is 11.000. In 1980 the wilaya o f Algiers 
counted 707 associations, o f whom 187 were religious and 187 culturally orientated. In 1987, the 
same wilaya counted 1500 associations overall. Dahak, B. Algerie Actualite n .l 122, 16 April 1987.
54 Algerie Actualite 1120 2 April 1987 .
55 Algerie -  Actualite 23 April 1987.
56 Pour decharger 1’etat: la vie associative ’Algerie Actualite 1226 12-13 April 1989. Also quoted in 
Kapil [1990: 534]. See also various dossiers on Algerie Actualite 1120, 2 April 1987; 1122, 16 April 
1987; 1123, 21 April 1987; 1210, 22 December 1988; Revolution Africaine, 1217, 20 June 1987; El 
Moudjahid, 4 April 1987.
57 Law 90-31, 4 o f December 1990.
58 Interview with Maamar Aatatfa, advisor to the Minister o f Social Action and National 
solidarity, former director o f the Associative Movement Directorate of the Ministry o f  Social 
Action and National Solidarity (MASSN), Member o f the Board of Directors o f ‘Touiza’, 
Algiers, Interview, 15 January 2002.
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Examining how and why the associative element o f  Chadli’s opening survived A lgeria’s 
authoritarian revival will shed light on the role the associative movement played in relation 
to the state’s need to divert discontent. This will then lead to revising the interpretation o f  the 
country’s political change as a mistaken sequence o f econom ic and political reforms.
Diverting discontent
Between 1990 and 2006, Algeria’s associations grew from 11,000 to a staggering 73,.000. 
The breadth o f  this evolution is as important as its numerical dimension. Expanding in 
parallel to the shrinkage o f  the state’s intervention capacities, associative activity increased 
to cover vast sectors o f  welfare provision and social care. This is made clear by the way the 
ministry o f  interior categorises local associations [Figures 3.1 and 3.2].
Figure 3.1 Local associations by category, 2001
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The continuing intermingling o f  ‘democratic’ change and ‘econom ic’ retreat has been a 
prominent feature o f  the authorities’ interpretation o f  such growth. Playing to both internal 
and international publics, the governmental rhetoric constantly reiterated associations’ 
relevance to the country’s democratic development, without omitting to stress their 
contribution in filling the vacuum left by the disengaging state.59 Foreign donors encouraged 
this trend. In 2000, under the Democracy Assistance chapter o f  its MEDA programme, the
59 The relationship between the emergence o f  associational life and the external legitimacy o f  the state 
is dealt with in chapter 7.
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EU launched a ‘Programme in support o f  development-oriented associations,60 while in 
2001, within the framework o f  the ‘Democracy Grant’, the American government granted 
subsidies varying between US$ 8000 and US$ 20000 to eight Algerian NGOs, in order to 
buy PCs, office equipment and medicines. Western embassies in Algiers often contribute to 
the organisation o f  meetings and seminars on the involvement o f  associations in the social 
and cultural sectors. Since 1987, at least three major government-sponsored conferences61 on 
the welfare provision role o f  the associative movement have been held. The latter, which 
dealt specifically with the role o f  development oriented NGOs in eliminating poverty, was 
sponsored by the World Bank.
Figure 3.2 National associations by category, 2001
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In order to examine the insulating functions o f  associational life, this rhetoric must be 
analysed from two perspectives: first, the use the state made o f  associations; second, the 
impact associational life had on society. The upheaval starting in Kabylia in the spring o f  
2001 and the proposals for the arrangements for the reworking o f  local governments 
provides a case study o f  the first perspective.
Local Governments ’ institutional decay
In the wake o f  the first wave o f  riots, Prime Minister Benflis attributed widespread popular 
malcontent to “a crisis o f  local politics”. Besides targeting income registry headquarters,
60 EC (2001) ‘Protocole d ’Accord du Programme d’appui aux associations algeriennes de 
developpem ent’, Algiers
61 They were held on the 13 and 14 o f December 1987, 16 and 17 June 1996, and 28, 29 and 30 
October 2000.
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gendarmerie barracks, political parties’ offices as well as other symbols of the administrative 
and political infrastructure of the state, the rioters showed a particular keenness in hitting 
local government buildings - such as wilaya headquarters, dairas and municipal councils 
(Assemblies Populaires Communales, APC).
The reasons for targeting local government buildings do not merely lie in their geographical 
proximity to the demonstrators. The targeting of APCs was a function of the tasks they 
performed, and of the progressive depletion of the resources they should have been endowed 
with. As Taibi [1990:305,fn:15] points out “local governments are particularly important as 
centres of allocation of material and immaterial goods”...“The range of products offered by 
the commune is vast and includes civil status documents, building permits, registers 
involving commerce, employment, housing, and land ownership, as well as a certain number 
of authorisations and licenses”. Although this had been true at least since independence, by 
2000 financial bankruptcy was putting in question the APCs capacity to keep on performing 
their role. APCs’ total deficit increased from AD5bn in 1994 to AD15bn in 1999. According 
to the government, the number of indebted APCs has reached 1183 in 2000, while according 
to the CNES this figure was even higher.
Along with financial collapse went the system of power relations between bureaucrat and 
citizen. For over a decade, local governments’ soft budget constraints helped keep in place 
patronage mechanisms based on resource distribution which were now becoming 
unsustainable. During this time, no general effort to reformulate local governments’ 
institutional framework was attempted, but the pressures of hard budget constraints 
progressively limited the capacity of outreach of patronage networks, and exclusion brought 
discontent. The very same patronage mechanisms that constituted the modus operandi of 
local administrators, as well as the institutional imagery of their related cliques, ended up 
appearing as condemnable corruption. [Taibi, 1990]
This situation is evidenced by an independent consultant working for the wilaya. By citing 
the dangers of his professional activity, he expresses his disappointment regarding the 
situation of property rights in land:
Take a map of Algeria and throw a dart on it: I defy you to tell me whom that spot belongs 
to. 1 spend days trying to figure out who owns which parcel o f land, and believe me, it is not 
a matter of time, it is a matter of interpretation, because ultimately nobody knows. And in
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this country one day you get interpretations wrong and you get rich, the other day you get 
them right and you end up in jail.62
Two categories of scapegoat suffered the brunt of local governments’ institutional 
inadequacy. The first is composed of those bureaucrats who, after the cancellation of the 
1992 elections, took over a vast majority of APCs as centrally-appointed “commissaires” 
{delegues executifs communaux, DECs), inaugurating what later became known as 7a 
republique des DECs’. Many of them ended up serving jail sentences for corruption scandals 
often involving cadastral improprieties and illegal appropriation of state-owned land.63
Political parties provide the second category. In this respect, the experience of the 
Rassemblement National Democratique (RND) is a special case. The RND was created 
immediately before the 1997 elections, and won both national and local rounds - the latter by 
such a vast margin to make the presence of electoral fraud blatant. But in addition to being 
associated to electoral fraud, the RND soon became synonymous with local mismanagement 
and corruption, a perception amplified by the fact that after the 1997 elections the majority 
of APCs were governed by RND-led coalitions, at a time in which local government was 
facing financial breakdown. The price that the RND had to pay for playing the scapegoat 
function it played was twofold: first, a number of RND mayors and administrators followed 
their DEC predecessors to prison, and second, on the wave of popular discontent due to its 
performance in local politics, the RND lost a vast share of its support and relinquished its 
position of first party to the FLN following the May 2002 legislative elections.64
Civic associations make up the third category of scapegoats. This was introduced after the 
2001 black spring riots, when PM Benflis linked his plans for solving the ‘communication 
failure’ between local governments and citizens to the inclusion of ‘elements of participative 
democracy’ to be implemented ‘with the help of the associative movement’.65 In a 
declaration to the APN in June 2001 Benflis stated “for the present and near future, we the
62 Interview with Moha Mouloud ‘Geometre Expert, Tizi Ouzou, December 2001. This statement is 
not to be taken as an exaggeration. It probably applies to much o f the land in the plains and in the 
vicinity o f the towns (although not to land tenure in the mountains where traditional village structures, 
land tenure patterns and local customs and rights have survived). William C. Byrd writes : “for years, 
the cadastre and a system of registring o f property rights have not been put in place, despite their 
irrefutable necessity. ‘ Algerie -  contre performances 6conomiques et fragilite institutionnelle 
''Confluences Mediterranee .n.45 2003
63 Djillali Democratie et Corruption en Algerie provides a well-documented recollection o f  the 
wrongdoings of Algeria’s delegues executifs communales DECs, and o f how the many facets o f  the 
local government crisis were attributed to the maliciousness o f bureaucrats.
64 For an in-depth discussion o f the relationship between the state and the parties not exclusively 
focused on the RND, see Chapter 6.
65 Kaci, A. ‘La Politique de 1’Arouche’ La Tribune, 24/07/01
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government, imagine Algeria as a society organised in a dense network of civic 
associations”.66 Three months later, he summoned “civil society to solve the problems once 
dealt with by the state”... “civil society’s involvement - he said - is essential and imperative 
in order to build a modem, civilised and imaginative country”.67 In February 2002, again 
during a speech to the APN, Benflis declared: “I would like to underline the government’s 
attention to civil society and to its contribution to promoting the public interest. The 
associative movement is first of all a clear example of the consecration of the fundamental 
liberties and of human rights as stipulated in the constitution ... Keeping in mind the rapidity 
and the complexity of the changes affecting the socio-economic field, the government 
intends to put in place durable and definitive mechanisms intended to increase civil society’s 
involvement in the management of public affairs”68. Interior Minister Yazid Zerhouni (who 
as Khediri before him often appeared to be an associational life enthusiast)69 clarified the 
PM’s plans for reworking the local government system. Discussing the possible ways out of 
the bad management syndrome suffered by most APCs, the Interior Minister put forward a 
three-legged proposal aimed at “solving the country’s problems at local level, where the 
hogra is largely felt”,70 by “renewing local councils’ system of government”. This was to be 
achieved by a) endowing the walis with “more decision making power”;71 b) limiting the 
prerogatives and powers of the APCs’ elected members; c) involving the associative 
movement in the decision making process at the local level.72
Far from being limited to wishful thinking or mere programmatic expectations, the 
government’s agenda for local government reform was based on a number of examples of a 
happy ‘collaboration’ between the executive and civic associations, in which popular 
discontent was diverted away from the former and onto the latter. The Association Citoyenne
66 Dahmani, I. ‘Benflis a l ’APN’ Le Jeune lndependant, 27/06/01.
67 A. Lemili ‘L’implication du mouvement associatif, sinon rien’ Jeune Independent 18/10/01
68 www.cg.gov.dz/gouvemement/chef-G/discours/Reponse-APN.doc
69 El Moudjahid (30-31 March 2001) reported Zerhouni’s satisfaction with “national and local 
associations ... functioning in complete freedom and taking active part to the social, economic and 
cultural life o f the country” .
70 Hammadi ‘Quel Code pour les communes’ Le Matin, 23 July 2001.
71 According to the Interior Minister “Algeria is under-administered”, for three main reasons. First, 
lack o f  human capital: o ily  three per cent o f employees have a university degree. Second, the 
“security situation”: security guards sent to protect public buildings were on the APC payrolls, and 
thirdly the dissolution o f local public enterprises (EPL) reducing financial resources for the APC in 
Kaci, A. La Tribune, 24/07/01
72 Interview on the Official Algerian Television (ENTV), 26 October 2001. Despite having been on 
the government’s agenda for several years, the reform o f the Local Government Law (Code de la 
Commune) has not taken place yet. The most recent Code de la Commune was approved with law 
90/08 o f 7 April 1990. The only documented attempt was that o f the Sbih Commission (from named 
after its Chairman, Missoum Sbih, now Algeria’s Ambassador to France), which was appointment by 
President Bouteflika in 2000 to lay down a plan for reforming the state, including local government.
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de B6jai'a (ACB) provides one of the most exemplary cases.73 Before its disbandment, the 
ACB entertained a close relationship with Bejaia’s wilaya and APCs. Indeed, through its 
organisation of social work, charitable activities and social events, the ACB experienced a 
peculiar fusion of the associative and administrative fields. The two spheres merged 
structures, roles and tasks, thus seemingly reshaping the modes of local governance as 
described in Benflis and Zerhouni’s vision. Once social discontent arose though, the local 
administration left the ACB to absorb social frustrations, to the point that it announced its 
disbandment after rioters had raided its offices and set them on fire.
Two more examples of how the Algerian associative movement deflected social discontent 
in cases of clear state failure are to be found in the Bab El Oued floods and the Hassi 
Messaoud affair.
The Bab El Oued flooding
Bab el Oued (BEO) - the “river’s gate” in Arabic -  is one of Algiers’ most famous working 
class districts. Its name today stands for Algeria’s urban ills: overcrowding, mass 
unemployment and social exclusion. To many, the fact that it was also the district with the 
highest death toll following the November 2001 flooding, seemed an especially bad trick of 
fate, as well as a clear sign of the state’s disregard for the lower classes. While the prime 
causes of the tragedy were an exceptionally heavy rainfall and ill-fated urban planning 
schemes (including in particular the construction of a highway on the river bed), the 
authorities failure to foresee the dangers and to appropriately manage relief operations make 
the BEO floods an exceptional example of state failure. It was termed ‘genocide by 
negligence’ by those pointing the finger at the country’s lack of available expertise to 
anticipate the events, the lack of appropriate maintenance of the capital’s drainage system 
and particularly the failure to restore the large draining pipes blocked to prevent the islamist 
guerrillas from using them.74 Because of the lack of appropriate equipment to empty the 
streets from the tons of mud, the army had to step in and take charge of operations inside the 
district, and three conspicuous white trucks sent from Casablanca by the Moroccan 
government were involved in the lighter drainage procedures.
Yet, more than an example of the authorities’ ineptitude, the floods have to be considered as 
a prime proof of the state’s insulation capacity. In the wake of evident government’s failure 
and with rising popular discontent, no member of the cabinet resigned and no official was
73 The ACB’s case is described in more detail in chapter 6.
74 See ‘La colere gronde a Alger’ Le Monde, 14 November 2001.
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fired. President Bouteflika did not visit the place until three days after the events, only to 
declare that “responsibility for what happened rests neither with the government or with a 
party.. .it is God putting us to the test”.
Meanwhile, slow aid delivery and widespread accusations of incompetence were causing a 
charged political environment, thus pushing government officials in pursuit of fresh 
scapegoats. Colonel Mustapha El-Habiri, Director General of the Civil Protection did not use 
a soft hand in chastising the associative movement that, according to him, “was 
conspicuously absent at the time of the tragedy hitting the BEO neighbourhoods”. The chief 
of the firemen squads “confided that associations, despite being numerous, have disappeared 
right when we needed their help”.75 Quite rapidly, in addition to the authorities, Algeria’s 
indiscernible associative sector also came under the limelight and was exposed as a culprit. 
At different stages the press remarked “the scandalous absence of the associative movement 
on the ground”.76
These accusations soon reverberated among the BEO inhabitants. When the authorities 
announced that new housing would be provided to all those who lost their dwellings in the 
mudflow, the number of affected people suddenly surged. During the month it took to draw 
the definitive lists of recipients even harsher accusations of incompetence and favouritism 
emerged.77 But for Ali, staring at the A4 papers containing the provisional lists of 
beneficiaries hanging outside Bab el Oued police station, the fault was not completely with 
the authorities:
If the comites de quartier (neighbourhood committees) were active, for the authorities it would be 
easier to distinguish those who really have lost their flats from those who are just pretending. 
Apparently there should be at least 100 comit£s de quartier in Bab el Oued but I do not know o f  
anybody who’s involved in any o f them. They’ve all been set up by the state (le beylik) and that’s 
why nobody really gives a damn.78
Meanwhile, the very few effectively active associations were facing mounting pressure from 
the population. Immediately after the floods, SOS Culture Bab El Oued (SOSBEO), an 
association primarily involved in promoting the local cultural and music scene, transformed
75 Amina A. et Nefla B. ‘Le plan ORSEC n’a pas fonctionne’ Le Jeune Independent 29 November 
2001.
76 Bendaoud, L. ‘Mouvement associatif: absence de culture, responsabilit^ de l’Etat’ Liberte 20 
November 2001.
77 Hasna Yacoub ‘Les laisses-pour-compte de la tragedie’ La Tribune 19 November 2001.
78 Interview with Ali, musician, 43 years old, Bab el Oued, 12 December 2001
55
Outsourcingfailure
the garage it used for bands’ rehearsals into a storage and distribution point for food, clothes 
and other aid. Its members were twice involved in scuffles with the inhabitants which at 
various stages contested its decisions regarding the distribution of aid. As a consequence, 
SOSBEO had to start carrying out part of its relief activities almost undercover:
The people next door are in the same conditions as these families, maybe in even worse 
conditions. But we can’t deal with both: we are artists, not firemen. Do you see that guy? He 
jumped in the mud to save people during the flood. Do you think anybody thanked him? 
Nobody will thank us. So we decided to keep this quiet, and at least allow a couple o f  families 
to have a decent ‘Ftur.79
At the same time, for many associations, the international resonance of the events increased 
the incentives for getting involved. The ‘fund chasing’ race it generated shows how conflict 
can entrench itself inside the associative movement. SOS culture Bab El Oued - itself well 
connected to the French associative sector -  criticised the course of action taken by the Rally 
for Youth Action (RAJ):
[It] is true that I and he [Hakin Haddad, RAJ’s secretary general] have different political views, 
but for BEO we could have worked together. Instead, they failed to show up, they did not even 
come here to see what happened...they had all their time to write their little project to scrape a bit 
o f  money off the Swiss embassy, and then come around to demand our room for the last day o f  
Ramadan.80
The extent to which the associative sector was ‘used’ for diverting pressures and sharing 
discontent is best made clear by those limited cases of associations that seemed to be 
outperforming the authorities, thus undermining their primacy. The many instances of 
clashes involving the authorities and associations when the latter were ‘too successful’ in 
organising relief show this side of the story. In fact, while the Ministry of Social Action and 
National Solidarity (MASSN) decided to avail itself of the associative sphere for aid 
distribution, the wilaya departments showed particular contempt for the prominence certain 
associations were acquiring, particularly those receiving vast quantities of goods from 
overseas, like SOSBEO:
Ould Abbes (the MASSN minister) is a good guy, he was here immediately and we work 
together. But the wali is an idiot, and his petty bureaucrats are just the same. They think they are
79 The Ftur indicates the breaking o f the daily fast during Ramadan. Interview with Nacer, 
Secretary General SOS Culture Bab El Oued, Algiers, 2 December 2001
80 Interview, Nacer Secretary General SOS Culture Bab El Oued, Algiers, 19 January 2002
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in a competition and don’t let us work. They decided to move their distribution point to Les Trois 
Horloges (the centre o f BEO district), in order to be more ‘visible’, and the Red Crescent hassle 
us day in day out claiming that it’s them who are in charge o f aid delivery.81
The same kinds of quarrels were arising in other parts of town, as a representative of another 
cultural association involved in aid delivery clarified:
We came from Tizi with a truck full of clothes, covers and toys for the kids. It was a sign o f  
solidarity from the people back in Kabylia. But the civil protection and the police stopped us 
in Bouzareah, and told us to leave the truck there. They said it was because in a way or in 
another the Islamists were going to get hold o f the stuff and distribute in the mosques, but it 
is clear they will use it themselves.82
Preserving factional equilibria
Even though at some stage the scapegoat politics backfired, thus forcing the authorities to 
tame down those associations showing excessive zeal, the associative sector’s original 
mission in sharing the blame for the mismanagement of the relief operations was 
unquestioned. The popularity acquired by a limited number of associations constituted at 
best only a minor menace to the position of certain bureaucrats, and certainly not a threat to 
the state. Yet, the Bab el Oued floods showed another dimension of the interplay of state and 
associative spheres. It is the dimension of the state’s internal conflict which transpires from 
SOSBEO positive collaboration with the MASSN and its contrasting and conflictual 
encounters with the wilaya departments and the Red Crescent. The virulent attack on the 
authorities carried out by Dr. Mostapha Khiati (the president of the Algiers-based association 
Foundation for Health Promotion and Research Development - Fondation Nationale pour la 
Promotion de la Sante et le Developpement de la Recherche (FOREM) in front of a crowd of 
western diplomats provides another clue:
I could not believe my ears. First he invites us (a delegation from the Canadian Embassy) to 
El Mithek (an official residence attached to the Presidential Palace) and then over dinner he 
burst out in a long speech on the situation in BEO and the incompetence o f those responsible.
81 Interview, Belkacem, 41 years old, President o f SOS Culture Bab El Oued, Algiers, 2 December 
2001.
82 Interview, Nadia Ai't ZaT, lawyer, Secretary general o f the Ait Menguellet Association, Algiers, 19 
December 2002.
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They say Khiati works for the state: maybe, but after meeting him several times, I still can’t 
make sense of whom he stands for.83
In addition to providing a view of his personal ambitions, the reasons behind Khiati’s attacks 
clarify the sway the associative sphere gained over the state’s internal workings:
Khiati does not miss any opportunity to mock Ould Abbes because he aspires to be in his 
place in the near future, or maybe to become the next minister o f Health.... particularly now 
given that everybody is talking about the elections. And after the BEO’s events even more 
so, as by keeping him out [of the relief operations], they deprived him o f  a very important 
stage for showing off.84
Khiati’s attacks show how insulation cannot solve the prime problem of Algeria’s 
adjustment process: the presence of factional divides at the core of the state. The conflict 
between Khiati and Ould Abbes shows that the role the associative sector assumed in filling 
the vacuum left by the state also made it a battlefield in which these very divides are played 
out. But associations can also constitute a sphere in which these internal conflicts are 
smoothed, subdued and played down, as shown by the events in Hassi Messaoud.
The Hassi Messaoud Affair
On the night of July 13-14, 2001, in the Saharan town of Hassi Messaoud, one of the 
country’s most important oil centres, a crowd of around 300 men attacked at least 95 women 
living alone in their flats. All of them reported severe injuries and signs of torture, some 
were gang raped and some died from their injuries. Their houses were looted and set on fire. 
The attack was carried out after an imam allegedly accused single women living in the area 
of 'dissolute' behaviour and fornication during a Friday sermon. The police intervened only 
at 3 am, and failed to prevent similar atrocities from taking place the day after.
The Hassi Messaoud affair was widely interpreted as an example of the ‘return of violent 
Islamism’.85 Yet, despite the religious connotations of the violence, its economic orientation
83 Interview with Chantal de Varennes, First Counsellor at the Canadian Embassy and Canadian 
Consul, Algiers, 27 January 2002.
84 Interview with Marco Ramazzotti, head o f the Italian NGO Comitato Italiano di Solidariet& tra 
i Popoli (C1SP) in Algeria, 1 January 2002.
85 An analysis o f the titles o f the francophone press is eloquent in this respect. ‘L'int6grisme islamiste 
vient de provoquer un nouveau drame en Algerie’ (Abla Cherif, Le Matin, 15 July 2001), ‘Un 
integrisme qui n’a rien perdu de sa virulence’ (Ali Ouafek, Liberte, 17 July 2001), ‘La violence de 
l'obscurantisme islamiste’ (Karimene Toubbiya, La Tribune, 19 July 2001), ‘L’Algerie face a 
1'intolerance islamiste’ (Le Matin 21 July 2001), ‘Les saints et les catins’ (Latifa Benmansour, Le 
Matin, 21 July 2001), ‘La psychose de la campagne de re-islamisation et de moralisation op^ree par 
les milieux islamistes’ (Mounir B., Le Quotidien d'Oran, 21 July 2001).
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was scarcely highlighted. Among invocations of ‘god is great’, the assailants also shouted 
slogans against the state and against those who came to 'steal the jobs' of the local 
population, like ‘get out o f our country!’ ‘Hassi Messaoud is ours!’, ‘Our children are 
unemployed while you eat our bread’. For the most part, the women attacked were from 
other parts of the country and were all employed by foreign oil companies as cleaners, cooks 
and secretaries.86
The events caused grave embarrassment for the government, firstly because they clearly put 
one more question mark on Bouteflika’s civil concord policy, and secondly because of the 
high sensitivity of the oil town for the country’s foreign relations. But in the face of the 
uproar, the government preferred to keep a low profile. The press reported that charges 
against an unspecified number of men were brought.87 The women were placed in a local 
hostel in order ‘to guarantee their security’, where they were apparently left without access 
to medicines or sufficient food. No care was dispensed, on the grounds that the ‘place was 
not equipped for the circumstances’.88
From then on, the management of the Hassi Messaoud affair was ‘outsourced’ outside the 
state’s direct sphere. First, a delegation of three women MPs was sent on the 18th of July, 
among whom was Khalida Messaoudi, the internationally renowned feminist and president 
of women’s association ‘RACHDA’ Rassemblement Algerien Contre la Hogra et la 
Trahison (Algerian Rally Against Contempt and Treason).89 After the visit she stated that the 
women needed medical and psychological care and that they had to be removed from the 
hostel. Shortly afterwards RACHDA was entrusted with all the aspects of the care and 
rehabilitation process, and the association produced a number of internal and international 
communiques framing the analysis in Algeria’s long history of violence against women.90 
The whole affair seemed to fade away, never to reappear again in the press, or in the 
government’s considerations.91
Fettouma Ouzegane, a fighter during the war of independence and a feminist activist still 
involved in the women’s movement despite her advanced age, described her visit to Hassi 
Messaoud with a delegation of women’s groups a few days after the event in these terms:
86 Youssef Rezzoug Le Matin 17/07/01.
87 La Tribune, 17/07/01 reported 40 arrests, while Le Matin only nine.
88 Le M atin , 20-21 July, 2001.
89 Le Matin, 20-21 July, 2001.
90 See RACHDA’s statement on the affair titled ‘The coming back of the inquisition’ in Le Matin 17 
July 2001.
91 Le Matin,20-21 July, 2001.
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Hassi Messaoud, one had to be there to see. She [Khalida Messaoudi] behaved as i f  she is the 
state. She arrives a day before everybody else, and she leaves a day before everybody else.
She directs the doctors, and she’s got the connections with the police. It looked like we were 
sent there to watch her. But that’s fine, that’s just the way it is. I told Maryam [Bellala, 
president o f SOS Femmes en Detresse] not to get involved in this affair, that this is political. 
They have to stay social, afar from politics, because they risk being destabilised. What ‘Laila 
Khalida’ does not understand is that she’s being used. She is used by a state that wants to 
keep its hands clean.92
By sending its most prominent and internationally renowned feminist to Hassi Messaoud, 
and by entrusting her association with such delicate matters as psychological care and 
support for the victims, the state appeased the international community, and at the same time 
could afford not to take an official position on the affair. Moreover, the decision to entrust 
the analysis of the violence to an overtly anti-Islamist association enhanced the 
simplifications made by the sensationalistic press coverage, which focused on the religious 
orientation of the atrocities, but gravely understated their economic nature. The state’s 
economic failure (the condition of mass unemployment and uneven livelihoods prevailing in 
the town) was at once masked by such simplification, and at the same time served as a 
justification for the state’s ‘incapacity’ to intervene (the lack of appropriate equipment and 
personnel). Thus, the outsourcing of the Hassi Messaoud affair outside the state’s sphere 
limited damages to the civil concord policy, while ‘Islamist sensibilities’ inside the state 
were spared the inconvenience of commenting or getting involved. The associative sphere 
allowed the factional equilibria to be preserved.
This conclusion is backed by the interpretation that Marco Ramazzotti gives for the reasons 
why he ended up working with Dr. Khiati in Bentalha - one of the villages that endured the 
worst massacres of all the guerrillas years. His story provides similar, yet somewhat parallel, 
features to the Hassi Messaoud affair.
Personally I do not care who Khiati is linked to. I knew there were ECHO93 funds available 
to be spent in Algeria and I had to find a counterpart for the project. Khiati solved all the 
problems, sometimes he even went too far, but without him I wouldn’t be the first foreign 
NGO to have a formal agreement with a ministry (Health), and 1 wouldn’t be here writing the 
project report for the donors. Some say that a general backs him, that Khiati is a former 
Barb^felene94. But that’s the point: Khiati is important for me because o f  the contacts he has,
92 Interview with Fettouma Ouzegane, Algiers, 16 January 2002
93 European Commission Humanitarian Office
94 Term used to describe the Islamist wing of the FLN since 1989.
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and maybe i f  he didn’t have those contacts the children in Bentalha would not benefit from 
the kind of psychological care we are providing them with.95
So if, in Hassi Messaoud, responsibility for dealing with an episode of religious violence was 
entrusted to the most secularist of women associations, in Bentalha it was Dr Khiati’s 
FOREM, and its (albeit tacit) religious sensibilities that were right for the job. In both cases 
though, the state could afford not to intervene explicitly, letting its associative sector handle 
public relations and deal with the consequences of potentially divisive events.
From state failure to civic failure
As is evident in the Bab El-Oued case, one of the results of the increased involvement of 
associations in social and cultural service provision and the expectations raised by 
government discourse was a deterioration in the citizenry’s view of the role and relevance of 
the associative sphere. Yet, to understand the extent to which this evolution assumed the 
traits of ‘a public opinion’ on associational life, our analysis cannot be completed without the 
view taken by Algerian ‘opinion makers’.
In the run-up to the last state-sponsored conference on the associative movement, which 
participating World Bank officials termed ‘a failure’,96 an international team of consultants 
was recruited in order to carry out an appraisal of the NGO sector in relation to poverty 
reduction strategies. Despite stressing that segments of the associative sector are “involved in 
valuable welfare and short term reaction to handicap sufferers and is increasingly engaged in 
gap-filling for the government as government services shrink”, the report underlined the fact 
that government’s reliance on NGOs to conduct poverty reduction schemes and development 
initiatives was misplaced. Given the actual potential of the NGO sector -  the report also 
concluded - associations are “not, as far as we could see, oriented to, nor interested in, 
innovative long term development projects\programmes addressing issues of endemic 
poverty in rural areas, rural small towns or poverty pockets in the large cities”.97
The fact that the government rejected the conclusions of the report does not mean that 
frustration with the countiy’s associative sector is not felt also within the state apparatus. At
95 Interview with Marco Ramazzotti, head of the Italian NGO ‘CISP’ Algeria’s operations, interview I 
February 2002.
96 Jonathan Benthall, INTRAC chairman, private communication, 17 April 2002.
97 J.Benthall, private communication 17 April 2002. The report was not published and the government 
refused to pay the team o f consultants for the work.
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the Maison des Associations in Bologhine (MAB),98 where a number of service-delivery 
associations are based, one civil servant spelt out his dissatisfaction in this way:
They come here saying they’ve set up an association and want to be registered, and cannot even 
write. Can you believe it? Any ordinary fellow that cannot even write his name has the right to 
create an association. Ok, the right to create an association has to be guaranteed, but you see, the 
law has a great shortcoming: it does not require a minimum level o f intellectual ability. The law 
should at least require associations’ promoters to have a bare minimum o f preparation. In order to 
facilitate the procedures, it is important to be able to write and talk well, no matter what for, 
whether you need to target sponsors or speak to the people.
In order to solve these problems, after the recognition procedure, there has to be a follow-up, an 
audit, a control from the administration. Maybe even before granting I ’agrement we should 
introduce a psychometric test at the level o f the wilaya: In order to get official recognition, the 
president and the bureau’s members have to pass the test. If the guys are total zeros, if  the 
president can’t even help himself, how can he pretend to be able to do something for other 
people? Associations have to be managed by influential people (par des gens haut placees), not 
by beggars."
At the Ministry of Social Action and National Solidarity, a counsellor to the Minister uses 
similar tones:
It must have been around two weeks after the events in Bab El Oued, a group o f people came and 
asked to see the Minister. They said that their association had helped out during the floods, and 
they wanted to be paid. When we refused, they asked to be given a job. For as long as people 
don’t understand what voluntary work means we will never have an associative movement in this 
country.100
This kind of disillusioned analysis reverberates across Algeria’s private press.101 In a tirade 
typical of many editorials on the inadequacy of the country’s associative sector, Sofiane 
Bensalam remarks that “in Algeria, associations are set up and dissolved depending on the 
weather. The inflation we experience in the matter is [the consequence of) having dealt with 
this issue with a certain slack, bartering the need for quality in favour of numbers. The 
responsibility lies within those associations that are associations in nothing but their name....
98 The Maison des Associations was created in 1998 by Cherif Rahmani, Governor o f Great Algiers, in 
order to facilitate the establishment o f civic associations by providing them with space to set up an 
office at a moderate price.
99 Interview, Nabil Mekhzani, MAB ad interim Director, Bologhine, Algiers, 23 October 2001
100 Interview, Yazid Saidi -  Head o f Communication, MASSN, Algiers, 5 February 2002
101 Bendaoud, L. ‘Mouvement associatif: absence de culture, responsabilite de l ’Etat’ Liberte 20 
November 2001 ; Soheib Berber ‘Mouvement associatif: la grande disillusion’ El Watan 25 
September 1996.
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freezing registration [years ago] could have contributed to cleaning up the associative field in 
order to get rid of all parasitic associations swarming out of a political conjuncture promising 
new perspectives towards the consolidation of civil society”.102 A different newspaper 
highlights “associations’ representatives’ sheer lack of knowledge of the simplest 
management tool”,103 whilst another advocates the ‘shutting down [of] thousands of 
associations managed by notorious opportunists’.104
So the stress on associations’ representatives’ lack of necessary technical skills is coupled 
with, and enhanced by, a lack of ‘civic feeling’. In extending this view to the realm of 
academic analysis, Omar Derras writes that “beyond its quantitative importance, the 
associative phenomenon is unorganised or at least it is still undergoing a stage of immature 
structuring [...]The pictures and the perceptions of [associations’] representatives -  he 
argues - allow us to observe that apathy and lethargy characterise the situation...[as well as] 
the lack of one of the essential values of associative work -  the sense of responsibility -  
[which] is not really felt or appreciated by associations representatives” [ Derras, 1999, fn 2, 
38].
By the time development agendas started promoting the idea that not only state failures but 
also ‘civic failures’ matter [Fine, 1998] such a view was already firmly rooted in the minds 
of the Algerian public and opinion makers. In this sense, Algeria provides an example of the 
impact of ‘post-Washington Consensus’ ideas in transforming state-society relations. 
Algerian associations failed to fulfil the role shaped by the dominant political discourse at 
the time of their emergence. They failed to meet the expectations that the government had 
raised for them. And the failures of Algeria’s associative sector became the failure of 
Algeria’s society.
Conclusions
This chapter has argued that the progressive induction of notions of civic failure constituted 
a prime element of Algeria’s paradigm of adjustment, and that the associative sphere 
provided a prime element of this development. It all started with the swift passage from the 
dogma of the state’s unique prerogative of intervention to widespread notions of ‘associative 
responsibility’. This induced a fleeting change from the norm of ‘social wait and see attitude’
102 Sofiane Ben sal am ‘Assainissement’ El Watan 7 March 2002. Italics mine, see also D.B. 
‘Mouvement Associatif: quelle force de proposition?’ El Watan 14 June 1998.
103 Le Matin n. 1578 10 April 97
104 Zahir M. ‘Enquete sur les finances des associations’ L ’Expression 23 June 2005.
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to new canons of self-help and of “citizens taking responsibility themselves”. The twist in 
how such changes were interpreted and applied allowed associational life to become an 
opportunity for limiting the political damage caused by economic reform. Rather than merely 
disengaging the state from its service provision duties, associational life contributed to 
absolving the state from its responsibility for economic mismanagement, thus transposing 
failure to Algerian society’s presumed managerial, cultural and civic shortcomings. As 
clearly appeared in the Bab El Oued floods, its main achievement was to make the hardships 
of economic reform acceptable by inducing a pervasive sense of social failure, thus further 
rooting conflict and insecurity at the social level.
Moreover, Algeria’s associative sector shielded the state from its own inner dynamics. The 
examples of Hassi Messaoud and Bentalha show how prominent associations like RACHDA 
and FOREM can be called on to intervene in crucial circumstances, allowing the treatment of 
politically sensitive events to be outsourced outside the state’s sphere, thus preserving the 
shaky balance of alliances at its core. This evidence questions existing explanations of 
Algeria’s recent political trajectory. In particular it requires a revision of those interpretations 
centred on the mistaken choices of policy makers who choose to open the political space 
when insulation was instead needed. In this light, it is worth remembering that ‘divide and 
rule’ is an expression commonly used by every ordinary Algerian. And scapegoat politics 
might well be a category of divide and rule politics. Analogies with other episodes of 
Algeria’s history come to mind. Martinez’s idea of ‘a return to the beylik’ to describe the 
stalemate produced by the conflict leans in this direction. In drawing the comparison with the 
Regency of Algiers between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, Martinez [2000: 220] 
writes: “just as the Janissaries left local governors (beys) to deal with the dissidence of tribal 
confederations, the current government leaves it to prominent local citizens and their militias 
to contain the Islamist guerrillas’ violence”. Ageron [1991: 9-10] makes a similar remark 
concerning the turbulent inception of French domination, when “General Clauzel, who was 
at one and the same time imperious and devious, thought that it would be easy to establish 
French rule using Muslim chiefs as French agents”. During the times of economic reform 
which the above analysis has been concerned with, scapegoats have multiplied. They 
included not only associations, but also DECs, walis, cadres and a number of competent 
state-company directors who were jailed on grounds of wrongdoing and subsequently 
released without charge, once their previously successful companies had been shredded and
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privatised.105 Algeria’s history shows us a pattern o f ‘indirect unruliness’ usually established 
in times of political crisis.
By keeping in mind the functions of disorder as a means of preserving power [Chabal & 
Daloz, 1999] one is left to ask whether the failures of economic reform were really a 
consequence of policy mistakes, but also whether they played a more ‘positive’ role. One is 
left to ask whether Algeria’s peculiar type of insulation was instrumental to adjustment, or 
whether the functional relationship has to be read the other way around; or indeed whether 
both the democratisation process and structural adjustment, both the opening up of channels 
of voice and the process of state retreat were themselves functional to insulating the regime 
from society.
105 On the experience o f public sector employees in the era o f liberalisation in Algeria, see Kadri, 
Belaribi [2000] Un cadre au foyer  Algiers : Casbah
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Chapter 4. Out o f trust? Presidents and families versus Algeria’s associative decay 
Introduction
In 1998, Cherif Rahmani, the Governor of the Greater Algiers District, highlighted his 
support for the associative sector by creating a Maison des Associations in the Algiers 
district of Bologhine. Initially intended as a pilot scheme to be replicated in other parts of the 
capital and possibly in other wilayas, the main aim of the Maison des Association de 
Bologhine (MAB) was to address what was widely acknowledged to be the biggest obstacle 
to setting up an association - the lack of affordable office space. Against payment of a 
moderate fee, the MAB provided registered associations with an official address, the 
possibility of holding meetings and conferences, as well as a variety of services like 
individual mail boxes, telephones, fax and internet access. During the spring of 2000 though, 
the Greater Algiers District was returned to its former administrative status of wilaya106 and 
by October 2001 rumours of ongoing talks about using the MAB building to relocate the 
Wilaya’s Department of Arts and Culture emerged. The MAB staff had been expecting such 
a move for a long time:
They finally realised that there’s not much to do here. The MAB hosts 150 associations, but 
no more than 30, or maximum 40 ever showed up. I have worked here for a whole year and 1 
have seen 10 or 15 o f  them, the others are total strangers. What I know is that most dossiers 
are left incomplete; most o f them haven’t even paid last years’ fees and do not even bother 
replying when we contact them. They don’t do anything. You want to know what I think?
The majority of these associations are just bogus.107
As seen in the previous chapter, by the end of the 1990s this kind of disenchanted scepticism 
about the associative sector was not uncommon in Algeria. Yet, outside Algeria the mood 
was very different. Besides being known for the blend of intense violence, political turmoil, 
and relentless economic decline characterising its domestic politics, Algeria was recognised 
as the Arab country with the highest number of voluntary associations [Ben Nefissa, 2000]. 
Attracted by the coincidence of outstanding associative activity with enduring economic and 
political troubles, analysts focusing on Algeria’s emerging associational life interpreted it as
106 The initiative apparently came from President Bouteflika himself, annoyed by the visibility 
acquired by Cherif Rahmani. Rahmani later became Minister o f  Environment and Territorial 
Development m Ali Benflis’s Government 26 August 2000, position which he maintained under the 
two successive governments headed by Ahmed Ouyahia (May 2003 -  May 2006) and Abdelaziz 
Belkadem (May 2006).
107 Interview with Nabil Mekhzani. 36 year old, MAB ad interim Director, Bologhine, Algiers, 23 
October 2001.
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a striking example of associative success taking place in the most adverse circumstances. 
Yet, they strangely failed to engage in a proper investigation of such an odd concomitance. 
The following discussion shows how this omission made Algeria a perfect case for the 
application of mainstream views of civil society, but also laid the basis for a 
misinterpretation of the associative sector’s scope, role and significance for the country 
political development. Foreign portrayals of Algeria’s associative sector have mainly relied 
on mainstream notions of civil society, social capital and trust. Such interpretations need to 
be reconsidered by reassessing the degree of associative activity in the country, and taking a 
closer look at the internal dynamics of Algerian associations. In this light, the development 
of Algeria’s associative sector acquires a different significance from that postulated by 
mainstream notions of civil society. Rather than a locus of reciprocity, solidarity and 
cooperation, associations appear as the by-product of increasingly conflict-ridden social 
relations and reveal some of the strategies deployed by individuals to cope with political 
change.
Social capital in Algeria
The emergence and multiplication of Algeria’s associations occurred at a time when civil 
society was becoming a fashionable research topic across the whole spectrum of the social 
sciences. Since analyses of Algerian associations have much to do with the way ‘civil 
society’ entered mainstream development agendas and the ensuing interpretations of the link 
between associational life and political development, it is worth having a look at some of the 
foundational arguments for such interpretations, such as Robert Putnam’s study of 
democratic governance in Italy [Fine, 1999: 4].108 In trying to explain the determinants of 
regional governments’ performance, Putnam notices that a) better performing regions show a 
high density of “neighbourhood associations, choral societies, cooperatives, sports clubs 
etc.” [1992:73], and that b) badly governed regions feature negligible levels of associative 
density. Putnam links associative density to endowments of ‘social capital’, i.e. “features of 
social organisation - such as networks, norms and trust”. These are seen as lowering the 
information costs arising from collective action and facilitating widespread co-operative 
relations and the pursuit of win-win outcomes [1993:180]. This argument establishes a
108 A plethora o f other studies explicitly applied his framework to a number o f different countries, 
especially in the developing world, and the list would be too long to cite here. Putnam himself 
refocused the same problematic on the US, deriving pessimistic inferences on Americans’ declining 
civic engagement. The virtual library hosted by the World Bank Social Capital website gives an idea 
o f the sway acquired by SC inside both academia and development agencies. For a literature review 
see Harriss and de Renzio, 1997; Fine, 2001).
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causal link between civic/associative development and political and economic performance, 
as shown by assertions such as “the state ...operate[s] more efficiently in civic settings”, or 
“good government is a by-product of singing groups and soccer clubs” [Putnam, 1993: 176- 
181].
Putnam’s concept of social capital spawned a deluge of research and contributed to the 
development of mainstream academic theories of civil society which thanks to their 
‘prescriptive universalism’ [Comaroffs, 1999; Lewis, 2002: 575-6] were applied to a number 
of countries and to all sorts of political and economic settings.109 Many of these studies 
support the idea that social capital can be ‘measured’. Civic associations are a site where 
trust is built, stored and spread and thus the vibrancy of associational life represents a proxy 
for the presence of networks of horizontal co-operation, norms of reciprocity and society’s 
endowments of social capital [Avritzer, 2000; Lewis, 2002: 571]. Indicators of 
associationalism such as the width of associations’ membership or the number of 
associations per capita are taken to measure levels of social capital within a country and thus 
indicate a proxy for its future developmental trajectory [Putnam, 2000; Mishler & Rose, 
1997; Rose, 1998].110
This approach partly explains the enthusiasm with which foreign observers have viewed 
Algeria’s associative sector. Official figures show that during the fifteen years which 
elapsed since the introduction of freedom of association in 1989, Algerian associations grew 
at exponential rates [Table 4.1]. What is also striking is that, in terms of growth, they seem to 
have surpassed the associative sectors of other Middle Eastern countries like Morocco and 
Egypt, which show equivalent or even larger populations, legal systems allowing comparable 
degrees of associative freedom, and longer histories of associational life. [Marzouk, 1997: 
196; Ben Neflssa, 1997; Denoeux & Gateau, 1995].
109 Putnam himself without any qualms transfers his conceptual framework from Italy to the USA to 
assess the presence o f social capital in America
110 Besides associational life, Putnam uses newspaper readership and indicators o f political 
participation to define levels o f ‘civic involvement’. Nevertheless, throughout his own work and many 
o f the ensuing analyses it inspired, the vibrancy o f associational life takes the lion’s share in 
accounting for social capital. For a rating o f Arab countries according to cultural measures including 
societal trust measures, which precedes Putnam’s social capital, see Hofstede [1991 pp.53, 68, 84 and 
113].
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Figure 4.1 Growth of Registered Local Associations 1989-2005
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The outstanding growth of the associative sector offered a terrain for the application of the 
conventional wisdom on civil society to Algeria. Ben Nefissa highlighted the Algerian case 
by remarking that “it would be accurate to describe what happened in that country as a 
veritable explosion of associations...set up within the space of few years [2000]. Zoubir 
[1999: 36] observed that “literally thousands of associations... springing up
everywhere...[from] human rights leagues to others focusfing] on such concerns as ecology, 
religion, consumer protection”, and claimed that “a civil society revealed its existence”. In a 
separate paper commenting on the outcome of the 1999 elections, Zoubir [1999: 11] wrote:
“The main difference with the past is that the debate is public and no longer taboo. The 
construction of a democratic order is still painful, especially since nation and state building 
has not been completed. The most positive aspect of all though is that a vibrant civil society 
has made its appearance in Algeria. Despite its weaknesses, it has demonstrated a level of 
dynamism that is rarely equalled elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa”.
In realms as diverse as women’s rights and private business, associations became 
synonymous with society’s astonishing assertiveness [Dillman, 2000; Sgrena, 1997] and 
were alternatively portrayed as forms of autonomous organisation demanding a shift from 
authoritarian practices, as solidarity groups resisting the climate of violence, or as safety nets 
compensating for the near collapse of social services [Fath, 1990; Layachi 1995; Lloyd,
111 Rouzeik,1994
112 Ben Nefissa, 2000: 16
113 MASSN, 2000: 17,
114 Algeria’s official report on socio-economic rights presented to the UN commission on social, 
economic and cultural rights, reported in Le Quotidien d ’Oran, 14 November 2001.
115 Government Communication to Amnesty International, El Moudjahid 11 November 2000
1,6 El Moudjahid, 30-31 March 2001.
117 UNDP Algiers Offices, February 2002.
118 Zahir M. ‘Zerhouni demande des comptes’ L 'Expression, 23 June 2005.
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1999]. In an analysis reminiscent of Fukuyama’s views on trust [2001], Yacoubian [1997:18] 
saw in the mounting number of associations a sign of society’s resilience, an expression of 
“social self-reliance, collective action” and “a culture of participation”.
In relation to Algeria, mainstream views of civil society, social capital and trust dominated 
the interpretations given to the emergence of the country’s associative sphere. Since this 
interpretation was primarily based on quantitative evidence, before examining the extent to 
which the associative sector can be likened to a realm of social co-operation and civic trust, 
we need to take a closer look at the figures.
Associative decay
Far from being confined to the staff of Bologhine’s Maison des Associations, the idea that 
‘active’ associations are far fewer than reported by official figures is widespread in Algeria, 
especially among the press, Algerian academic circles, as well as representatives of the 
associative movement themselves, such as Prof. Mostapha Khiati, President of the prominent 
FOREM. In October 2001, at a debate organised by the French Institute for International 
Relations, Khiati criticised the ambiguity of the 1990 law on freedom of association, which 
oversaw “the emergence, in a very quick time, of more than 70,000 associations in areas as 
diverse as sport, the construction of mosques, cultural identity, neighbourhood welfare, 
professional interests, etc. ...all having equal status because of their inclusion in the same 
legal framework”.1,9 A few months later, in his office at the Belfort Hospital in El Harrach, 
Khiati qualified his statement:
I said 70,000 because this is the figure I was given. But of course the reality is quite different.
At the end o f the day most associations are not really there. You’ve got 14,000 associations 
established to build a mosque, with a fixed-term objective but which remain registered for a 
long time either because the mosques are never finished, or because they simply are not 
removed from the lists. Then you have district and areas committees...well these are only 
sleeping entities and are not really active. Then you’ve got sport associations, that were 
already there at the time o f the FLN and that are still there now. Then there are the others, 
among which not many really do any work.120
1,9 Les ONG en Algerie, speech delivered during a meeting at the Institut Fran9ais de Relations 
Internationales 31 octobre 2001 [ ww.ifri.org/F/Debats/lnterventions/ 2001/0110_khiati.htm ]
120 Interview with Prof. Khiati, FOREM President, 1 December 2001, El Harrach, Algiers
70
Out o f  Trust?
Khiati’s analysis is similar to the one provided by Zoubir Salhi, vice president for social 
development of the high-flying Algerian NGO Touiza, who nevertheless puts his finger on 
the role of ‘culture’:
Touiza never existed exclusively on paper, like many other associations. It’s a matter o f  
attitude, o f culture, if  only two thirds - or maybe less - o f associations which are 
“administratively declared” are really active. There is a lot o f attentisme, an attitude that is 
historically rooted. Touiza’s success lies in the different attitude we have. From the 
beginning our work had a voluntary character, and we were able to pool the energy and 
resources in this sense. We never waited for the state to realize our projects.121
Far from being limited to the views of representatives of the civic sector trying to single out 
the uniqueness of their associative experience, the discrepancy between registered and active 
associations has been noticed by other observers. A UNDP report on the work of 
environment-related associations states that out of three hundred associations nationwide 
which were contacted to collect data, only 46 were taken into consideration, “the others 
being either dissolved, on stand-by or simply non-existent”.122 In his survey of Oran-based 
associations, Derras remarks that while “the Associations Bureau of the Wilaya gives an 
approximate figure of 1800 registered associations...the vice president of the APW123 
estimates that, of the total number of associations created in Oran, only 200 are still active 
[1999: 96,113].
Recurring press stories on the baffling absence of associations that should supposedly be 
active provide evidence of the national spread of the phenomenon. Corroborating the case of 
Oran, El Watcm stress its ‘disappointment’ in noticing how “according to estimates the total 
number of associations in the wilaya is 1388 -  quite a lot, given their small visibility. These 
numbers seem to refer to a cumulative sum that over the years neglected to take into 
consideration associations which ceased their activities”.124 Wondering where the resources 
allocated to the associative movement go, a journalist writes: “In Maghnia, like in other 
regions, associations involved in different domains seem to be burgeoning, but on the ground 
they are totally absent.125 Already in 1997, A. Djabali asserted that “among the associations
121 Interview with Zoubir Sahli, Touiza Vice -  President charge du developpement solidaire, Algiers 
11 September 2001
122 UNDP (1998) Le Mouvement Associatif et VEmironnement June, Algiers, p.32
123 Wilaya Popular Assembly (Assemble Populaire de Wilaya) It is the body elected at regional level, 
but does not manage the wilaya administrative units (like the association bureau) which depend on the 
Ministry o f  Interior via his appointee, the wali.
124 Djamel Benachour ‘Mouvement Associatif: Deception a 1’Ouest’ El Watan 23 November 1998.
125 Chahreddine Berriah, Maghnia: Oil va 1’argent des associations? El Watan, 30 May 1996 .
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recognised by the wilaya of Annaba, several hundred remain purely fictitious”126. In the 
same year the wilaya of Tiaret was in a similar situation.127 But the most candid confirmation 
of the uncertain size of the associative sector comes from the authorities themselves. In 
2000, an unpublished report commissioned by the MASSN admitted that in Algeria 
“associations mushroomed in the 1990s, but now the majority of them exist in name only”128.
Providing an estimate of the proportion of the associative sector showing some degree of 
activity is beyond the scope of this study. When this research was carried out such 
information simply did not exist, even though in principle it should have been available to 
the government. The law on freedom of associations requires associations to re-register 
annually “in order to regularly provide public authorities with information concerning 
changes in their membership, their financial condition and the origins of funds”.129 Wilaya 
administrations are supposed to erase from their lists all associations not complying with this 
rule during subsequent years. However, this audit is not carried out on a systematic basis 
and, as is clear from the statements of both associations’ representatives and the press, 
inactive and disbanded associations remain on the wilaya lists. This, as the MASSN internal 
report admitted, created a condition whereby “in practice [there is] a governmental ignorance 
of the scale and variety of the sector...the Ministry of the Interior has no up to date database 
that is valid or of any use in controlling associations’ activities and finances, and it is 
questionable whether it could manage the incoming data in a useful way even if it did have
130
Poor governmental record keeping is not necessarily seen as a ‘problem’, and does not 
prevent the authorities from making very precise claims. In March 2001, Interior Minister 
Zerhouni praised the government’s track record in upholding civil liberties by stressing “the 
incontestable reality of 57,117 local association and 842 established at national level”.131 
Nearly one year later, addressing the lower chamber of parliament, Head of Government 
Benflis stated: “freedom of association is today a tangible reality: the associative movement 
numbers more than 60,000 local associations, and more than a thousand at national level”.132 
These claims are the stuff on which the image of thriving associative activity portrayed by 
analysts was built. But this image was invariably based on figures reporting the number of
126 A. Djabali Annaba / Plusieurs Associations Fantomatiques’ El Watan 22 March 1997.
127 A.B. ‘Tiaret :Des assises lointaines’ El Watan 11 May 1997.
128 MASSN (2000) p. 15.
129 Art. 18 o f law 90.31, 4 December 1990.
130 MASSN Internal Memo(2000) p.15 A more detailed analysis o f  funding o f associations and the 
audit procedure is provided in chapter 5. Chapter 6 delves into the arbitrary use o f  the recognition 
procedures by the Ministry o f Interior.
131 El Moudjahid, 30-31 March 2001.
132 www.cg.gov.dz/gouvemement/chef-G/discours/Reponse-APN.doc
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registered associations, while omitting any reference to the absence o f  associations on the 
ground.
Despite the lack o f  hard data on this discrepancy, there is evidence to support a particular 
hypothesis. This relies on data concerning patterns o f  growth o f  local associations, and the 
procedures em ployed by wilayas to keep track o f  such growth. According to the M ASSN, 
“some Wilaya administrations have been undertaking a process to clean up their lists o f  local 
associations in order to establish a clearer picture o f  the size and quality o f  the sector in each 
region” 133. Such ‘cleaning up’ o f  associations’ lists was invoked at various stages by the 
press,134 and w e know that in 1998 it was about to be carried out in Oran [Derras, 1998]. 
Table 2, which shows the growth in registered local associations between 1994 and 2001, 
suggests that other wilayas updated their lists.
Figure 4.2: Percentage growth in registered local associations by wilaya 1994-2001
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The table shows average growth at 72.19% , with peaks reaching 163% in the wilaya o f  
Tiaret, 214% in Tebessa and 221% in Illizi - trends in stark contrast to the modest 7.4%  
growth in Boumerdes, and Mascara’s stagnation at 0.54%. What is most remarkable though 
is the trend shown by the wilayas o f  Medea and Ouargla, where over the years the number o f  
registered associations actually decreased. By assuming that the concerned wilaya 
authorities cleaned up the associations’ lists -  an assumption which seems valid at least in 
the case for Ouargla, where the authorities update their lists regularly135 - and by
133 MASSN (2000) Internal Report
134 See for instance Sofiane Bensalam ‘A ssainissem ent’ El Watan 07 March 2002.
135 See ‘Gel des Activites de 222 Associations, El Watan 20/06/94 and La tribune 20th October 2001. 
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extrapolating the results at national level, the discrepancy between registered and active 
associations would have to be reckoned in the tens of thousands. This would substantiate the 
widespread belief that official figures are misleading and provide a certain twist to the story 
of associative vibrancy made popular by the literature. During its first 15 years, Algeria’s 
associative development went through a wild process of formation whose outstanding rates 
of growth were matched by equally outstanding degrees of inertia and decay. A few 
examples of the dynamics characterising relations among members shed light on what allows 
for survival and determines decay in Algerian associational life.
Out o f distrust
Popular outside Algeria, the vision of the associative sector as a site of trust by no means 
corresponds to domestic views. If anything, associations are better known to Algerians for 
the climate of mistrust reigning inside them. In taking a sceptical look at the benefits of the 
associative sector, one journalist for instance claimed that “in the Algerian associative 
movement, the relationships among members look like those between unfortunate lovers 
[showing] first enthusiasm and commitment, and then arguments, misunderstandings and 
divisions”.136 Representatives of Algerian associations themselves attribute their abortive 
associative experiences to strained relations among members. On the basis of a survey of 
perceptions among the membership of Oran-based associations, Derras claims that “the 
unhealthy climate generated by internal rivalries and fallings-out constitute one of the main 
flaws leading to the atrophy of associations”. Seventy per cent of respondents in his sample 
cite conflicting relations as the main problem affecting their associative experience, while 
seventeen per cent chose not to express themselves on the subject. [1998:113]. This might 
explain associations’ often limited membership. In Maghnia for instance, “at present, even 
when they have an office, associations are not active and many are composed of no more 
than two or three people”.137
Asserting that strained relations among members are at the core of the decline of associations 
provides only one side of the story. An equally valid claim would be that lack of trust among 
members not only determines associative decay but also accounts for their multiplication. A 
number of examples can be cited in this respect, with Algeria’s Rotarians providing a notable 
one. Algiers’ first Rotary Club (RC) was created immediately following the approval of the
El Watan 23/07/94. This would explain why in terms o f associative density, Ghardaia is the worst 
performer among the Southern Wilayas (see table 3).
136 El Watan 5 may 1997.
137 Chahreddine Berriah, Maghnia: Ou va 1’argent des associations? El Watan, 30 May 1996.
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1990 law on freedom of association. In the space of a dozen years the capital could count 
five more Clubs. What is striking in the Rotary Clubs’ growth is that it does not necessarily 
stem from any particular increase in members, but follows the dynamic of internal schisms. 
While still serving as president of the RC ‘Alger La Blanche’, Dr Hamid Brahimi declared 
that at the end of his 2001 mandate he would quit the club to found another one - the RC 
‘Alger La Baie’. In the process, his circle of friends from ‘La Blanche’ left their previous 
club to follow him, and form the core membership group of the new club. Moreover, the 
RotarAct (young Rotarians) attached to the previous club was disbanded, and some of his 
members set up a new one linked to ‘La Baie’. Brahimi’s daughter, who for some years had 
been a prominent member in the RotarAct ‘Alger La Blanche’ put the reasons behind the 
change in this way:
Everybody was aware that it had become quite difficult to work. For years the projects were 
stalled because o f tensions inside the club. This is why my father decided to start a new club, 
together with Khodja and others friends of his, who were more active. With the Rotaract it has 
been the same, and from the very beginning. There are always some clans that emerge. In the end 
we didn’t even meet up any more, and so we were happy to leave. If we left it’s out o f the distrust 
that developed.138
Besides questioning the link between associational life and trust, this impressionistic account 
of the way Algerian associations ‘grow’ by multiplying through divisions points to two 
recurrent features of Algeria’s associative development. One is the prominent role of the 
president, and the other is the presence of family members among the core membership 
group. A few examples show how these elements are prevalent in a wide variety of 
associations and particularly in those that survive the associative sector’s tendency towards 
inertia and decay discussed above.
Surviving decay: associative presidentialism
The process by which associations split into two (or more) because of the personal drive of 
some members is far from being peculiar to the Rotary Clubs. The women’s movement 
provides another prominent case. As seen above,139 women’s groups constituted one of the 
pioneering elements of Algeria’s associative sector, both chronologically and in terms of
138 Interview with Amira Brahimi, commercial agent for Pfeizer pharmaceutics and Rotaract member 
Algiers, 21 July 2001
139 Chapter two provides a historical account of the development o f the women’s movement.
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their activities. Because of the political context in which they developed and the vocal stance 
they adopted, women’s associations attracted the lion’s share of international attention, 
which often portrayed them as the bastion against fundamentalism and violence.140
Among the first to be created, the Association for Equality between men and women under 
the law141 was led by Khalida Messaoudi. This is how she recalls the beginnings of the 
association:
The first association {Equality) counted four Trotskyists out o f  40 members. I was elected 
president and Louisa Hanoune142 secretary general. The rest were women committed to the 
cause o f  women’s rights...at that time we had an enemy, and we thought in these terms and 
we were respected for that. At university the boys mocked us, because we were feminists, but 
they also helped us, especially with security when we had meetings. It was a constant battle, 
and we were so driven by our own hatred. If Equality has been the association where there 
was most debate [it was] because o f these circumstances. We had some huge dust-ups, but it 
worked. Until the day when somebody decided to ‘cleanse’ a town in Ouargla o f all the 
women who lived there alone. It is the same thing that happened in Hassi Messaoud,143 they 
set the place on fire. The association held a meeting with the idea o f  going into the street and 
holding a march, but the Trotskyists refused, saying that what had happened was due to 
social exclusion, that these people suffered from poverty and unemployment and that one had 
to address the economic and social issues to solve the situation. It was at this point that the 
association split: the Trotskyists did not back down. Even if  the bylaws stated that decisions 
were taken by majority and that in the case o f a tied vote the president’s vote decided, we had 
always worked on the basis o f  consensus. It was here that I stepped down, and in January 
[1990] we set up Triomphe.,44
But then it really started. I don’t know whether one day we could draw the balance sheet o f  
all the destruction. Beside the dead, the infrastructure, terrorism did something worse: it 
emptied the public spaces. People left the country. So in 1993, o f the 12 members o f  the 
bureau, only three were still living in Algeria. Now there are only two. During the electoral 
campaign for Zeroual, in the years between 1993, 1994 the women’s movement was still the 
most active one, intellectuals had left, and public opinion was in fact women. The 
presidential elections were the occasion for members of women’s association to get on the 
street, two from SOS Femmes en D6tresse, two from Triomphe. Because what happened to 
our associations happened to all o f them: associations were still there, but they were like
140 Chapter 7 develops this point.
141 Association pour I ’egalite entre hommes et femmes, more commonly known as Egalite
142 Louisa Hanoune, like Khalida Messaoudi, is a women’s rights activist turned politician. She leads 
the Workers’ Party (Parti de Travailleurs, PT).
143 The Hassi Messaoud affair is dealt with in chapter 3
144 The independent association for the triumph of women’s rights, Association Jndependante pour le 
Triomphe des Droits des Femmes, A1TDF
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heads without bodies. In November 1995, when we set up Rachda we tried to do things 
differently, we really tried to work with a base.145
Eight years after Messaoudi was elected MP,146 the association Triomphe still existed. I met 
its president at a meeting of women groups’ representatives aimed at calling for a boycott of 
the October 2002 local elections. Sitting among her colleagues, she portrayed Messaoudi’s 
career in this way:
Just think that in the lists o f the United Nations she is still mentioned as president o f Triomphe. 
Abroad, you Europeans see Khalida as the symbol o f the women’s movement, when in fact she 
tried to ruin one association after another. She started well before Equality, she started at 
university in the student committees. And then she went on. She even claims she contributed to 
set up SOS Femmes en Detresse, when she did everything to wreck it, given that she could not 
control it. If she got to where she is today it’s because o f  the women’s movement.147 Everybody 
knows that she was in it for her personal ambitions.148
Messaoudi’s account of the deeply political reasons for the splits inside the associations she 
led might not be shared by her fellow activists, but her comparison of women’s groups as 
‘heads without bodies’ would less easily be rejected. Certainly not by Mrs Harhad herself, 
who is not only Triomphe’s president, but also its only member. The identification of 
associations with their leader seems to be characteristic of many women’s associations, 
impinging not only on their internal affairs, but also on the way they relate to each other. 
This is how Malika Remaoune, president of the Oran-based Association feminine pour 
Vepanouissement de la personne et Vexercice de la citoyennete (AFEPEC), describes the 
rival tensions pervading the world of women’s associations in Algiers:
Here in Oran the situation is different. It might be because it is the capital, because they are near 
the administration, I wouldn’t know, but in Algiers they have a different way o f  working. Every 
time I go to Algiers for a meeting we end up with nothing. There are always problems of
145 Interview with Khalida Messaoudi, President o f RACHDA and Minister o f Communication, 
Algiers, 23 January 2002. RACHDA is Messaoudi’s last association. When she entered the 
government she was still President, with no executive powers. Chapter 5 and 6 provide more insights 
into this association.
146 Khalida Messaoudi was elected on the lists o f the Rally for Culture and Democracy, which she left 
in May 2001. More on Messaoudi’s political career in chapter 6, which deals with the relationships 
between associations and the party sphere.
147 The case o f  SOS Femmes en Detresse is dealt with in detail in chapter 6, again in the context o f the 
analysis o f  the relationship between the associative and party spheres.
148 Interview with Ouardia Harhad, President o f the Association Independante pour le Triomphe 
des Droits des Femmes AITDF, Algiers, 7 October 2002
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leadership, o f organising future actions. There are too many people around the table who only 
think o f themselves.149
But the problems in the organisation of collective action are certainly not exclusive to 
Algiers’ associative life. The paralysis affecting an EU-funded project aimed at building a 
network of associations with the idea of sensitising Algerian society to women’s needs 
shows that the same issues also arise from the way Oran-based associations such as the 
AFEPEC operate:150
Eight associations were in it from the start: RACHDA, AFEPEC, SOS Femmes en D&resse and 
others. Malika Remaoune was central to the whole project. She was the one getting the contacts 
with 1MED151 in Italy. But the project required that one person be employed to manage the 
money. An accountant was recruited. But then the AFEPEC representative in the steering 
committee meddled with the whole process, claiming that their association was the leading 
agency, and that the money was to be managed by some o f their members. That’s why the project 
stopped. At 1MED the person in charge o f this really does not understand what happened. If 
you’re not based here I guess it’s difficult to understand. It’s just that when one tries to put all 
these people together one doesn’t get anywhere.152
Women’s associations’ limited membership as well as the central, and at times overbearing, 
role of their president is not unfamiliar to representatives of international organisations and 
NGOs working in Algeria. But, as the case of 1MED shows, when these justify their 
operations and reasons for being in Algeria by appealing to the existence of a thriving local 
‘civil society’, their awareness of the reality on the ground can turn into a cause of 
embarrassment. Amnesty International provides another case:
But where are they, where are these associations? They ask to meet us at the [Hotel] Saint 
Georges, they come and talk. But it’s always the same faces, usually the president and someone 
else. I have never seen the list o f members o f  these pseudo-associations, and certainly not the 
members themselves, and - trust me - 1 asked to, and many times.153
149 Interview with Malika Remaoune, AFEPEC President, Oran 23 October 2001
150 This project was part o f the "European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights”, funded by the 
EU. Chapter 7 examines the EU’s democracy assistance programme in Algeria in more depth.
151 The Italy-based lnstituto per il Mediterraneo (IMED) was chosen as executing agency of the 
project.
152 Interview with Riccardo Varotto, Italian Embassy’s intern, Algiers 4 October 2002
153 Interview with Donatella Rovera, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Amnesty 
International Secretariat, London April, 2001. Chapter 7 describes how the centrality o f  the president 
might not always be a burden for donors, particularly when implementing civil society support 
programmes.
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Despite being a strikingly recurrent feature of the women’s movement, associative 
presidentialism is far from being unique to it. While investigating the issue of the 
governance structure of environmental associations, and more particularly the extent to 
which it can be qualified as democratic, UNDP states “inside associations, the president is 
the key person and represents the most stable element. [Out of forty-six associations], only 
thirty-three proceeded with the re-election of their management boards. Seventeen re-elected 
the entire executive bureau but only nine re-elected their presidents. In all these cases, apart 
from one or two exceptions, there was a systematic reappointment of the same president” 
[1998:41].
When commenting on this ‘presidential bias’, Algerian observers tend to consider it as an 
aberration. Derras, for instance, explains the “deterioration of the relationship between the 
president and the rest of the members” and the low turnover of presidents inside associations 
through “the weakness in the tradition of collective commitment, the inexperience at the 
level of management and the lack of associative culture”. [1998:109], These views though 
fail to recognise that if associative presidentialism appears as such a frequent feature of 
Algeria’s voluntary sector, it might be because the associations that survive the process of 
decay are frequently those precisely centred around, or sometimes limited to, their 
determined, energetic and often ambitiously individualistic presidents.
The ambivalent nature of the centrality of the president - its being disapproved of while at 
the same time considered necessary for associations’ continued existence - is further 
illustrated by two very different examples. One youth constituting sitting on the permanent 
bureau of the Rally for Youth Action (RAJ) explained the ‘formal’ lack of a president in 
their association in the following way:
When Dalila [Taleb] left RAJ154 we decided not to elect another president. We do not need a 
president. Hakim has been here for years and if  RAJ is still going on it’s purely [due to him]. Even 
i f  the law requires having a president, having elections, what does it matter? For them it would be 
better if  we all went back home, some back in Kabylia, and the others on the street, unemployed. 
And instead we’ll continue to cause upset, like w e’ve done the other day, on 10 October.155 Did you
154 Dalila Taleb, former president o f RAJ, was elected as MP on the lists o f the Socialist Forces Front 
(FFS) in 1997. Hakim Haddad, who back then was already secretary general, was also running on the 
FFS lists, but failed to get elected.
155 10 October is the anniversary o f the October 1988’s bloodshed, when during massive 
demonstrations all over the country, the army fired on the crowds in Algiers, killing several hundred 
people. RAJ commemorates this episode every year in Algiers’s Place des Martyrs, despite overt 
pressures from authorities.
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see Hakim speaking in Place de Martyrs? He wants to remain secretary general, because he’s too 
good to be president”.156
The tension between adhering to formal governance requirements and carrying out 
significant levels of activity also emerges from the work ethic characterising the Islamic 
Charitable Association. One of the most popular Islamic charities in Algiers, if not in the 
entire country, I ’Association lslamique de Bienfaisance (AIB) was founded by Sheikh 
Chemseddine Bouroubi, grandson of an Imam and enfant du quartier. In July 1989, at the 
age of 24, after 14 years of Coranic School, Chemseddine decided to commit himself full 
time to directing the association:
We are not a ministry. We have 15 members because it’s required by law, but we do not have the 
resources to pay for so many people. We are not a ministry, but a charity. We do have elections, 
every few years, but it doesn’t matter who’s the president. It is getting the work done that matters. 
Do you know how many associations there are which don’t do anything but meetings? There are 14 
projects to run, and a number o f commissions in charge o f  all o f them: the Social Affairs 
commission deals with health, weddings and orphans. Then there’s a women commission in charge 
o f the Professional Training for women, and so on. We give away 2000 school bags a year and soon 
it will be Ramadan. People get in touch with us from all over Algeria to work with us, and they ask 
me to use the name o f the association, but I’ve always refused. At the Conference on the 
Associative Movement they wanted to make me the representative o f the associative movement in 
Algiers, but 1 declined. I’ve got ministers visiting me every other week, congratulating me for my 
work. I tell them that all 1 want to do is work. And they don’t let me. Now they say they need the 
metro line to go right under here and that I need to move, but there’s no way I’ll move if  they don’t 
give me another space like this.157
The AIB looks more like a small business venture than an association. Its four employees 
spend every morning dealing with the associations’ public image. The association produces 
an incredible amount of “informative material” -  leaflets, press adverts, posters - explaining 
the rationale of its activities. By 11 am each day, 2000 letters containing promotional leaflets 
reach the post office to be sent all over the country. As Chemseddine makes clear: “here, we 
are specialists in marketing campaigns”. A brief text explains how the reader can contribute 
to the associations’ activities, while full coloured pictures describe the associations’ diverse 
projects. Every leaflet stresses the trustworthiness and the reliability and the ‘return’ of the 
donation, to which five current account numbers follow - a conventional one, a postal one,
156 Interview with Nasim, RAJ member, 12 October 2001
157 Interview with Chemseddine Bouroubi, President of the Islamic Charity Association, Belcourt, 
Algiers, 4 September 2001.
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one in foreign currency and two zakat accounts. The name of the association appears in 
Arabic, in English, and, in slightly smaller characters in French. According to Chemseddine, 
this is purely due to the fact that English these days is more fashionable.158 As Chemseddine 
states: “charities have to be structured, organised and effective...instead of distributing the 
zakat anarchically, it would be better to set up a bank and invest the money rationally, in 
large and profitable projects.159
The reasons for Chemseddine’s concern about his visibility will be clear later on, when the 
events leading to the authorities’ decisions to freeze his association will be addressed.160 For 
now it suffices to note that the AIB provides another clue leading to the questioning of the 
link between associational life and trust. Unlike the “networks of Islamic charities implanted 
in the Mosques” [Ben Nefissa, 2000] which during the 1980s -  before their activities were 
blocked following the dissolution of the FIS in 1992 - thrived on the voluntary work of 
supporters, the Islamic Charity Association based its success on its president’s drive. In this 
regard the AIB is similar to many of those associations that were created in the 1990s and 
which carried on their activities in domains as varied as the environment and women’s 
rights. Its presidential character does not contrast with its religious message, just as Dr 
Brahimi’s drive never contrasted with the formal objectives of the Rotarians, or Messaoudi’s 
central role within half a dozen women’s associations did not conflict with the cause of 
women’s rights, at least in the short term. Because of the patterns of managerial style and the 
governance arrangements characterising them, these examples of surviving Algerian 
associations appear more similar to start-ups or informal economic ventures than to the 
model of a civic association. They survive through the entrepreneurial drive of a sort of 
associative CEO, with few members, or more often some employees, revolving around him 
or her. An examination of how these members and employees are chosen shows that 
presidents are far from being alone inside associations: their family often surrounds them.
Surviving decay II: associative familism
Edward Banfield’s theory of the amoral familist society [1958] provided Putnam with the 
explanation of why Italian regions had diverged in their associative density and levels of
158 Benrabah instead attaches political significance to the use o f  English when he writes about the 
reform of education: “the introduction o f English in primary schools follows from the attempt to 
progressively get rid of the French language, and “cut the grass” under the francophones’ feet. The 
superiority o f  Shakespeare’s language is an Islamist claim and its acceptance by the authorities is a 
concession in their favour”.
159 M. Yacine ‘Association de Bienfaisance: de 1’Aumone a la Charity d’Entreprise’ El Watan, 5 May 
1998
160 See Chapter 6
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social capital, leaving the South lagging behind while the North was blessed with prosperity 
and good government. When Banfield carried out his study, he described the Southern 
Italians as characterised by “amoral familism” - a pervasive predisposition to rely solely on 
the nearest circle of relatives and distrust anyone else. The familist culture causes those 
impersonal social relations on which the civic ethos thrives to atrophy. Hence, in Putnam’s 
framework, the South’s low associative density and its poor political and economic 
development.
It is strange how transpositions of the civil society/social capital paradigm to developing 
countries regularly skip over the issue of familism, when the cultural, economic and political 
role of the family is so remarkable. Some observers of the Middle East and North Africa, for 
instance, consider it as the basis of society’s functioning and structure and, more 
importantly, the main driver of its adaptation to exogenous political and economic change 
[Sharabi, 1988]. In the case of Algeria, putting the family into the analysis of associational 
life would foster a reconsideration of its significance.
As we have seen, associations’ often dismal membership is as known as the gap between 
active and formally existing associations. Besides orbiting around the president, the core 
membership group frequently comprises one or more individuals from his or her family. In 
order to back their claim that “democracy inside associations is only effective from a formal 
point of view”, the UNDP-sponsored consultants evaluating environment-related 
associations notice that “the omnipresent and central role of the president... is accentuated by 
the proximity of the bureau whose symbiosis with the president is confirmed by the fact that 
more than a third of the 46 bureaus [surveyed] contain more than one person having the 
same family name....this element raises the issue of the kinship ethos characterising part of 
the associative movement” [UNDP, 1998:41].
Far from being unique to environment-related associations, it would appear that this family 
character pervades the entire associative sector. Associations based at the Maison des 
Associations in Bolognine show a frequent occurrence of members sharing the same family 
name, especially that of the president (see Annex). The cynical stance of the director of the 
MAB sheds some light on the reasons behind ‘family-run’ associations:
If the law requires a minimum of 15 members to set up an association, and you want to do it, 
who are the first people you turn to? You need somebody that deals with the finances, 
another that deals with the APC, or the wilaya. Who better than your brother, or your son to 
do it? And then after three years there are the elections o f the bureau: your cousin, who was
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treasurer, gets elected as the secretary general, you make your new brother in law vice 
president, and your son becomes treasurer. You o f course remain president, and on top o f that 
the money stays with the family”.161
The value of these comments is somewhat reflected in the experience of the National 
Council for Mutual Aid for Youth and Children (Conseil National d ’Entraide pour la 
Jeunesse et I ’Enfance- CNEJE) -  a prominent association enjoying consultative status at the 
UN NGO committee. In his office based in the commercial centre of Ryad El Fath, Mr 
Bengana, the CNEJE’s president, explains why he chose to employ his niece as secretary:
She’s nice and reliable, with a degree in business and marketing. Even if  she weren’t my 
niece I’d employ her anyway. And yet it’s true that this is not a normal association, and that 
we deal with personalities o f a certain calibre, and often with sensitive issues. You cannot 
just have faith in anybody to do this job.162
Associations do not always revolve around the axis of the family from their birth. Some 
become more family-centred as they develop. Amira Brahimi’s account of the reasons why 
she followed her father in the new Rotary Club illustrates this, as do Mme Sai’dani’s reasons 
for leaving Tharwa Fadhma n 'Soumer, a women’s rights associations based in Algiers:
Tharwa has become une association de famille managed by Ourida Chouaki (president) and 
Yasmina [her sister]. They keep all the documents at home, and the fax and PC are there too. 
Djazia [Djazia Ait Kaki, secretary general o f Tharwa Fadhma n’Soumer, and at the same time 
member o f  Mme SaTdani’s Actions Solidarites] does not have access to anything, she is literally 
cut out o f  the management of the association. Now, they also have their link in France: a woman 
o f their family married a Frenchman from Toulouse. They get money from French NGOs and 
every other month they get their little trip to France. I preferred to set up my own association, 
even if  I had to use my husband’s grocery shop as an office. In fact I’m planning to set up another 
one, PAssociation de Femmes d’Alger: we have already 45 members, we cover almost every 
wilaya. We think we can register as national association.163
In lamenting her exclusion from the family-run management, Mme Sai'dani neglected to 
mention that besides the Chouaki sisters, Tharwa Fadhma n ’Soumeur also included another 
family, the Ait Kaki, which beside Djazia included her sister Leila. When Leila quit, Djazia
161 Interview with Nabil Mekhzani, 36 year old, MAB acting Director, Bologhine, Algiers, 14 
September 2001
162 Interview with Belgacem Bengana, CNEJE President, Algiers, 8 January 2002
163 Interview with Mrs Malika Sai'dani, President of ‘Actions Solidarity Femmes d’Alger’, Algiers, 
14 October, 2001
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was left struggling to sustain the Alt Kaki’s attempts to control the association, ultimately 
losing the fight. Associations can indeed become the arena in which family rivalries are 
played out. Yet, often in cases where there is a family the association has a better chance to 
survive its internal tensions. The development of SOS Culture Bab el Oued (SOSBEO) 
provides one example.
According to some of its members, in the summer of 2002, Belkacem Aidoun, SOSBEO 
president, left Algeria with more than AD200,000 (at the time equivalent to a black market 
value of US$2000) belonging to the association and joined his wife in France. The money 
came partly from a sum (AD59,000) granted by CARITAS to fund a project providing 
professional training to eight young people in France. The latter were refused visas by the 
French embassy, and the money was left with Belkacem for an indefinite period. 
Furhermore, he pocketed an additional ADI 50,000 from the sale of a sound system and other 
material the association used to organise concerts.
The report made by Nacer Meghenine, SOSBEO Secretary General, to other members 
following Aidoun’s departure, reads
For a while the objectives o f the president had no longer coincided wth those o f the association, 
which has always proclaimed ‘Algeria First’ as its achievements so far testify. Unfortunately little 
by little, in the eyes o f its president, SOS Culture became SOS Belkacem, as many ironically say, 
who considered it as his promotion and travel agency. He did not understand that the choice o f  
creating an association having music as main mean to reach young people in the neighborhood was 
not an end in itself. He often contested completely transparent choices, like the mission to Brussels 
o f  the vice-president and the treasurer, which resulted in a grant of AD700,000. This money was 
then used to rent a space for the associations’ headquarters. This space belonged to Belkacem’s 
family and was very over-priced given that it was nothing more than a garage, ...Rather than a 
president, he revealed himself as a petty dictator. ‘Houmisme,164 and opportunism prevailed over 
proper management and the association’s interests, to the extent that members o f the bureau are not 
allowed to use or know the official email address o f the association, while his friends do. While the 
relationships with his friends were privileged, he isolated himself from the majority o f the youth in 
the association, whom he deems dangerous and derides. And he takes this attitude not only towards 
the youth but also towards women. With his misogynist attitude he does not allow his wife -  a 
member of the bureau - to take part in any activity, while at the same time she enjoys the privileges
Houmisme : tendency to favour one’s friends and neighbours living in one’s houma, district, 
quartier.
84
Out o f Trust?
o f her position. ... the association has been dealt a hard blow by the wrongdoings of its president, 
and the time has come for a new general assembly.165
Following the general assembly, Djamila - Nacer’s wife - was made Secretary General and 
her sister remained the associations’ Treasurer. The SOSBEO Bureau was now completely 
centred on one family, Nacer’s. A few weeks after the reorganisation of the bureau, Nacer, 
the new president, was already envisaging the association’s future:
He has embarrassed us vis-a-vis our partners abroad, and the people who believed in us here. He 
considered the association as his private property and many had understood this for a while. He 
behaved like the manager o f a firm, with the attitude: ‘i f  I leave; I take the keys with me’ and so 
on. This time besides the money he took the official stamps o f the associations, and even our 
address book. Now that Belkacem has gone, we can set up the new room where people can 
rehearse. Before financing the redevelopment o f the new building, CARITAS obviously wanted 
to make sure that this affair was sorted out. They’re betting their money on us, and this time we 
won’t disappoint them .166
Four years later SOSBEO was still up and running. It kept organising concerts and 
promoting young musicians inside and outside Algeria, still giving a hard time to the 
authorities at every possible occasion and still providing the entry point to Bab El Oued for 
foreign correspondents, in search of sub-proletarian hittistes167 and their stories of 
marginalised youth.168
Ignoring the family in the analysis of Algerian associational life has certainly facilitated the 
application of notions of civil society, but it also concealed part of the story. It is true that the 
family ethos of Algerian associations can appear ‘amoral’. It tends to regulate conflict by 
excluding non-family members, thus stifling the openness of associational life, and 
maintaining its logic in pre-public dimension of the family. But associative familism also has 
positive functions. It keeps the association together, protects its development from internal 
and external threats and preserves a degree of cohesion among core members, which is 
necessary to take the association’s activities forward in an efficient and effective way. It is
165 Rapport du Secretaire Generale au President de 1’association SOS Culture et a tous les membres 
adherents p. 1
166 Interview with Nacer Meghenine, SOSBEO President, Algiers, 4 October 2002
,67.Term derived from the word hitt, wall. Literally, person propping up the wall. Term generally used 
to indicate the unemployed youth lining the streets o f major towns cities.
168 Nacer Meghenine appears at length in the coverage o f  Bab el Oued in the 5 March 2003 by Radio 
France International following the visit o f France’s president Jacques Chirac in Algeria. More on 
SOSBEO in the following chapters
85
Out o f Trust?
worth asking if associations of this kind are really worth sustaining. As will become clear 
later on, key actors, including foreign donors and the state, tend to think so.
Conclusions
As Max Weber once remarked, ‘the quantitative spread of organisational activity does not 
always go hand in hand with its qualitative significance”.169 Algerian associational life is not 
always a locus of trust, and associations do not seem to form horizontal networks of 
reciprocity and cooperation, as claimed by much of the literature. Primarily, the notion that 
the Algeria of the 1990s was a burgeoning field of associative activity was largely based on 
official, but misleading, figures. These figures report only one side of Algeria’s process of 
associative development (its outstanding rates of growth) but ignored another, the equally 
astonishing tendency to collapse and decay to which associations often fall prey. Second, the 
dynamics regulating the establishment and multiplication of associations can be attributed to 
the emergence of ‘distrust’, i.e. divisions, fallings-out and factional rivalries among 
associations’ members, as much as to social trust. Third, associations that survive decay, and 
particularly those that do well in terms of reputation, scope of work and intensity of activity, 
generally do so because of the energies deployed by a single actor (usually the president), 
and not a group of members. Rather than pointing to individuals’ newly found logic of 
collective action, sometimes associational life seems to respond to a collective ethos of 
individual ambition and enterprise. Finally, very often an associations’ central figure is 
accompanied by his or her family members, which constitute the association’s core activist 
group. To an extent, associative familism discourages the development of ‘horizontal’ 
cooperation inside and outside associations. But it also ensures each association’s existence, 
by suppressing or preventing ‘non family’ members from engaging in dangerous 
interferences or threats to an association’s equilibrium, thus helping it achieve viability and 
visibility vis-a-vis the outside world. In part this might be due to the fact that when assessing 
associations, ‘trust’ does not count much either to those inside or outside associations. What 
counts is the effectiveness of their operations, their financial viability and the visibility of 
their impact or sheer existence. If associations do not always follow a civic ethos, it is 
because the associative logic is often an individualistically utilitarian one.170
These remarks are not meant to be sweeping generalisations. There is no attempt here at 
claiming that presidentialism and familism are traits making up an ‘ideal type’ of the
169 Quoted in Berman,1997: 407.
noAbdellah Tamine ‘Les associations gagnent en efficacit^’ El Watan, 14 October 2000.
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Algerian association, or that decay is the overriding pattern of Algeria’s associative 
development. Nor should this analysis lead us to draw a scenario a la Putnam, whereby these 
patterns of associative development stem from Algerian society’s failure to develop 
civicness and social capital. As seen before, this is a conclusion Algerians themselves, to the 
benefit of the authorities, came to.171 Rather, these findings should encourage a 
reconsideration of the neglect shown by enthusiastic observers of Algeria’s associational life 
for the conditions in which it developed, and raise some doubt about the theoretical 
foundations supporting their views.
Among the many points of criticism raised against mainstream views of civil society like the 
one embodied by Putnam’s concept of ‘social capital’ or Fukuyama’s notion of ‘trust’, the 
most relevant here is their disregard of the role that politics plays in development 
[Putzel,1997]. The “civil society consensus” disregards the interests and motives driving 
individuals and groups to get involved in the associative sphere, and the political framework 
in which associational life is embedded. It is in this respect that the ‘strong society, strong 
state’ view of Putnam, Fukuyama and co. appears a radical shift, but in truth contributes to 
maintain features of the previous paradigm, such as the neglect of political analysis and the 
anti-state perspective which is at the core of the Washington consensus [Fine,1999;2001], It 
is this disregard of politics that makes the civil society paradigm so easily applicable to 
different settings, but which also contributes to getting the picture wrong, as the Algerian 
case demonstrates.
In trying to readjust the interpretation of Algerian associational life, the following chapters 
will set out by considering the political conditions in which it developed.
171 See Chapter 3
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Chapter 5. Algerian associations from voice to loyalty 
Introduction
On the morning of 21 July 2001, commuters waiting in Place Audin -  home to one of 
Algiers’ busiest bus stations -  found themselves in front a more exotic choice of 
destinations than usual. During the previous night, the names of Algiers’s districts 
appearing on the departures boards had been defaced and the routes renamed. Audin- 
El Mouradia now read Audin-Los Angeles', Audin-Le Golf had turned into Audin- 
Nice; while Audin-Hydra was now Audin-Las Vegas. An example among many of 
Algerians’ pervasive irony, this episode also shows one other trait of their outlook -  
the widespread aspiration, particularly among youth, to leave the homeland.172
Emigration dreams are certainly not restricted to Algeria’s disenfranchised and 
frustrated youth. In this case though, they went hand in hand with another form of 
‘expatriation’, this time played domestically, and whose consequences the state is still 
grappling with -  political violence. As the interview Meriem Verges conducted with a 
hittiste showed [1995], the sensation of “living in a foreign country” common to many 
under 30s nourished both their desire to leave an environment void of opportunities 
and their aspiration to see it one day radically changed. At the beginning of the 1990s, 
the frustrated expectations of the youth filled the political reservoir of radical 
Islamism and in turn their swelling number fed the ranks of the guerrilla groups that 
declared war on taghout, the illegitimate state. [Pierre & Quandt, 1996: 11; 
Martinez, 1998].
Youth alienation is but one of the manifold symptoms of the breakdown in Algeria’s 
state-society relationship. These have been at the centre of analyses of the country’s 
political development for over a decade, generating a copious literature on the various 
dimensions of Algeria’s failing state.173 Quite oddly however, no corresponding 
analysis of the conditions allowing for the resilience of the state has yet been 
developed.
172 Already in 1991 a survey conducted by the National Office o f Statistics showed that 37% of 
under-35s wanted to emigrate. See Rarrbo [1995:210] and Lakhdar [2000:14-15].
173 See introduction.
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The ‘sustainability’ of the legitimacy deficit of the Algerian state can be partially 
explained through a political economy of Algerian associational life. The associative 
sphere has often been interpreted as a democratic solution to the authoritarian 
impasse, as the emergence of an institutional realm capable of narrowing down the 
state-society gap. As will be clear, associations did indeed provide a partial answer to 
the legitimacy deficit of the Algerian state, albeit of a very different nature. To 
understand the role of associational life in the country’s political change we need to 
consider the origins of the state’s legitimacy deficit in the crisis of Algeria’s post­
colonial pact and the shifting role of the public sector in articulating the state society 
relationship. The identification of the social categories on which the associative sector 
is based, the resources driving its growth and the institutional mechanisms regulating 
its relationship to the state show that despite their initial potential for political change 
associations ultimately contributed to preserving the stability of the political system 
and its fundamental institutional arrangements. In this light, associational life emerges 
as a sphere where state and society renegotiate their relationship to adjust to economic 
and political shocks. Not so much the expression of voice, but the renewal of post­
colonial loyalties and the avoidance of harmful political exits are the stuff associations 
are made for.
Post-independence loyalty, political exit and civic voice
To make sense of the Algerian youth’s emigration dreams and the motives of the 
Islamist insurgents, as well as the more general dynamics of physical and political exit 
in the country, it is useful to remember A.O. Hirschman’s analysis of organisational 
decline and survival [1970]. Hirschman showed that organisations tend to rely on 
three main mechanisms to maintain the support of their constituencies: exit, voice and 
loyalty. Firms avoid decline and improve performance by facing up to the market, i.e. 
the permanent possibility of customers’ ‘exit’ to products carrying better opportunity 
costs. But they also seek their customers’ allegiance through non-market means, such 
as for instance freebies and ‘loyalty’ cards. Lastly, to stay afloat, companies attempt to 
remain in tune with consumers’ preferences by allowing voice - the expression of 
customer (dis)satisfaction. Similarly, the organisational and institutional decline and 
success of unions, parties and states depends on vaiying blends of exit, voice and 
loyalty: militants, voters and citizens ensure organisational survival by expressing 
dissent, developing extra rational (ideological) links to the ‘organisation’ they belong 
to and inflicting exit sanctions.
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If viewed through Hirschman’s framework, Algeria’s political history appears as a 
shift from the stability of post-colonial loyalty to the discomfort of multiple forms of 
exits such as the one carried out by the Algerian youth. Post-independence Algeria 
appeared as a country that “despite serious obstacles [...] emerged as one of the most 
stable and seemingly successful of the Arab revolutionary republics” [Hudson, 1977: 
364]. Algeria’s remarkable postcolonial stability depended on four dimensions. 
Ideologically, the bases of state legitimacy rested on the political capital derived from 
nationalism and anti-colonial struggle; Financially, the revenues generated by 
hydrocarbon exports allowed for soft budget constraints in social and welfare 
expenditure. Institutionally, the state “reactivated” and exploited the traditional 
networks of patronage and clientelism pervading Algerian society [Etienne, 1977]. 
Organisationally, the party-state system provided the apparatus enshrining the 
legitimacy of the independence struggle and allowing the hydrocarbon rent to trickle 
down through welfare systems, subsidy arrangements, guaranteed employment 
schemes etc. [Liabes, 1988: 238; Luciani, 1990]. The result was a tacit social contract 
based on the promise of increasing or at least sustained prosperity in exchange for 
restrained demands for political rights [El Kenz, 1991; Testas, 2000]. Voice as a 
political mechanism was made unnecessary, or rather redundant, by an abundance of 
sources of loyalty.
Algeria’s faltering stability in the mid-1980s was due to the concomitant emergence 
of three factors. First, plummeting oil prices caused falling government revenues and 
acute budget deficits resulting in a tight fiscal crunch and cuts in social welfare 
[Blunden,1994]. Second, with their political capital discounted by the 20 years 
elapsed since the liberation war, the authorities had to deal with new generations less 
receptive to the appeal of independence struggle [Vandewalle, 1992]. Third, the 
combination of rapidly increasing population and rising expectations put under 
pressure the organisational machinery of consensus building -  party, mass 
organisations, etc. The October 1988 riots marked a dividing line in the history of 
post-colonial Algeria [Bourenane, 1989; Boukoubza, 1991; Garon, 93]. Interpreted as 
either due to the relentless fall in living standards [Seddon and Watson], or to “a 
generalised disavowal of the regime” [Roberts, 1992: 448; 2001], the scale and spread 
of the demonstrations as well as the precise targeting of symbols of the FLN-state, 
such as party offices, police commissariats, appeared as a clear end of the consensus 
established between rulers and ruled.
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Since then, the ‘breached pact view’ -  i.e. the idea that the legitimacy deficit affecting 
the Algerian state derives its origins from the collapse of the pact through which the 
people had entrusted their post-independence allegiance to the authorities, in the 
collapse of loyalty, has been one of the mainstays of Algerian studies [Tozi, 2000; 
Mae-Estrada, 2002]. John Entelis [1996: 1, 1999] for instance viewed the political 
stalemate as stemming from the breakdown of the “ruling bargain struck by the 
leadership with its people at independence”, while Kapil cited the vanishing “civic 
pact” as the prime reason for the violence [Kapil, 1995]. Domestic and foreign media 
reinforced these portrayals. In 2001 for instance a Jeune Independent op-ed argued 
that “[s]ince 1986, Algeria’s bases are crumbling because no alternative solutions 
have been found to the rupture of the social contract between le pouvoir and the 
people”.174 From the columns of Le Monde Diplomatique, Ghania Mouffouk justified 
the explosion of the 2001 Kabyle riots by claiming that “sticks and stones are the only 
means that millions of underprivileged Algerians have to demand a new social 
contract”, whilst Ihsane El Kadi [1998:58] wrote that throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
“Algerians have tom entire pages of their social contract apart”.175 In one of its 
critical attacks on the executive, the news website Algeria-Interface mocked the 
government for “clinching contracts for military hardware”, while “being incapable of 
securing anything resembling to a social contract”.176 Far from remaining limited to 
the academic and media communities, the collapsed pact argument is also central to 
the rhetoric of the political opposition. Speaking from a US-based detention centre, 
one of the main representatives of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS, Front lslamique 
du Salut) declared that “the FIS believes that no political stability can be attained 
without a social contract and trust established between governing and governed”.177 
From the other end of the political spectrum, the secularist Rally for Culture and 
Democracy denounced President Bouteflika’s policy of concorde civile and ‘the 
climate of impunity’ caused by it as yet another violation of the social contract.178
With Algeria shifting from a polity based on loyalty to one weakened by exit, the 
emergence of Algeria’s associative sphere was interpreted as an opportunity to reform 
the social contract around an institutional realm of ‘voice’. Drawing on de 
Tocqueville’s examination of 19th century American associationalism and in line with
174 Rachid Hammouche ‘Pour une reconciliation sociale’ Jeune Independant 30 January 2001.
175 Mouffouk, G [2001] ‘Algeria: only way up and out’ Le Monde Diplomatique, July.
176 Algeria-interface 7 December 2001.
177 Communique by Anwar N. Haddam, President of the Islamic Salvation Front Parliamentary 
Delegation Abroad, Detention Centre o f Manassas, Virginia 20 May, 1997 
http://www.librarv.comell.edu/colldev/mideast/20may97.htm
178 http://www.rcd-algerie.org/html/bulletin decembre.html December 2002.
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donors’ Good Governance agenda [Lewis, 2002: 571], these analyses see “voluntary 
associations enhancing] democracy by expanding the number and range of voices 
addressing government ...more civic actors means more opportunities for a wider 
range of interest groups to put pressure on and act as a watchdog vis-a-vis the 
state...to have a ‘voice’ [Silliman & Noble, 1998: 306; Mercer, 2002: 8],179 In relation 
to Algeria, the civic voice argument portrayed the associative sphere as a promising -  
if partial - solution to political crisis. In praising the creation of a space for legal, non­
violent protest, Layachi provocatively opposed ‘instating civil society’ to ‘reinstating 
the state’ as the most viable option for the re-foundation of the Algerian polity [1995]. 
In his discussion of the obduracy of Middle Eastern authoritarianism, Henry Moore 
singled out Algeria by arguing that, as compared to other countries equally stuck in 
the mires of authoritarian politics, “Algeria may be exceptional in that ...it has such a 
vibrant civil society ...that pressure for change may prove irresistible’ [1999:4].
A look at the professional categories present in Algerian associations casts some light 
on the validity of the civic voice view of the associative sphere, and shows that not 
only change, but also continuity, characterises its relationship to the state.
The social bases of associational life
One of the ideas underlying neo-liberal portrayals of civil society is that its growth 
is driven by emerging and increasingly assertive social groupings engaged in a 
struggle with the state to maintain or reshape the contours of the public-private 
divide [Gill,2002; Norton, 1996]. In the Algerian context though this view is only 
partially confirmed. As seen in chapter 2, women and human rights’ groups and 
more generally the set of Algeria’s associations emerging at the beginning of the 
1980s were indeed born within professional categories carrying new social and 
political demands, such as members of the liberal professions, academics, lawyers 
etc.180 20 years down the line though, the groups constituting the bulk of the social 
base of associational life are no longer the same.
179 For notable examples o f the neo-Tocquevillian view see Mercer [2002] who provides a 
review o f ‘the Anglophone academic literature on NGOs, civil society and democratisation in 
order to highlight assumptions and biases producing] this dominant normative consensus’. 
Lewis [2002] argues the usefulness o f thinking about civil society from outside the boundaries 
o f neo-Tocquevillian paradigm. These points are more widely dealt with in the introduction to 
the book.
180 Before 1987, the creation o f associations and their activities was regulated by a 1971 
ordinance. Chapter two examines the development o f  the legislative framework regulating 
associations’ relation to the state, from the colonial period to the present. Chapter 3 explores 
the state discourse on associations and its emphasis on democracy.
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Tables 5.1 to 5.3 provide a breakdown o f  membership by professional affiliation for 
three samples o f  local and national associations active in different domains.181 Table 1 
(M AB-Bologhine sample) shows associations’ members as being generally in full 
employment. Nearly two thirds are occupied in different branches o f  the public sector, 
with the biggest share employed in the civil service (30.85% ), education (27.24% ) and 
health (5.25% ) sectors. Only less than 20% o f  members are employed in the private 
sector.
T ab le 5.1 A ssociations m em b ersh ip  by professional affilia tion  (M aison  des A ssociation s o f  B ologh in e, A lgiers  
2002 n=723)
■SSH
Bureau M em b erP res iden t M e m b e r T otal (% )
l i v i i  serv ice  uocai ami 11
Executive
ationa i;
8 13 8
M iddle Ranking 
Low Ranking
2
6
43
40
54
49
T otal C iv il Serv ice 
iji]uc3non
16 (29 .09% ) 9 6 (4 2 .4 8 % ) 111 (2 5 .1 5 % ) 223 (30 .85% )
University Teacher 3 6 21
T eacher 4 24 37
Clerical 1 5 12
Student 4 21 59
Total E ducation 1 2 (2 1 .8 2 % ) 56 (24 .78% ) 129 (29 .2% )_________197 ( 27 .25%  )
H ealth
Doctor 4 8 9
Nurse 0 1 16
T otal H ealth  
Public E n terprise
4 (7 .27% ) 9 (3 .98% )
Executive State Enterprise 
Engineer
Adm inistrative
Worker
T otal Public Enterprises
1
2
7 (1 2 .7 3 % )
10
4
2 4 (1 0 .6 2 % )
20
30
62 (14% ) 93  ( 1 2 .8 6 % )
P rivate S ector
Shopkeepers 2 7 22
Entrepreneurs 1 1 3
Liberal Professions 4 13 17
Other 7 15 47
T otal Private S ector 1 4 (2 5 .4 5 % ) 3 6 (1 5 .9 3 % ) 8 9 (2 0 .1 % ) 139 ( 1 9 .2 3 % )
U nem ployed, 2 (3.64% ) 5(2 .2 1 % ) 26  (5.9% ) 33  (4 .5 6 % )
In full em ploym ent 49  (89  1%) 2 0 0 (8 8 .5 % ) 357  (80.7% ) 606(8 3 .1 2 % )
Not in full empl (Stud+Unem p.) 6  (10.9% ) 2 6 (1 1 .5 % ) 85 (19.3% ) 117(16 .18% )
T otal 55  (100% ) 226(1 0 0 % ) 4 42 (1 0 0 % ) 7 2 3 (1 0 0 % )
Sources: Primary Research at MAB, Bologhine
The Oran sample shows some similarities, but also a few  differences. First o f  all here 
again w e find the bulk o f  members employed in the public sector (66.32% ). Not 
surprisingly, the share o f  members employed in the civil service (12.63% ) is much
181 The data presented in Table 1 draw on primary research conducted at the M aison des 
Association o f Bologhine, Algiers, between July 2001 and October 2002. Data on the O ran and 
Environm ent samples are based respectively on Derras, 1999 and PNUD,1998. Coming lfom 
various sources, the data are only partially com parable, but do nonetheless provide a detailed 
picture o f  predominant professional groups within Algerian associations. See annex B for the 
list o f associations included in the MAB sample.
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less pronounced than in Algiers, the administrative capital, while the education 
(29.75% ) and health (5.26% ) sector figure prominently in this sample too. More 
surprisingly, Oran-based associations have less members employed in the private 
sector (11.58% ), but a higher share o f  members employed in public enterprises 
(18.68% ) and unemployed (8.68%).
T able 5.2 A ssocia tion s' M em b ersh ip  by Professional A ffiliation  - O ran (n =380)
■ 1 1
President Bureau Total
C ivil S erv ice
Executive (Cadre) 4 4
M iddle Ranking (Fonctionnaire) 5 8
Lower Ranking (Em pl./A ssist//Secretary) 4 23
T otal C iv il S erv ice 1 3 (1 3 .7 8 % ) 35  (12 .3% ) 4 8 (1 2 .6 3 % )
E ducation hhhhhhmhhhhmhh
University Teacher 1 4
T eacher 13 18
Clerical (Adj. Education) - 5
Student 15 57
T otal E d u cation 29 (30 .5% ) 84 (29 .48% ) 113 (29 .75% )
H ealth  S ector IMifllHHUflHHMI
Doctor 5 10
Nurse - 5
T otal H ealth 5 (5 .2% ) 15 (5 .26% ) 20  (5 .26% )
Public E n terprises ■ m
Engineer 5 14
Executive State Enterprise 3 18
Administrative (Secretary / A gent Tech.) 4 15
Worker 5 7
T otal Public E nterprises 1 7 (1 7 .9 % ) 54 (18 .94% ) 71 (18 .68% )
Private S ector
Shopkeepers 12 16
Entrepreneurs * -
Liberal Professions 3 7
Other 4 2
T otal P rivate S ector 1 9 (2 0 % ) 25 (8 .77% ) 44(11 .58% )
Unem ployed 8 (8.42% ) 25 (8.77% ) 33 (8.68% )
Other 3 (3 .15% ) 3 (1.05% ) 6 (1 .58% )
N o R esponse 1 (1.05% ) 44(1 5 .4 3 % ) 45(1 1 .8 4 % )
In full em ploym ent 72 (75.8% ) 203 (7 1 .3 % )
Inactive (Stud + Unem ) 23 (24.2% ) 82 (28.7% )
T otal 95  (100% ) 2 8 5 (1 0 0 % ) 3 8 0 (1 0 0 % )
Source: Derras 1998
The third sample includes only associations dealing with environment-related 
issues.182 Because o f  the way the information has been collected and organised in the 
original source [PNU D,1998 ], defining the split between the various categories is 
more problematic. For instance, entries such as Cadre and Engineer could apply to  
both public and private sectors.
182 Yet, the UNDP study from which the data is drawn from argues that these associations are 
usually active in a variety o f domains irrespective o f  their name or central mission, as Algerian 
associations in general.
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What is interesting though is the high percentage o f  engineers in the sample, which  
seem s to point to a link between type o f  profession and association activity and 
between professional level and level o f  associative responsibility. These features are 
also evident in the M AB sample, where in a number o f  cases membership is heavily 
linked to the professional activity o f  its members and the sector where the association  
is active.
These data show that Algerian associational life is no longer the expression o f  the 
strata that in the 1980s helped convey Algeria’s civic voice into the international 
arena. The exponential growth and diversification o f  associations have widened their 
social bases to progressively embrace a broader spectrum o f  social groups. Among 
these, the liberal professions and the private bourgeoisie are a distinct minority, while 
salaried categories including public sectors workers, teachers, doctors, engineers, now  
form its prime human material.
T ab le 5.3 E nvironm ent a ssoc ia tion s’ m em bersh ip  by p rofessional affiliation  (local and national, cou n try- w ide)
President Bureau M em bers
E xecutive (Cadre) 8 (17 .7% ) 86 (23.69% ) 5475 (17.62% )
Teacher 15(33 .3% ) 69(1 9 .0 0 % ) 11231 (36.15% )
Engineer 10(22 .2% ) 91 (25.06% ) -
Liberal Profession 8 (17 .7% ) 61 (16.8% ) 2199  (7.07% )
Students - (0.0% ) - (0.0% ) 6 500  (20.06% )
Agent Technique - (0.0% ) - (0.0% ) 1458 (4.69% )
Workers - (0.0% ) - (0.0% ) 2632  (8.47% )
Other 4 (8.88% ) 5 6 (1 5 .4 2 ) 678 (2.18% )
U nem ployed - (0.0% ) - (0.0% ) 887 (2.85% )
Total 45 363 31060
Source: UNDP, 1998
The presence o f  bureaucrats in the ranks o f  North African associations has been 
documented, but the phenomenon in Algeria shows som e peculiarities. Denoeux and 
Gateau showed the influence o f  the higher circles o f  the M akhzen18’ on M orocco’s 
associative sphere through ‘regional associations’ led by former ministers and royal 
advisors, and through a number o f  consultative councils based on associations 
supported by the royal cabinet [Denoeux&Gateau,1995:19]. Ben N efissa ’s assessment 
o f Egypt’s civic sector equally unveiled the overlapping between the associational 
sphere and the state, and particularly the bureaucracy. “A great part o f  associations -  
she claims - notably development associations, are led or indeed created by officials
183 The term "makhzen" literally means "warehouse" but has long been used in Moroccan 
Arabic to refer to the country’s elite, the state or the K ing’s immediate circle. It is also used to 
refer to  Morocco’s opaque power structure.
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of the ministry of social affairs itself’ [BenNefissa,1995:41]. In Algeria however, the 
overlap between the human material of the state and that of the associative sector 
involves not only the upper echelons of the bureaucracy, but also lower ranking 
employees in central and local government, as well teachers, doctors and nurses, etc. 
It is therefore worth asking what are the motivations pushing these groups into the 
associative sphere. Part of the answer lies in their social trajectory.
From state-class to associative class: The rise, fall and exit o f Algeria’s public 
sector strata
Algeria’s experience with forms of physical and political exit such as the one 
examined above goes back to well before 1988. Indeed, the politically motivated 
departure of brains and arms was one of the first challenges the state had to confront 
at the dawn of independence. Between 1961 and 1962, 900.000 people, mostly of 
European origin, left the country, starting an outflow that went on for years. Among 
these were individuals ensuring much of the colony’s productive capacity - 
entrepreneurs, farmers -  but also those responsible for the functioning of the 
administration and its interface with society, such as civil servants, doctors, teachers 
[Etienne, 1977: 298; Stora, 2001:10]. Finding a solution to the shortage of skills 
necessary for running the administrative machinery of the state and its basic social 
services meant a huge effort on the part of the newly independent state, and one 
leading to a massive social transformation.
The social strata emerging from this process shared a destiny closely linked to that of 
the state, through a relationship lying at the core of Algeria’s post-colonial pact.184
184 The quest for placing the social groups bom out o f  the first phase o f  state building under 
some unitary label has long and inconclusively haunted researchers. Halpem’s concept o f New  
Middle Class [1963] has been one o f  the first and most influential, i f  much disputed, attempts 
to bring together those owners o f technical and intellectual capital such as white-collar 
workers, civil servants, public-sector managers and those in the public sector. Others have 
disputed the application of the concept o f class as analytical category to Middle Eastern social 
structures. Waterbury’s discussion o f the notion o f state bourgeoisie is a notable example 
[1991]. In relation to Algeria, Roberts’s dissection o f whether the Algerian bureaucracy had a 
class character is a case in point [1982]. This is no place to take up this debate again. There is 
no question here o f saying that these groups are oriented towards collective action or have the 
character o f ‘class for itself, but simply, that the individuals belonging to these groups define 
their economic and social status in relation to the state, and in this sense they share a world 
vision, are governed by shared interests and develop similar social practices, which can remain 
individualistically, rather than collectively, oriented. In Algeria, to use El Kenz’s words, the 
strata “constituted o f individuals entirely tied to the state”, was “the only Algerian middle 
class”. In this sense, for its broadness and inclusiveness, Longuenesse’s category o f  
‘intermediate strata’ [1979] i.e. those categories made up by educated, salaried and fairly well
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From the elite of westernised civil servants described by Gellner as the ‘mamluks of 
the modem world’ [1981: 169] and by Etienne as the ‘technostructure of Algerian 
independence” [1977: 304] down to the teacher in rural Algeria, these groups were 
fundamental to the state building project. They shaped social expectations around a 
synthesis of themes combining industrial development, agrarian reform, anti­
imperialism and ensured the trickling down of the oil rents and the expansion of state 
welfarism [Camau, 1978: 124], These groups ensured the state’s legitimacy not 
simply through their own direct allegiance, but rather through the articulation of the 
apparatus of consensus within society [Leca, 1990: 154]. Acting as the state’s political 
broker and stabiliser group, the ‘fonction publique’ in Algeria played the role of 
Binder’s Second Stratum - “the necessary mediating instrument without which the 
ruling class cannot rule” [Binder, 12-3].
In return, the state middle classes could enjoy the benefits of a public sector which 
became a source of social status and a certain degree of prosperity. Pierre Bourdieu 
placed “the functionaries and lower ranking employees, as well as those assured of a 
stable and relatively remunerative job and all the related privileges, and freed from 
manual work” in the higher echelons of the indigenous class structure at the eve of 
independence. [1970: 125] This privileged position kept on improving during the 
next two decades. As Addi pointed out, the reward for carrying out the “the task of 
managing the public space and obtaining the consensus of the people” was “the 
privilege of extracting resources” [1999: 178]. For civil servants such privilege 
materialised in the capacity to control and direct the allocation of public resources, 
and exerting a degree of control over them, through embezzlement and corruption. 
The combination of high salaries and patrimonial practices of appropriation resulted in 
generally high standards of living.185 Besides, their capacity to extract, appropriate, 
redistribute the ideological and economic material generated by the construction of the 
Algerian state endowed them with high social position [Leca, 1990].
In this light, the liaison binding the Algerian state and the public sector strata can be 
seen as approaching the archetypal clientelistic relationship - a dyadic hierarchical 
relationship of reciprocity linking actors or entities deriving mutual benefits from it 
irrespective of the power asymmetries involved. Contrary to recent dismissals of 
clientelism as dysfunctional [Putnam, 1993: 173-175], clientelism has in the past been
o ff individuals employed by the expanding public sectors in the Middle East, is the one that 
approximates the definition o f “state middle classes” used in this chapter.
1 5 In this sense, under Veblen’s definition o f leisure class, the cohesion o f these educated and 
salaried strata constituted rested on their living standard and status differentiation.
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seen as central to state-society relations in Algeria. Bruno Etienne [1977] described 
the Algerian civil servants as enjoying the comfortable dual position of both patrons 
and clients. To the state they were clients, by acting as intermediaries distributing the 
material and symbolic elements of state building to society, through the administration 
of the allocation of goods, state contracts, welfare, education and notably the oil rent. 
To the citizen they were patrons, as access to state goods and perks, knowledge of the 
legal and administrative twists of the newly built state allowed them to exploit the 
system to secure favours from clients [Taibi, 1990].
The state-public sector relationship was however going to change. Writing at the end 
of the Boumedienne era -  the apex of the unique phase of true state-building in post­
colonial Algeria - Etienne suggested that with the establishment a legal-rational form 
of authority typical of a modern state, Algerian bureaucrats would have progressively 
lost their political leverage, and the patron-client relationship linking state and public 
sector groups would eventually have faded into one of normal dependence of the latter 
vis-a-vis the former. The unfinished business of Algeria’s state building in the 1980s 
and its near collapse in the 1990s disproves Etienne’s guess. As the material and 
social status of the public sector strata was defined in relation to the state’s material 
and ideological construction, which they contributed to and depended upon for their 
own existence and reproduction, when the modalities of state building were put into 
question the state middle classes faced their decline.186 This process happened in three 
dimensions. First, the fall in oil prices and the economic slump of the mid 1980s 
called for a reduction in the size and cost of the public sector. With the shrinking of 
resources pushing an abrupt revision of the mode of development, Algeria’s civil 
servants were trapped in what David Hirshman calls the ‘box of bureaucratic decline’, 
whose four corners are lack of resources, low incentives, poor public service 
commitment and low legitimacy [Hirshman, 1999: 287]. As their purchasing power 
was eroded by exchange rate devaluation, inflation and blocked salaries, bureaucrats, 
doctors, teachers and academics also saw the deterioration of their professional status
186 Boukhobza [1991: 36] made clear how the social positioning and sense o f belonging o f  
Algeria’s administrators, functionnaires, cadres and more widely public sector workers 
depended on the way the state perceives, treats and take care o f them. He wrote “Each social 
category has its own leaders whose legitimacy is drawn from their position and their capacity 
to embody the perceptions and ideologies o f the groups to which they belong. The relation to 
the state is mediated by the degree o f recognition that the latter manifests vis-a-vis the role o f  
the former through the prise en charge o f their respective interests. By the whole o f  the 
administrative and technical cadres, the state is perceived through the norms it applies and puts 
in place to choose its representatives at different levels...for the consideration that is granted to 
them. The perception o f  the state for these social categories and the type o f  representation o f  
this state in their consciousness are thus profoundly correlated to the cleavage between the oft- 
repeated official rules and the real practices o f those who decide”.
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and social role.187 Second, as the justification for cut backs in welfare expenditure 
became associated with the chronic inefficiencies of the public sector, public 
employees became the object of a smear campaign that portrayed them as the causes 
of the crisis.188 Already in 1987, the state made the necessity of public sector reform 
as one of the mainstays of its discourse on institutional renewal, leaving white collars, 
teachers etc with much of the responsibility for the crisis [Addi, 1990]189 
[Boussoumah, 1992], The need to “break down the bureaucracy” characterised several 
initiatives implemented at that time, such as the institution of a state secretary in 
charge of civil service and administrative reform”,190 and formed part of a press 
campaign against the bureaucracy.191 Far from ending with the 1980s reforms, both 
public sector reform initiatives,192 and the smear campaigns in the press193 remained a 
defining trait of Algeria for years to come, with obviously negative implications for 
the status of civil servants, who remain identified with the prime source of hogra.m  
Third, economic liberalisation and the growth of the informal economy led to the 
emergence of new social strata challenging the economic and social position of civil
187 A. Benyahia: ‘ Un pouvoir d’achat degrade’ E l Watan 26 April 2003; A. R. 
‘Remunerations et pouvoir d’achat: salaires de misere’, El Watan 24 February 2004 .
188 In line with domestic perceptions o f the public sector, foreign portrayals o f the Algerian 
administration often depict it as the main obstacle to political development. Pervaded by and 
allowing for corruption, Algeria’s self-serving bureaucracy attempts to maintain its hold on the 
public space and stretch its grasp on the private sphere [Talahite,2000]. Private interests 
occupy positions within the state apparatus [Martinez, 1998; Djerbal,1997 ] through forms o f  
predatory neo-patrimonialism which stalemate those reforms necessary to address the people’s 
ever deteriorating living conditions [Belkacem, 2001; Dillman,2000].
189 “How to regain the trust of citizens? The most lucid within the FLN [knew] the answer: by 
dismissing the numerous political, administrative and economic cadres who were nominated 
not becasue o f their skills but because o f  their belonging the dominant clientelistic groups”. L. 
Addi’SVide de Pouvoir et intolerance ’. Le Monde Diplomatique June 1990.
190 E l M oudjahid: ‘ Compte rendu des travaux du conseil des ministres’ 26 November, 1987 
pp. 2-3.
1 ‘La lutte contre la bureaucratie. Consolider 1’Etat de droit’ E l M oudjahid, 30 November 
1987; ‘Des hommes de qualite pour une administration de quality Revolution Africaine n. 
1250, 12 February 1988 p. 19.
192 Committee on the Reform of the structures and missions o f  the State, usually named 
Missoum Sbih Committee form the name o f its president. The final report stated that in order 
to accomplish the necessary state reform, around half o f Algeria’s 1.3 million civil servants 
(les employees de la fonction publique) need to be scrapped o f  their permanent contracts” 
A lgeria  interface, 14 November 2002 http://www.al geria-
interface.com/new/article.php?article id=643.
,93“La crise de Let at ...non pas seulement celle de 1’incapacite du pouvoir politique a realiser 
un projet consensuel, mais plus encore dans son incapacity a realiser ses promesses a travers un 
appareillage administratif incompetent et faiblement efficace. { ...}  L’etat politique est 
aujourd’hui malade de son administration...les gouvemants, tuteurs de 1’administration, n’ont 
pas 1 ’initiative dans son mode d’organisation et la responsabilite dans la recherche de la 
performance”. Douma, M. ‘L’etat malade de son administration’ Le Quotidien d ’Oran, 
29/11/01
194 See Khelifa, Kamel ‘La hogra en question’ Le Quotidien d ’Oran, 21 October 2001 p. 15 
part one and two Le Quotidien d ’Oran, 22 October 2001.
Chapter 3 looks at how associational life has also been subject to this kind o f scapegoat 
politics.
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servants, academics, doctors. The fall in purchasing power and status was harsher 
when measured in relation to the expanding category of Algeria’s nouveaux riches 
emerging from the interstices of the new informal economy. 195As UNDP recognised 
“the government’s attempt to carry out liberalisation was carried out through an 
alliance of private interests and state actors at the expense of the middle class and 
public employees” [1997:41]. The fear that the ascending trajectories of street 
vendors, smugglers, illegal builders, etc. inspired in the middle classes and the 
intelligentsia can be grasped from the titles of (particularly francophone) newspapers 
and from the vehemence with which Algeria’s academic discourse has condemned 
these new economic practices [Harrold].196 Echoing those op-eds depicting those 
profiting from informal economy as “predators...establishing their reign”197 and 
putting society “under a state of siege ,198 Mohammed Boukhobza in 1991 described 
the state as “responsible for the abnormal inversion of social hierarchies’, by writing: 
“we have witnessed a veritable inversion of social hierarchies... the characteristic of 
all this generation of noitveaux riches is to spread over almost all the social space, 
trying to impose themselves as the Algeria’s new middle class,199 while the public 
sector strata were suddenly ‘no longer in the middle’.200
The progressive weakening of the public sector strata can be explained in the logic of 
clientelism. Building on the idea of patrons and clients’ inter-dependence, John 
Waterbury suggested that mutual vulnerability (whether real of perceived) is critical to 
maintaining the tension keeping clientelistic relationships working [1977]. As 
“patronage is a means of protection for the politically exposed, both for the weak and 
for the politically powerful” [1977: 336-7] the degree to which a patron (client) can 
rely on the services (favours) of his/her client (patron) depends on the latter’s factual 
or apparent weaknesses in the relation to the external environment. Yet, no actor is 
prepared to see the other’s weakness/vulnerability pushed too far, as the mutual 
benefits accruing from the relationship would be imperilled. Therefore patrons might 
have a stake in the clients’ weakness, and clients might relish their patrons’
195 Martinez’s work on Algeria’s conflict and the actors benefiting from it is interesting for the 
profile o f the nouveaux riches [1998].
Guerroudj ib id  p. 42
197 Mebarek, B. ‘Biskra: Le regne des trabendistes’ El Watan 26 October 2001.
198 Anonymous ‘Blida, Les Marchands ambulants assiegent la ville’ E l Watan 26 October 
2001 .
199 Boukhobza. M’hammed (1991) Octobre 88: evolution ou rupture?  Alger: Bouchene. For 
similar analyses by some o f  Algeria’s most eminent academics see Tlemcani, State, B azar and  
Globalisation; and Daho Rabal on Monde Arabe).
200 Mustapha Chelfi ‘The middle class is no longer in the middle’ 23 October 2002 
http://www.algeria-interface.com/new/article.php7article id=632&lng=e.
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undermining, but only to an extent. Tied in a dialectical relationship analogous to 
Hegel’s slave and master, patrons would not be without their clients, and vice-versa 
[Gellner & Waterbury, 1977].
Indeed, the decline in the social and political outlook of the state middle classes had a 
profound impact on the state. Once the pillars of nationhood and state building, these 
groups started sharing the same aspirations of the disenfranchised Algerian youth.201 
As Rarrbo writes “if once emigration concerned low skilled workforce, since 1985 the 
first candidates for exiles are middle and upper cadres [1995: 211]. In December 
2002, during a plenary session of the National Consultative Social Council (CNES), 
one of its members declared that 400.000 Algerian cadres left the country between 
1992 and 1996, the equivalent of what “the country ha[d] produced during a 
decade”.202 Tozy believes that from the very beginning the impact of this outflow was 
more than symbolic: the “thousands of senior officials, creative artists and 
intellectuals who fled the country and sought refuge abroad deprived the country of a 
major part of its vital forces and of important bases for the support of the regime 
[2000: 48]”. As with the youth, physical and political exit came together. According 
to Chibber, “the policy responses to budgetary deficits in the late 1980s led to the 
middle classes’ exit from the FLN” [1996:127]. The opening of the political system at 
the end of the 1980s further clarified the progressive withering of social component of 
the state’s legitimacy. In the 1990 and 1991 elections, the Islamic Salvation Front 
managed to rally these social groups in a vote of protest against the regime. Beside 
targeting those constituencies benefiting from the collapse of the party-state system 
such as the alliance of petty traders, the small business sector and the poor), the FIS’s 
message appealed to those “that [had] previously benefited from the post-colonial 
settlement [such as] low-level bureaucrats, administrators, and the educated segment 
of the population”. [Chibber, 1996:127]
More than a decade after an army coup neutralised the electoral threat posed by the 
FIS, the situation of the disenchanted public sector strata was not ameliorated, and the 
legitimacy of the Algerian state remained in question. The issue of whether or not the 
state managed to retain a relationship with the public sector as a basis of support and a
201 Benchiba, Lakhdar ‘Le mur de 1'argent fragmente la society algerienne’ Le Monde 
Diplom atique  October 2000 pp. 14-15; N. Grim : ‘Retraites Anticipees, deparmenisation, 
marginalisation. 120.000 Cadres perdus pour FEtat. E l Watan, 17 February 2002.
202 Bouakkaz, Salim : ‘400.000 cadre ont quitte le pays en quatre ans’, Le Quotidien d ’Oran, 
17 december 2002; Mohammed Salah Mentouri: ‘Les Incertitudes sur le moyen terme sont 
trop nombreuses’ Algeria-Interface, 15 January 2003 htto://www.aleeria-interface.com /new/ 
article.php?article id= 671.
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sphere of political brokerage regulating conflict in society had not been raised. To be 
fair, the authorities did not fail to act to this effect. Contrary to the treatment 
administered to state enterprises, the drastic downsizing of the bureaucracy and public 
services sectors such as education and health as advocated by the IMF and the World 
Bank was avoided until well into the second Bouteflika Presidency. Moreover, 
measures to reduce the “alarming proportions” reached by the outflow of white collars 
workers were also put in place.203 The associative sphere was a less clearly stated, but 
certainly equally effective attempt deployed by the state to retain partial control of the 
disenfranchised middle classes, and the realm where the two could redevelop a 
mutually beneficial relationship.
The associative sphere as political settlement
Institutional change involves winners and losers. If groups and individuals exerting a 
degree of influence on the trajectory of reforms happen to be among the potential 
losers, they are likely to oppose change, for instance by carrying out exit sanctions 
[North, 1990]. Transition bribes are the side-payments that a reform initiating state 
needs to provide to those effectively resisting change to offset their perceived or 
actual costs [Khan, 1995]. The volume of these side-payments constitutes the price of 
the ‘political settlement’ -  the price of loyalty. In order to minimise it, the state has a 
stake in keeping opponents disorganised. The most effective transition bribes 
therefore work in an opposite way to Olson’s ‘selective incentives’ [1971]: they target 
the individual within the group, not to encourage its inclination towards collective 
action, but to undermine it.
Since its very beginning, Algeria’s associative sphere provided the institutional space 
for negotiating the political settlement between state and public sector groups. In the 
early 1980s, impending decline was already looming large on the social and economic
203 In July 2003, Fatima Zohra Bouchemla, the Minister for the Algerian community abroad, 
recognised that “Ninety percent o f those who have left the country [did it for] reasons such as 
insecurity, the inadequacy o f the scientific environment, bad working and living conditions”. 
Driven by the awareness o f  the “extent and quality” o f “national skills” outside the country -  
the Minister declared that the government was going to deploy a set o f  incentives to put to 
fruitful use this expertise for ‘the development o f the nation’. “It is always possible to act on 
the patriotic fibre o f  these Algerians -  she said -  so that through missions, scientific stays, 
exchanges, etc ... Emigre academics, intellectuals, managers, athletes, financiers and artists... 
can deploy their competencies for Algeria’s local development”; O. Sadki ‘L’Algerie veut 
rapatrier se cerveaux’ Le Quotidien d ’Oran, 24 Avril 2003; Nabila Amir: ‘Expats Algeriens 
Etabli a 1’Etranger -  Des competences a exploiter’, El Watan 28 July 2003.
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horizon of the groups that were going to constitute the bulk of Algeria’s associative 
movement. For those within the first advocacy associations, the questioning of the 
political system went hand in hand with the signs of the impending failure of the 
economic system, “in a context of disillusion and ‘de-classing’ [in which] frustrations 
served as detonator for a repositioning of [...] the individual vis-a-vis [...] the state” 
[Karem, 1995: 216-217]. According to Muncef Bennouniche, a former member of the 
LADH board, the explosion of the human rights debate derived not only from the 
limits of a closed political system, but also from its “economic failure... yielding 
nothing but poverty and disparities”.204 As Karem points out, “human rights militants 
were marked by a sort of disenchantment, by the awareness that socialism could 
neither ensure development, nor guarantee the abolition of mounting social cleavages” 
[1995: 217]. With the acceleration of their material and social fall, rather than 
demanding more ‘autonomy and separation from the state’ as assumed by proponents 
of the neo-Tocquevillian vision of associational life [Layachi, 1995; Zoubir, 1999], 
those at the centre of Algeria’s associative spring experienced their progressive 
‘disconnection’ from the state with gloomy dejection. Writing in the aftermath of the 
1988 riots, Bourenane saw the origin of the country’s decline in the ‘situation de 
deconnexion' affecting the relations between civil and political society [1989: 67]. Ali 
El Kenz described the “uneasiness of the middle classes” and that of a “civil society 
left to itself’, abandoned “by a state whose organisational logic had reduced its social 
mediation instruments to its apparatus of order and repression”[1991: xxi].205
The state responded to the unrest of the public sector strata on their own associative 
ground. Even before the first measures introducing freedom of association were 
approved, the state developed a discourse aimed at ‘encouraging the blossoming of 
the associative movement’206 and portraying associational life as the embodiment of a 
new form of citizenship.207 According to Nacer Djabi, this was part of a strategy 
primarily targeting those strata that were losing out from the processes of economic 
and social change hitting Algeria at the time:
204 M. Moncef Bennouniche, former member o f the LADH Management Board, quoted by 
Karem, M. (1995) ‘La question de droits de 1’homme au Maghreb’ Annuaire de VAfrique du 
Nord, vol. XXXIV p.215-225.
205 Italics mine.
206 As codified in art.43 o f the 1996 Constitution. Manual fo r  the setting up and managing 
associations published by the Ministry for Social Action and National Solidarity.
207 The elements o f this discourse, and particularly the interplay between economic reforms 
and ideas o f democratic citizenship, are analysed in chapter 3.
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After 1985 le pouvoir felt the need to change its social bases. It’s here that the 
idea o f civil society was born: as a means to link up with the urban middle class, 
those in the administration, particularly the francophones. They (the group o f  
reformers working within the President’s Cabinet) wanted to change the system.
First they tried from the inside: the Cahiers des Reformes coming out in those 
years lay out the objectives and the means to achieve this. But the FLN and the 
UGTA were too big an obstacle. And so they tried with the associations. The idea 
was that if  the FLN catered for the rural strata, associations were its contrary, they 
targeted the urban civil society. And so the latter could be recruited to bring down 
the former.208
Tellingly, the state gave official recognition to the social and material decline of the 
state middle classes and their associative aspirations almost simultaneously. Measures 
of political liberalisation coincided with the official undermining of the previously 
privileged status of public sector employees. The law on freedom of association209 
was passed just a few weeks after the law abolishing permanent employment contracts 
and introducing the temporary contract as general rule. The related abolition of the 
“general statute of workers” definitely raised the spectre of public sector cuts and the 
end to inflation-adjusted wage increases.210 Then, in an attempt to re-establish its links 
with the discontented urban strata, the state did not limit itself to portraying the 
emerging associative sector as a realm where a new form of state-society relationships 
could develop: it proceeded to its direct creation by using the human material at his 
disposal: civil servants. According to Musette, immediately after the 1990 Law on 
associative freedom, the relevance of the associative movement among the general 
public was minimal. “The first associations -  he argues - did not receive a massive 
adhesion...they were created by the authorities ... by seconding certain functionaries 
to lead them” [2000:103].
More than ten years down the line, the linkage between public sector retrenchments 
and the development of the associative sector kept reverberating in the discursive 
armory of public sector reform, just as economic grievances keep on influencing the 
day to day lives of those inside Algeria’s associative movement. Charged with the 
task of reforming the administration, in 2001 the Sbih Committee211 praised an 
increase in the number of associations as a form of participative democracy “to
208 Interview with Nacer Djabi, University Professor, Algiers 8 August 2002
209 Law 90-31.
210 Law n.90-11,21 April 1990 relating to work relationships.
2n Seefii 71
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respond to the needs of society, in areas such as culture, social and humanitarian 
protection’.212 Then, in line with World Bank recommendations, the same committee 
supported plans to lay off 500,000 civil servants, in the same areas.213 A few blocks 
away from the government’s building where the Sbih committee had met, civil 
servants, university teachers and top-ranking bureaucrats forming the executive 
bureau of Touiza -  probably Algeria’s most prominent development NGO in Algeria 
-  met to discuss the failures of Algeria’s economic policy, ending up reflecting on its 
effects on their own living standards:
Do you know how much a magistrate earns? Less than a street vendor. Selling 
cigarettes on the street can get you up to 1000 Dinars a day, and a judge, with all 
his titles, can probably get the same after years o f service. A middle cadre like me 
earns between 12000 and 15000 AD a month. And do you know how much this 
pullover costs? 1 had it for 70 Francs in Paris. Here (in Algiers) probably far more.
Well, if  I earn 15000 dinars, you see, that in order to get dressed I need almost a 
month’s salary.214
Understanding the appeal which associational life has to public sector workers 
requires an ackowledging the character of some of the side-payments the state 
provided to the public sector strata in order to retain their loyalty.
From state distribution to distributive associations
Among the types of public policy identified by Lowi [1964], redistributive and 
regulatory policies are those more often linked to civic associations [Clarke, 1998b: 
44]. Their focus is believed to lie on macro political issues and actions aimed either at 
making government more responsive (the voice argument) or unburden it from its 
service delivery functions, as seen in chapter 3. The benefits are thought of as 
accruing either to large sectors of the population or to constituencies among the poor 
and the marginalized. There is enough evidence though to show that in Algeria the 
associative sphere is involved in another type of public policy: distribution.
212 Faycal Metaoui, ‘ “La democratic participative” oui, mais”, £7 Watan, 2 December 2001.
213 «2qo 000 in the health sector, 360 000 in education, and 25 000 in higher education : D.A. 
‘500 000 fonctionnaires menaces de depermanisation’, El Watan , 4 September 2003.
214 Interview with Gasmi Askli, school inspector, Algier, 7 October 2002
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The political economy of rent distribution in today’s Algeria remains largely obscure 
and, as a consequence, its importance is underestimated. As mentioned before, since 
the nationalisations of the oil and gas sector in 1971, the rent generated from the 
hydrocarbon exports provided one of the foundations of Algeria’s post-independence 
political system. Proponents of the breached pact argument often assume that October 
1988 showed the inadequacy of distribution as a viable institutional mechanism to 
retain consensus. It is true that oil price decline in the aftermath of the 1980s oil crisis 
decreased the capacity of the hydrocarbon rent to satisfy the mounting demands of a 
population undergoing swift demographic growth and rapid urbanisation. Yet, the 
share of the hydrocarbon sector has emerged largely unscathed by the disruptive 
developments of the 1990s: after all, oil and gas exports still account for more than 
95% of total exports, 30% of GDP and some 60% of government revenues [Aissaoui, 
2001: 1]. It is therefore strange that despite recognising its undiminished importance, 
domestic and foreign observers often limit the role of the hydrocarbon rent to the 
appropriation strategies of the decision makers occupying the highest and most 
opaque echelons of the state [Pierre & Quandt, 1996: 15].
The oil and gas rent as an element of consensus building remains fundamental to 
Algeria’s political process. What has changed since the early post-independence 
decades is the way it percolates into society. The demise of the FLN-state and its 
affiliated mass organisations engendered the collapse of part of the organisational 
architecture hosting Algeria’s distributive institutions [Vandewalle, 1996: 210]. After 
the opening up of the political system following the 1989 constitution little attention 
has been paid to the institutional mechanisms that keep the rent flowing. There are 
however indications that far from weakening it, the introduction of pluralist politics 
actually helped the reproduction of the distributive character of the Algerian state: the 
difference being that instead of one single channel - the FLN and its organisations - 
the state can now avail itself of several -  the range of political parties mushrooming in 
Algeria’s political landscape [Roberts, 1998].
The associative sphere is populated by less visible and yet equally effective 
distributive machines. Support to the associative movement took (and still takes) the 
form of a massive provision of public funds, uniting state and associations in the 
common origin of the resources financing their budgets. As an Algerian journalist has
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observed, “Associations, like the rest of Algeria, run on oil. If oil prices are high, then 
in that year the associative movement will be rich”.215
Since the promulgation of the 1990 law on associative freedom at least 11 ministries 
have opened one or more specific budget lines to support associations.216 Subsidies to 
associations operating in related fields often constitute a sizable part of the available 
financial capacities of the ministry. Between 1991 and 2005 for instance, funds from 
the Ministry of Youth and Sport (Ministere de la Jeunesse et Sports - MJS) increased 
from AD 100m to AD 952.5m, absorbing in some years more than 10% of the 
Ministry’s overall budget, including operating costs. In 2004, a year of Presidential 
elections, the MJS budget for associations more than doubled (Figure 5.1).
In addition to direct funding from the Environment, Social Action, Youth and Sports 
ministries and other line agencies, the Ministry of Interior has a local governments 
budget which includes allocations to wilayas and APCs for subsidies to local 
associations. The fact the budget for local associations can be ‘too high’ gives an idea 
of the scope and size of the state’s effort in supporting the country’ associative sphere:
The APC (Assemblee Populaire Communale -  municipal council) has one single 
budget line allocated to associations, except sport associations, for which there’s a 
special line. In 1999 there was more money than associations, we did not know how 
to spend it. So I decided to call them all up and hear what they had to offer me, and 
since then the number o f associations has certainly increased. Now we have reached 
a parity between associations and resources, which is manageable. We have 
achieved an equilibrium”.217
The way decisions concerning allocations are taken clarifies the distributive logic by 
which public funding to associations is carried out and the way the associative sphere 
is “seen by the state” as a consensus tool [Scott, 1998]. Overall funding to Algeria’s 
associative sector is decided centrally as one single envelope in the context of the 
Finance Law fixing the yearly budget of the state. Parliament plays an incremental
215 Interview with M. Larbaoui, Journalist at Liberie Algiers, 19 November 2001
216 The Ministries concerned are Labour; Social Protection and Professional Training; 
Tourism; Habitat (Environment); Social Action and National Solidarity; Youth and Sport; 
Culture; Interior; Finance; Moudjahidin, Health; Higher Education and Scientific Research. 
See Journal Officiel de la Republique Algerienne (JORA)
2,7 Interview with Badia Sator, President of Sidi M’hamed APC, RACHDA vice-president, 
member o f the Rally for Culture and Democracy, General Practitioner, 6 October 2002
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role, with MPs218 regularly pushing for increases in the overall envelope at the 
moment the Budget Law is debated. During one such parliamentary session, in 
October 2001, Ould Abbes, the Minister of Solidarity and Social Action, warned 
associations that “funds are there, and they are even considerable, no question about 
that...[but] there won’t be any subsidies to associations that don’t support the 
government”.219
Figure 5.4 MJS Funding to Youth and Sport associations 1991-2005 (AD millions)
1200
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60 0  --
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200  - -
Source: JORA, various issues220
This overall envelope is then split up between the various government departments, 
where efforts are deployed to reach the maximum number of targets by multiplying 
the number of allocations:
It would be very difficult here to draw up budgets at the start o f the year, it is 
not like in the other directorates. There it’s simple. You’ve got statistics, you 
know how many people there are in each category, how many elderly and 
disabled will need help. Here I do not know how many associations will ask for 
help each year. We try never to reject a proposal. Ultimately we tend to support 
every single project, though in different percentages. Sometimes it’s 5%, 
sometimes 50%.221
218 Particularly those MPs linked to associations, as we shall see in chapter 6
219 Mohamed NaTli ‘Pas de subventions aux associations qui nous critiquent” Le Jeune 
Independent 23 October 2001.
220 JORA ; n.5 30 January 1991; n.36 31 July 1991; n.2, 8 January 1992; n.5, 24 January 
1993; n.47, 18 July 1993; n.2, 9 January 1994; n.45, 13 July 1994; n.3 ,18 January 1995; 
n.38, 19 July 1995; n.2 10 January 1996; n.44 17 July 1996; n.2, 8 January 1997; n. 48 ,2 3  
July 1997; n.3, 21 January 1998; n.51, 15 July 1998; n.3 13 January 1999; n .49,25 July 1999; 
n.2, 17 January 2000; n.49, 9 July 2000; n.7 24 January 2001; n.38/39 21-22 July 2001; n.3 15 
January 2002; n.49 17 July 2002; n.l 5 January 2003; n. 42 ,16  July 2003; n.l 04 January 
2004; n.49, 8 August 2004; n. 10, 30 January 2005.
221 Interview with Mr Touafek, Head o f  the Direction for the Associative Movement, MASSN 
Algiers, 16 July 2001.
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Far from being simply Touafek’s concern, rewarding as many associations as possible 
is an objective of his ministry and the government in general. In 1999, for instance, 
the MASSN supported 33 national associations by granting a total of AD 80 millions, 
while the Ministry of Labour (Ministere du Travail et de la Formation 
Professionnelle, MTFP) spent around AD 16 millions to support 98 associations.222 If 
official figures for registered associations overestimate the number of active 
associations, as our data (chapter 4) suggest, the MASSN and the MTFP were able to 
provide substantial resources to more than half the number of associations concerned 
by their respective spheres of activity. This means not only that funding becomes 
fragmented into small amounts, but also that associations are encouraged to refer to 
several official sources to finance their activities:
Often we enter into partnerships with other sponsors. I tend to favour this kind o f  
partnership. Next summer for instance we are supporting a camping holiday for 
disabled people organised by the Organisation des Enfants des Chouhadas by 
contributing with 10%. The Ministry for the Moudjahiddin contributes another 60%, 
the Presidency with another part and so forth.223
The periodic denunciations of misuse found in the press make clear that this 
dispersion of funds ends up reaching associations’ members:224
Money is certainly not what associations lack. Some members o f certain local 
associations utilise the funds for their own personal profit. They manage to 
change their life style, personal expenses, etc. It’s time that the general 
inspectorate o f finances ran some enquiries on the financial management of these 
associations, whose members have often opened a second account in order to 
avoid such controls 225
As the data in section four show, a large proportion of presidents, secretary generals 
and members are from the administration. A report of the national Audit Court (Cour 
des Comptes) illuminates the level of overlap between state and associative sphere in 
terms of human and financial capital, to the extent that one can almost be considered 
as an extension of the other:
222 MASSN Internal memo, July 2000, p. 30.
223 Interview with Mr Touafek, Head o f the Direction for the Associative Movement, MASSN 
Algiers, 16 July 2001.
224 See also Ziad Salah ‘L’argent des associations’ E l Watan, 17 May 1999.
225 F.S. ‘Que font les associations locales? Le M atin  28 November 2001, n.2971.
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In the case o f  the association ‘Arts et Spectacles’, public funds were utilised for 
purposes different from what originally agreed in the contracts, notably 
concerning the remuneration of [seconded] functionaries o f  the ministry, which 
appears non justifiable. Such violation results from the illicit control o f the Centre 
for Culture and Information (CCI) -  an external service o f the ministry o f culture 
-  by the Association Arts et Spectacles, whose president is no one other than the 
director o f CCI.226
Equally, the Secretary General of the Festival Committee of the Wilaya of Oran 
0Comite des Fetes de la Wilaya d ’Oran) is the president of the APW Social Affairs 
Commission, while the president and the treasurer are employed by the wilaya.227 A 
similar situation applies to the Federation of Social Associations {Federation des 
Associations a caractere sociale), an umbrella organisation of more than 170 
associations, whose President, Hamidi Youcef, was elected to an Oran APC for the 
FLN, and whose employees work in various local government levels: commune, 
dai’ra, wilaya.228
Rather than simply funnelling ‘side-payments’ to their members, associations channel 
resources to society at large:
[A]ll too often we have to deal with people that come here to ask for a subsidy to 
celebrate a national holiday, and distribute gifts: this is the spirit in many 
associations, it’s the mentality o f the providence state through the associative
229space.
In the mind of local administrators, the role of the associative sphere as a distributive 
institution reaching out to society emerges more clearly:
Berbers, Arabs, Mozabites: these terms don’t really matter to me. My conception 
o f society is one based on the family. The individual would not exist without the
226 JORA n. 76 19 November 1997 p. 203 In the same Annual report, the Cour des Comptes 
quotes five other associations incurring in financial mismanagement and administrative 
favours: Association des Realisateurs, VAssociation des Scientifiques, I Association des Amis 
des la  Culture de S e tif  I A ssociation 'El D jah id ia ’, and VAssociation des Amis du Tassili 
N A d jer. The president o f the latter is A. Aouchiche, former minister under Boumediene. His 
association, like many others, is ‘multifunctional’: it is listed as an environmental association 
in the UNDP report, but according to the Cour des Comptes it specializes in the organization 
o f  cultural events too.
227 R.R.0 ‘Aux frais de quelle princesse’ El Watan, 1-2 October 1999.
228 Benachour ‘Mouvement Associatif a Oran: Bruits et chuchotements’, E l Watan, 13 
February 2000.
229 Interview with Yazid Sai'di -  Head o f Communication, MASSN, Algiers, 5 February 2002.
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family, nor would these groups. The wilaya o f Ghardai'a presents a complex 
reality from the social point o f view. And in this sense I consider myself lucky to 
be able to avail myself o f its dense associative movement, and to have a minister 
committed to supporting the associative movement who encourages me to have a 
permanent contact with it. Since the beginning we have deployed all our means to 
maintain an active and healthy associative sector, and we have a constant 
relationship with them. Associations allow us to go beyond the communities, and 
reach the family, what really matters.230
By working as an interface linking state and society through a constellation of 
distributive acts, the associative sphere helps minimise the cost of the political 
settlement. Through ministries, wilayas and APCs the state multiplies itself through a 
range of funding sources, different application procedures and manifold 
disbursements. In turn, to finance their activities, associations deploy their 
connections to tour and tap various departments. The state encourages a generalised 
perception that side-payments are available, by maintaining a distributive logic 
developed during a time of oil bonanza, even during periods, such as the mid 1990s, 
when such a time seems long gone. The distributive state is resuscitated from the dire 
straits of the fiscal crunch and economic adjustment, and with it the clientelistic 
practices it engendered.
Patrons and clients in associations
It is unfortunate that since the works on the relationship between the patron-state and 
the client-bureaucrat in post-independence Algeria [Etienne, 1977; Roberts, 1982; 
Taib, 1990] the subject has not been taken up by more recent investigations. For an 
update would be far from superfluous, as much has changed. Rather than an increased 
dependence of the public sector strata on the state expected by Etienne, the economic 
and political shocks of the 1980s and 1990s resulted in a higher ‘vulnerability’ of 
both. As Waterbury [1977: 339] suggested, it is in these transitional settings, where 
“the traditional forms of vulnerabilities [are] traded in for the vulnerabilities of 
modernisation”, that we find the clearest evidence of the formation of new forms of 
political clientelism. Sometimes, the emergence of the very organisations and 
institutions often believed to reduce the central role of clientelism and patronage in 
state-society relationships, such as those associated with democratic development,
230 Interview with M. Boudiaf, Wali o f Ghardai'a, October 2002.
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actually provide the ground for the renewal of clientelistic formations, as the 
development of Algeria’s associative sphere shows.
As seen before, state distribution of resources to associations was not simply the result 
of a top down project of consensus building. It followed the calls coming from within 
the associative sphere itself for side-payments offsetting the cost Algeria’s public 
sector strata had paid -  and are still paying. But because these costs are not merely 
financial, but also related to the loss of the previously privileged position of being 
clients of the state, and patrons of the public, financial side-payments could never be 
enough. Nor could the discourse developed by the state to turn the bureaucrats it tried 
to undermine into the representatives of Algeria’s ‘civil society’.231 True, state 
funding of associations and the distributive practices in which associations themselves 
engage in redistributing subsidies to society are the first element of a refoundation of 
the old patronage relations. But to maintain their social status bureaucrats and public 
sector workers had to extend their range of action, through for instance the 
opportunities offered by Algeria’s booming informal economy, whose expansion 
constitutes one of the very threats to their social status.
To use the words of James Scott, in Algeria “as in many third world countries [public 
sector groups] have passed from super-ordinate class, to a subordinate and declining 
class, whose infra-politics need to be understood” [Scott, 1985]. These infrapolitics 
often revolve around the survival strategies deployed by public sector employees in 
the wake of economic reforms. When their status and salaries shrink, “civil servants 
[and] front line service deliverers deploy coping strategies designed to ensure 
household survival” [Hanlon, 2002: 13].232 In the perceptions of a UN official, these 
strategies constitute some of the prime motivations inside associations:
After working with them it becomes clear that associations are tools for the
financial and political repositioning o f the individuals who create and join them.
231 On this, see chapter 3
232 In 1995 UNICEF and UNDP published Pay, Productivity and Public Service arguing that in 
the five African countries studied “as a result o f the erosion o f  basic service providers’ 
remuneration, corruption and privatised user fees” were widespread, and concluded that “the 
elements associated with the decline in public service quality are all elements o f coping 
strategies designed to ensure household survival. They cannot be eradicated so long as 
additional incomes beyond government pay are necessary for the survival o f the majority o f  
public servants who are front-line service deliverers”. See Adjededji et al. 1995, quoted in 
Hanlon, 2002: 13].
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Associations are not only a source o f good money, they are almost another
233career.
The economic opportunities offered by associations go in fact far beyond the financial 
flows emanating from the state. Formally, associations are requested to stay away 
from profit making activities, but policing of such requirement is de facto non­
existent. What is clear, on the other hand, is that associative ‘activities’ are not subject 
to taxation. A classified list of associations which are exempted from VAT and 
imports duties is kept at the level of the Ministry of Interior.234 Similar lists exist at the 
level of each wilaya for local associations. This complex of facilitations makes 
associations prone to be exploited by the commercial interests of its founders and 
members, and involves them in the dynamics of the informal economy:
Once the association is set up and they have the receipt proving the wilaya’s 
recognition, they start asking for little donations, a little help. We already had a 
few cases o f  members using the official stamp of the association for their own 
ends. The president o f the ‘El Fouhsane’ association uses the name o f the 
association to introduce goods in the country. And because he’s connected to the 
port authorities he also sells the laissez-passer for the customs. Entire containers 
are allowed to come in. And on top o f that, he uses the offices (o f the Maison des 
Association) for his own deals. He comes here in the morning with his secretary; 
he does his business in total tranquillity.235
The influence of commercial interests on associative activity is not necessarily kept 
secret. On the main door of the CNEJE headquarters - located in the central shopping 
centre complex of Riad El Fath - one can read, in smaller characters; CNEJE 
Informatique. The president of the association, Mohammed Bengana, explains:
For an association renting an office here would be impossible. It’s too expensive.
So we decided to use the office for our company, in order to amortise the 
expenses. We import software and PC parts. We also hired a secretary, who can 
help out within the association.236
233 Interview with Leila Tadj, UNDP Programme Officer, Algiers, October 2002.
234 Abdelhaq Illeli ‘Des Associations sous controle’ 
http://www.algeria-interface.com/french/politique/assosQ90201 .htm
235 Interview with Nabil Mekhzani, Algiers, 23 October 2001.
236 Interview with Belgacem Bengana, CNEJE President, Algiers, 8 January 2002. The CNEJE 
is described in charter 3.
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In tolerating the overlap between civic and commercial activities, the state manages to 
reinforce its links with its associative clients, and viceversa. Official recognition of an 
association entitles members to set up current accounts, renting an office and 
‘recruiting’ staff. In Algeria none of these is a trouble-free endeavour, and they often 
involve connections and contacts within the administration. Through an association, 
though, access to the higher levels of the administration can be easier:
Nothing happens in Algeria without kickbacks (pot-de-vins), everything is based 
on contacts. It sometimes takes me weeks, or even months to find the thread to a 
colonel or a mayor, to obtain what amounts to a fundamental right o f the women 
[victims o f abuse and taken care of by the association]... As an individual you 
have to pay, as an association you go through a system o f  relationships. This 
raises an essential issue: associations, like APCs, are not subject to proper 
mechanisms of control. The only difference being that until today, contrary to the 
scores o f mayors now in prison, no president o f an association has ever been 
arrested.237
While Maryam Bellala seeks contacts within the administration to carry out her 
associative duties, others set up associations in order to gain contacts within the 
administration. A resident of the Cit6 Co-opemade in the Algiers’ district of Kouba 
points out how the situation has changed since the neighbourhood committee which 
he contributed years before has been disbanded:
We used to have a comite de quartier (neighbourhood committee) here which 
functioned well. For instance we managed to stop a construction project that was 
going to spoil that green area. But there isn’t one anymore. And do you see the 
way this place is kept now? There’s no point in struggling when you do not even 
own the flat. It’s normal that as soon as you have some money you try to leave. 
That’s why there are no comites de quartier here. Even when somebody sets up a 
comite, most of the time it is to have an ‘in’ at the wilaya or at the APC.238
As seen before, the dispersion of funding through associations forces individuals to 
extend their networks of contacts within and around what still is an opaque 
administration. But even the very task of setting up and leading an association 
requires the same process. Official recognition of associations is still arbitrary, and the 
departments concerned usually claim to be running massive backlogs. Research at the
237 Interview with Mme Bellala, Secretary General of SOS Femmes en Detresse, Algiers, 5 
December 2001
238 Interview with I.K., Journalist, Kouba, Algiers, September 2001
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Maison des Associations shows that the average time for gaining recognition is over 
18 months. Most associations function for years with the recepisse released by the 
Ministry or the wilaya, a provisional document acknowledging receipt of the 
application for recognition. This allows associations full rights to operate, but the 
administration can at any moment ‘refuse’ recognition. This keeps associations in a 
permanent state of attentisme, a wait-and-see attitude vis-a-vis the state.
In these situations a friendly hand inside the ministry or the wilaya can help speed up 
the various dossiers. Procedures for gaining eligibility for government subsidies are 
subject to the same rules. In principle only associations having been conferred the 
statut d ’utilite publique can receive government funds.239 Yet, Algeria’s Audit Court 
(Cour des Comptes) notes the “absence of clear selection criteria for the attribution of 
subsidies” which results in a “climate of generalised tolerance” and subjective 
decisions.240 This means that applicants need to secure and maintain support within 
the administration in order to first gain recognition, and then ward off the dangers of 
financial controls.241 When applicants come from the administration, things are very 
easy:
The president o f the Ligue Sports Universitaires worked as inspector in the 
minister’s cabinet (youth and sport) and one day took his retirement to dedicate 
himself entirely to his association as president. Just imagine, somebody with 
children who are still at school leaving his job in order to be un cadre associatif.
But this gives him the opportunity o f going out o f the country at the expense o f  
his association, and to get foreign currency to bring back. And more than that, it 
gives him the opportunity to develop a number o f contacts, for instance with the 
Olympic Committee -  and if  you want to understand politics in Algeria you just 
have to dig into the Olympic Committee: the last time the issues have been 
debated in parliament they forced everybody to leave their weapons outside.242
239 Chahreddine Berriah ‘Oil va 1’argent des associations?’ El Watan, 30 May 1996. During the 
1997 ‘Forum National des Associations’, the government (precisely Mrs Rabea Merchemene, 
Delegated Minister to Social Solidarity) assured that the rules concerning the status o f ‘public 
usefulness’ were going to be revised, in order to make the law applicable. Until May 2002 
though, nothing changed. See Souhila H. ‘La quete d’un nouveau statut’ El Watan, 12 April 
1997.
240 See Rapport Annuel de la Cour Des Comptes in JORA n. 76 19 November 1997
241 Controls on the use o f associations’ funds are not infrequent, but their underlying reasons 
and the criteria according to which they are carried out are unclear. See for instance La 
Tribune (20 October 2001) for a case in Ouargla, where the wilaya directorate o f  youth and 
sports (DJS) suddenly decided to audit the accounts o f 102 cultural and social associations 
benefiting from public funds.
242 Interview with Saida, 34 ans, former Secretary at Federation Mechanical Sports, Algiers 5 
October 2002
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And when they are within the administration, the relation with the state is even easier. 
The case of Mr Atatfa is exemplary in this respect. For a few years the head of the 
directorate for the Associative movement at the MASSN, he now fills the post of 
advisor to the minister. Stockpiles of folders labelled Touiza’ line the walls of his 
office at the Ministry:
How do I combine my job in the ministry and my associative activity in Touiza?
It’s true, it’s hard. I haven’t been at Touiza’s office for three months now. 1 was 
too busy at work. But as you can imagine I can solve many o f  the problems o f the 
association from here: managing projects and writing proposals, we’ve got people 
who do that. But dealing with the bureaucracy can also take a lot o f time and 
that’s mostly my contribution.243
The increasing frequency with which public sector workers opt for pre-retirements, 
leaves, secondments or straightforward resignations to take up positions of 
responsibility within an association has already made Algerian observers talk about 
‘associative professionals’.244 Equally often though, as seen before, rather than 
quitting their jobs, these individuals simply combine it with their new associative 
responsibilities. This gives them an opportunity to rebuild and regain the lost status of 
the civil servant as dispenser of favours, a patron vis-a-vis the citizen:
It is not simply a question o f money but somehow o f prestige too: an office, a 
chair, a car, the privileges that come with ‘having one’s own association’, o f  
having one’s own office. Here an office-based ‘job’ is still the only respectable 
job...even better therefore if  you have two.245
Explaining the interplay between state and associations simply as the product of 
public sector employees’ coping strategies would miss part of the picture. In 
accounting for the effects of new public management reforms on Africa’s 
bureaucracies, David Hirschman claimed that “rather than reduce the bureaucrats’ 
sphere of interest, [the reforms] served to expand the opportunities available to 
them...[the bureaucrats] read and interpreted the new set of incentives and 
disincentives from [their] own perspective and responded actively in [their] own
243 Interview with Maamar Ataatfa, Founding Member of Touiza, Ministry o f National 
Solidarity and Social Action, 15 January 2002 Algiers
244 Benachour ‘Mouvement Associatif a Oran: Bruits et chuchotements’ El Watan 13 February 
2000
245 Interview with Marco Ramazzotti, CISP director, 13 September 2001, CISP Algiers offices
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interests....the bureaucracy might have been bypassed, but the bureaucrats were not. 
[1999:292]. Although based on high-ranking African officials, Hirschman’s argument 
equally applies to Algeria’s middle and lower ranking civil servants, doctors, teachers 
and other front line service delivery agents, who found in the associative sphere an 
opportunity to recycle and exploit their position and contacts within the bureaucracy 
to their own advantage:
How do you think these new NGOs can keep themselves together? Sure they tap 
government and donor’s funding but in the end they do not even pay any salary. 
Take FOREM for instance: Khiati is often able to do big things with few means. He 
actually has a tendency to have things done in the cheapest way, which I guess is 
good in a way, but for us it can be a problem. After all, we don’t need to save 
money: we need to run a project in the best way given the amount o f resource 
available. Sometimes Khiati’s logic runs against our own. His staff is an example. 
FOREM pays the salary to only one person, the secretary based at the association’s 
headquarters in Hussein Dey. But then again, his personal secretary working at the 
Belfort hospital does a great part o f the job and she is on the hospital’s payrolls. 
Besides this he also employs Zohra who works as Project manager, a young 
graduate from the Ecole National d’Administration (ENA) who works as legal 
adviser, a journalist who works as a so called press officer, and two psychologists 
working in Bentalha. But these people are not paid by Khiati, they are paid by the 
wilaya o f Algiers, through a pre-employment scheme which usually allows young 
people to work in public enterprises. We are talking o f  nothing more than 6000 DA 
a month. But in the end these people are not at the FOREM for the money, but to get 
some experience. They are happy to work for Khiati and it is him that tells the 
wilaya to employ them. The problem for me is that often they are not competent, 
and when they are they soon leave to work somewhere else. This is why there is a 
big circulation o f personnel at FOREM and this is why Zohra now works for us. At 
least we have been able to train someone to write projects.246
Far from simply helping public sector employees respond to job insecurity and wage 
cuts through a range of economic opportunities, associations allowed them a chance to 
enhance the political capital attached to their position within the state apparatus. By 
turning themselves into associations’ representatives, public sector employees 
responded to the declining power of the office by combining it with the situational
246 Interview with Marco Ramazzotti, CISP Headquarters, Hydra Algiers, 16 December 2001
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rents 247 provided by associations, thus reacquiring the role of patrons in a range of 
clientelist networks pervading family, regional and communitarian lines:
We employ Samir’s father-in-law because he’s somebody we can trust. Moreover, 
he’s retired, with AD 24000 (£160) a month with 7 people to look after. The AD 
9000 a month he’ll receive for a living are going to make a difference for h im .248
29 year old and unemployed, Ali works in a internet cafe from 4:30 pm to 9:30 pm. 
The internet cafd is located in the new offices of the CAPE, a group of associations 
aiming to provide training to unemployed youth:
The internet cafe makes around AD 1000-2000 a day. 1 get AD 300, enough to 
survive. The rest goes to the association. 1 do not know how they use it. But this is 
not what bothers me. If we say we are active in Belcourt it means we need to work 
with the people o f Belcourt. If it was up to them [the bureau members], they’d 
keep the door o f  the shop permanently closed; one is from Blida and wants to set 
up a cultural event in Blida, the other is Kabyle and wants to take the association 
there. But if  we have to work like this, if  everybody joins the association to help 
their friends at home they might as well set up their own association.249
This is exactly what certain representatives do:
For us Mzabis, contributing to the welfare o f the community is very important. It’s 
a value that they inculcated in us since we were kids. I became aware that I could 
do little inside the administration, but 1 could use my skills and talents in the 
association.250
247 The term situational rents (rentes de situation) is widely used in Algeria to define rent 
seeking opportunities. Mouloud Hamrouche, former Prime Minister, was among the first to use 
it in a public debate, when he publicly accused FLN members to be the “retainers o f  
situational rents”. The re-emergence (in different shape) of rent-seeking behaviours in 
political systems experiencing changes in economic forms o f  production such as a switch in 
emphasis from planning to market has been described by Fforde [2002] in an analysis echoing 
Waterbury “re-emergence o f  political clientelism in different forms in transitional settings” 
seen above. For rent seeking in Algeria, see Dillman, 2000 and Talahite,2000. On the specific 
linkages between rent seeking and clientelism in the state administration, see Addi, 1999 and 
Taibi,1990.
248 Interview with Nacer, Secretary General o f SOS Bab El Oued 4/10/02]
249 Interview with Sid Ali, photographer, Collectif d’Associations pour l’Aide a 1’Emploi 
(CAPE) employee, Algiers, 4 October 2002]
250 Zoubir Bellala, vice president o f Association for the Safeguard o f the Mzab valley, 
Ghardaia, 15 October 2002
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But besides traditional cleavages, associations also reproduce clientelistic relationship 
across more modern ones:
My thesis supervisor asked me to join her association on the study o f  traditional 
Arabic poetry. The reason is that she’s not very good, and she knows it, and she 
knows that others know. She’s the director of the history department, can you 
imagine? A francophone leading a department o f arabophones. The association 
serves to portray her as less o f a francophone, in the eyes o f  her colleagues, and 
she goes rounding up people like me, simply because we are arabophone. I’d 
rather not take part, but still, I need somebody to present my thesis”251
Conclusions
The length of time over which the breached pact view served as the basis for 
understanding Algeria’s political development almost makes it an article of faith, an 
interpretative passe-partout applied to anything ranging from elections’ results to the 
political mindset of the Algerians.252 These arguments though provide a static view of 
the Algerian polity. Here is their limit. That state and society stand in a relationship of 
reciprocal alienation seems undeniable. More problematic is to define where the lines 
of such cleavage lie, and how they have been evolving over the course of the last two 
decades. And if the exhaustion of Algeria’s post-colonial pact was already evident in 
the 1980s, what has, since then, prevented the total collapse of the polity? In an 
attempt to answer these questions analysts focusing on Algeria’s civil society often 
mistook the emergence of Algeria’s liberalised autocracy with a real dynamic of 
democratic change. The birth and development of associational life provides a case in 
point in this misunderstanding.
This chapter has questioned mainstream views of Algeria’s associational life and, in 
so doing, has questioned recurring assumptions about the character of state-society 
relations in the country. Far from contributing to a shift to a polity based on 
democratic voice, the civic sector has helped the preservation of loyalty and the 
mechanisms supporting it. Rather than altering them, it has contributed to preserve the 
institutional arrangements (distribution, clientelism) interfacing the state apparatus
251 Interview with Mohamed B . , Algiers, 3 February 2002
252 This o f course does not mean that - despite its widespread sway on Algerian studies - every 
analyst o f Algerian politics explicitly subscribes to the ‘breached pact’ view.
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with society, and has ‘recast’ the groups (mainly stemming from the public sector) 
previously involved in the management of postcolonial loyalty.
In showing that part of the institutional arrangements regulating state-society 
relationships under the post-colonial setting remain alive and kicking today, under 
different forms and in a much more adverse environment than the one they stemmed 
from, the discussion has also tried to argue that notions of breakdown and collapse are 
to be used with caution. The question which remains to be answered is to what extent 
Algeria’s weakened state will be capable of going beyond the ad hoc acquisition of 
loyalty from certain social groups and reshape itself around broader and firmer bases 
of political support.
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Chapter 6. Party bypass: associational life and the management o f political pluralism
Introduction: Algerian parties and their discontented
In November 2000, a year and half into Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s first term in office, a group 
of young officers led by Mohamed Touati - considered as the army’s ideologue -  were 
given the task of devising a strategy to get the country out of its decade-long political 
stalemate.253 The document they drafted provides an interesting insight into the way the 
Algerian army conceived its role in fixing the failures of Algeria’s political change. Besides 
portraying “the current crisis [as] the result of the biases introduced by the democratisation 
process since its launch” [...], the document advocated “a complete reconstitution of 
[Algeria’s] political landscape”. According to the army’s analysis, since the introduction of 
political pluralism, Algeria’s parties had mainly succeeded in generating popular discontent 
with clear repercussions on the country’s political stability and reputation abroad. As to a 
solution, the document called for “the dissolution of all political parties” present on the 
political spectrum, a three year break with party politics, followed by a reconstitution of 
parties under different names and different rules of the game.254
The disappointment shown by Touati’s young officers, and the solutions they suggest, 
confirm the role played by (parts of) the Algerian state in managing political pluralism in the 
country. According to what amounts today to a consensus, the 1989 opening of the political 
system and the country’s experience with party politics since then have to be understood in 
the context of the authorities’ progressive legitimacy loss, and the mechanisms they 
deployed to retain power. The demise of FLN’s monopoly of political representation did 
little to transform Algeria’s political system; as Roberts has pointed out, “[t]he Party had 
been a fa9ade for the real power structure; the introduction of pluralism replaced a 
monolithic facade with a pluralist one, but this fell a long way short of a substantial change 
to the form of government.” [Roberts, 1999: 386]. In this sense, rather than representing 
specific groups in society, Algerian parties cater for the various factions in the state, which 
retain control over their activities to seek legitimacy, either by using the parties as clientelist 
relays to co-opt individuals within or close to the parties or, more importantly, to establish a 
form of electoral representation in society. Lahouari Addi for instance believes that “the
253 ‘ L'armee reve de dissoudre tous les partis : Un document confidentiel expose les projets du 
pouvoir’ E. L. Liberation, 1 June 2001.
254 The document was later published by the website Algeria-Watch “Analyse des conjunctures des 
origines recentes de la crise aux perspectives. Quoi faire, comment et pourquoi?”
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regime does not conceive the elections as a modality of political competition, but rather as a 
way of legitimising and re-legitimising itself. ...it does not consider parties as competitors 
but as ‘assistants’ helping to acquire an electoral representation. In this scenario, the results 
of elections do not only reflect the fights at the core of the state, but also serve as a way to 
make them official and open.” [Addi, 2001].
Yet, in addition to confirming widely held views on the genesis of Algeria’s party system, 
the document also raises several important questions. First, the army’s disappointment with 
parties calls for an explanation of why the attempts at engineering political pluralism have 
been less than successful. Second, as the ‘reconstitution of the political landscape’ envisaged 
has not yet taken place, the document calls for an analysis of whether the authorities have 
pursued different avenues to encourage the country’s process of political institutionalisation. 
Since 2001, in fact, Algeria has gone through several electoral rounds and, mainly after the 
re-election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika for a second Presidential term, has been perceived as a 
more politically stable country. How did Algeria’s pluralist politics cope with a party system 
that was recognized as ineffective by those very elements in the regime that had put it in 
place? Last, the document calls for an analysis of why Algerian parties have failed to 
emancipate themselves from the state’s tutelage and become a true force of democratisation 
in the country.
The hypothesis put forward here is that some of the answers to the three questions above - a. 
what are the causes of the state’s unfulfilled expectations for the parties? b. how did the 
authorities remedy the malfunctions of the party system? c. why did Algerian parties fail to 
emancipate themselves from state control? -  can be found in the increasing role of the 
associative sphere in the party-political realm since the mid 1980s. Authors attributing a 
democratising role to the emergence of the associations in Algeria have often neglected their 
relationship to other actors born during the liberalisation era, particularly the parties. To this 
day there is no analysis of the way the associative realm relates to Algeria’s party system, 
electoral politics and state institutions such as Parliament and the executive, nor of the role 
played by the authorities in facilitating or discouraging such interactions. This has allowed a 
neglect of the way associations - under the strict supervision of the state - have grown to 
become an alternative to parties in the political game. As a by-product of their increasing 
political role, associations contributed to further the imbalance between the executive and 
Parliament, by centralising power within the former and undermining the latter. To see how, 
it is necessary to start by looking at the state’s attitude vis-a-vis the party sphere, and the 
strategies it deploys to control it.
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Hyperpluralism in Algeria
Not the least point of convergence in the views of Algeria’s political development over the 
last fifteen years has been the ineffective role played by political parties in Algeria’s process 
of political change. [Roberts, Addi, 2001; Willis, 2002], In this sense, very few observers of 
Algerian politics would disagree with the premises of Touati’s officers’ analysis. The point 
of contention would rather lie in the type of solution they put forward. Liberal theory 
perceives the strengths and weaknesses of political parties as a function of the links they 
establish with social groups. The origin of political parties in Western democracies is 
associated with the emergence of socio-political cleavages representing deep societal divides 
arising during historical processes key to nation-state building and economic transformation 
[Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Flora et al., 1999]. Issues such as the definition of national 
boundaries and the role of minorities, the secularisation of state institutions, the 
consequences of different economic policy options, etc generate conflict dynamics between 
social groups which eventually crystallise in party systems [Schmitter, 1992]. As these 
processes usually take place over long periods of time during which citizens’ preferences 
remain in flux without anchoring themselves to any specific party organisation, the 
institutionalisation of party systems is often problematic in new democracies [Pridham, 
1990], In this sense, the weakness of Algeria’s political parties could be accentuated by 
Algeria’s unfinished business of state and nation building determining blurred and fluid 
socio-political cleavages, or by the shortness of Algeria’s affair with pluralist politics, or 
both. Recent surveys yielding interesting insights on Algeria’s electoral sociology have
255supported the relevance of these two hypotheses to explain Algerian parties weakness.
According to a more established view though, the lack of popular support affecting Algeria’s 
parties is directly related to the state’s conception of parties’ role, and the way it tries to 
control them. While Roberts asserts for instance that “an essential part of the regime’s 
strategy [has consisted in] keeping Algeria’s parties where it wants them -  on the end of a 
leash -  [...] to ensure that they never acquire more legitimacy than is necessary from the 
regime’s point of view” [2002b], Addi [2003: 26] stresses that the state’s efforts to prevent 
parties from acquiring a strong social rooting explains why the FIS and the FFS “have been 
neutralised”. Including legal and more covert means ranging from disbandment (as in the 
case of the FIS) to refusing official recognition (e.g. the Wafa party256), the armoury
255 See Boukra, Liess ‘Reflexions sur un score electoral conteste’ Le Quotidien d ’Oran 21 April 2004
256 In 2000 to justify the decision not to allow official recognition, the Minister of Interior argued that 
the Wafa represented ‘a reconstitution o f  the ‘dissolved party’ -  the FIS El Watan 9 November 2000 -  
cited in Willis [2002: 20]
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deployed by the state to control parties’ capacity has actively contributed to the population’s 
declining trust in their role [Roberts, 1998: 225-231; Addi, 2001; Willis, 2002]. The 
authorities’ habit of fiddling with the ballot box to - in the best-case scenario - ‘correct’ 
election results has progressively undermined the electorate’s perceptions of parties as an 
instrument of articulation of their preferences. As Roberts [1998b: 24] argues, electoral 
rigging has “made it difficult if not impossible for the various parties [...] to act as effective 
vehicles of a genuine development of democracy. As a result, popular cynicism about the 
voting process [ended up being] compounded by cynicism about the political parties 
themselves”. Another reason why parties “are far too weak and divided, and accordingly are 
too vulnerable to manipulation by the various factions of the Algerian army” has to do with 
the rentier nature of the state. Besides enhancing parties’ discredit vis-^-vis the electorate, 
Algeria’s opaque distributive political system of public funding accentuates parties’ stake in 
their relationship with the authorities, rather than their electoral bases [Roberts, 1998: 229- 
230].
In this light, Touati’s young officers’ contemptuous attitude towards political parties shows 
some of the ironies of the Algerian state’s experiment with the engineering of political 
pluralism: by preventing their social rooting, the state undermines the very function it 
assigned parties, the maintenance of legitimacy. But in revealing the state’s failed 
expectations concerning the role of parties, it also calls for an explanation of what has gone 
wrong in the regime’s management of political pluralism. Part of the answer lies in the 
factionalised nature of the Algerian state, and in the attempts by the various factions 
composing the state to control political parties though divide and rule politics. Commenting 
on the results of the October 1997 elections, Roberts wrote that “effective political 
representation was once again monopolised by regime-sponsored parties, except that now 
there were now two of these (the RND and the FLN) as well as two of everything else -  two 
constitutional Islamist parties (the Mouvement of Society for Peace -  MSP, and En-Nahda) 
two parties based on the Berberophone Kabyle minority (the RCD and the FFS), etc. a state 
of affairs that maximised the regime’s room for manoeuvre and its ability to play off the 
parties against one another ad infinitum” [1998: 23]. This situation is certainly not exclusive 
to the 1997 elections, nor is the result of the spontaneous articulation of the electorate’s 
preferences. Along the years, the state has sponsored ‘duplicate parties’ for every political 
cleavage (Islamist, Berberist, Nationalist, etc) in an attempt to reduce each party’s individual 
appeal [Addi, 2003]. Following the disbandment of the FIS in 1992, the state has 
continuously backed the presence on the political landscape of at least more than one party 
tapping the Islamist electorate, or at least its more moderate components, like Hamas, En- 
Nahda, and lately Abdellah Djaballah’s Islah. As to the Berberist/secularist electorate, the
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formation of the RCD in 1989, and the backing it received by then President Chadli’s circles, 
was deliberately aimed at countering the FFS’s hold on the Kabyle electorate [Roberts, 
2001a]. And finally, the creation of the RND in 1997, which partly contributed to curtailing 
the FLN’s monopoly in the representation of the Arab/nationalist ‘family’.
In transferring its own internal divides into the party sphere, it is likely that the regime has 
underestimated the effects on the overall institutionalisation of the party system. Effective 
party system consolidation requires a balance between the number of parties competing for 
power and the social cleavages shaping the polity. If entry barriers to political competition 
remain low, the polity can experience a sustained formation of parties inducing a condition 
of ‘hyper pluralism’. A high number of parties engenders a fragmentation of the party 
system, with several parties crowding up the various cleavages shaping the political 
spectrum. A number of narrowly focused issue-based parties emerge and disappear without 
relying on any particular social group [Huntington, 1968; Dalton et al, 1984; Putzel, 2002] in 
turn contributing to political parties’ failure to establish solid links with social groups [Duch, 
1998: 151]. By undermining citizens’ perceptions that their preferences are articulated in any 
meaningful or effective manner, party proliferation further weakens the ties between social 
groupings and parties, in turn affecting their mobilisation roles. The process of ‘partification 
of politics’ [Arato, 1994], which usually follows the first stages of liberalization, becomes 
unsustainable, leading to unviable political parties, and ultimately to popular demobilization. 
Hyper pluralism due to party proliferation has characterised Spain at the beginning of the 
post-Franco democracy [Barnes et al, 1985], the dawn of South Korea’s democracy [Shin, 
1994], the Philippines’ protracted experience o f ‘imperfect democracy’ [Putzel, 1999] and 
Thailand’s recent process of political change [McCargo, 1997].
Rather than simply being an unintended consequence of divide and rule strategies, party 
proliferation has also been an integral part of the regime’s vision of the country’s political 
system. Hyper pluralism has indeed been a feature of Algerian politics since the 1989 
political opening. The rushed process of political liberalisation started in 1989 gave rise to 
dozens of political parties, often much too small to mobilise enough voters and militants 
[Lazreg, 1994]. Barriers to entry were extremely low. The only formal requirement to create 
a party and gain official recognition concerned membership, requiring that at least 15 
individuals registered as founding members. In fact, rather than raising barriers to entry, the 
state provided incentives to party creation. During the 1989-1990 fiscal year, the budget set 
aside to finance new political parties amounted to more than AD 2 million. Willis’ [1996: 
121] claim that in 1989 a number of personalities were approached by the regime to form
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new political parties, might explain why in 1991, commenting on the introduction of 
multiparty politics, a former minister admitted: “we have officially financed a number of old 
mates clubs”.257
Party’s proliferation might therefore have a lot to do with why Algerian parties have been a 
disappointment for a) analysts of Algerian politics examining their potential for political 
change; b) the Algerian electorate and its demands for democracy and participation as well 
as c) elements of the Algerian state in search of avenues to further the country’s political 
stability. By trying to control parties by supporting their replicas, the state underrated the 
extent of potential damage to the broader institutionalisation of the party system, thus 
leading to the situation lamented by Touati’s young officers. Algerian parties’ lack of solid 
class-bases [Roberts, 1998: 230] and weak links to social groups suggests that the Algerian 
context might have indeed experienced a condition of hyper pluralism contributing to 
parties’ weakness. This in turn could explain parties’ tendency to engage in highly dogmatic 
agendas rather than concrete policy issues such as the economy, in an attempt to mobilise the 
electorate around strong moral platforms and identity matters [Roberts, 2001].
The party proliferation argument obviously also has limits. Some for instance will point out 
that although entry barriers to political parties were virtually nonexistent in the first phase of 
liberalisation, since the 1992 coup the authorities have substantially discouraged the 
establishment of new parties, through legal and bureaucratic means.258 The analysis that 
follows will show that party proliferation is not the only factor responsible for a condition of 
hyper pluralism. If other players emerge on the political landscape that share some, or all, of 
political parties’ main functions such as popular mobilisation and electoral competition, the 
polity might also experience hyper pluralism. The growth of Algeria’s associative sphere and 
the role it played in the state’s project of pluralism engineering are very much part of this 
story.
257 Duteil, Mirelle (1995) ‘La nebuleuse du Pouvoir’ Esprit, n. 208 Jan. p. 102
258 The constitutional revision o f 1996 made the conditions for the creation o f political parties stricter 
compared to 1989, and was described as ‘a potentially crippling assault on the prerogatives and 
prospects o f the existing political parties [Roberts, 1996: 14]. Art 14 o f the new law raised the number 
o f founding members from 15 to 25, requiring that members should represent at least one third of the 
country’s 48 departments. The law additionally established a 5% threshold for parties to clear in order 
to be represented in the National Assembly, thus forcing parties to strengthen their territorial presence 
and popular hold more generally. The new law led to a drop in the number o f political parties taking 
part in elections, down from 49 in the first round of the 1991 elections to 39 in June 1997 [Bouandel 
& Zoubir, 1998: 181-2].
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Associations and parties: from alliance to distance
From the emergence of Western democracies up to the ‘third wave’ of African 
democratisation, civic associations have been perceived as being key to democratic transition 
and consolidation, not only through their direct action but also by supporting the role played 
by political parties [Lindsay, 1939; Pateman, 1970; Dahl, 1971; O’Donnell & Schmitter, 
1986; Linz, 1990; Arato, 1994].259 Ensuring a pluralistic political system [Bratton, 1989], 
reducing the state’s role as autonomous political actor [Pridham&Lewis,1996], and 
spreading an understanding of the democratic rules of the game in society [Almond & Verba, 
1963; Inglehard, 1990; Putnam, 1993] have all been identified as crucial functions played by 
both parties and associations. Liberal theory assumes that these common functions give rise 
to symbiotic relations whereby a) associations are central to the establishment of political 
parties and, in turn, b) political parties contribute to maintain a thriving associational life. 
Agulhon’s analysis of associational life in Southern France’s villages shows how the 
aggregation of citizens’ demands by associations in the initial phases of liberalisation often 
translates into explicit political agendas, which eventually form the starting point for the 
creation of party action. Associations are responsible for the creation of the political 
platforms on which parties base their electoral agendas and the continued articulation of 
interest groups’ preferences after the electoral battle. In turn, party politics helps maintain an 
active associative sphere by calling upon grassroots organisations for support, particularly 
during electoral times. Kauffman [1999] shows how in late 19th century American cities, 
interest group mobilisation was driven mainly by the necessity to support specific party 
platforms. In a similar vein, Tilly [1975: 277] highlighted how competitive electoral politics 
pushed associations to grow and multiply in order to assist parties in carrying out activities 
like acquiring financial and human resources and mobilise the electors, devising platforms 
and even campaigning in the wake of elections.260
The development of Algeria’s associative sphere in the 1980s provides a perfect example of 
the convergence of parties and associations’ roles described by liberal theory. As seen
259 One o f  the few opposing views is provided by Sheri Berman’s analysis o f  associative networks in 
Germany during the Weimar republic, where instead of supporting political pluralism, associational 
life contributed to alienating people from mainstream political parties, ultimately playing into Nazi 
totalitarianism [Berman, 1997]
260 “It is well known that the development o f national electoral systems promoted the formation of  
durable political parties...the confrontation o f British, French, Italian and German experiences 
suggests a much wider effect o f  elections: they legitimised and promoted the growth o f associations as 
vehicles for collective action. Religious associations, trade associations, friendly societies, and even 
social clubs whose everyday activities were drinking and talking flowered in the age o f elections” 
[Tilly, 1975:277]
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above,261 the 1980s associative spring was a direct response to specific political cleavages 
(secularism/islamism; the gender divide, and the minority issue) that could not find an 
expression in the vision of unified society portrayed by the state’s official discourse. 
According to Karem [1995], it was their opposition to the state that brought these 
associations to share the objectives -  and to a certain extent the membership -  of clandestine 
and more distinctively political groups, primarily the MCB in Kabylia, but also the PAGS 
(Parti de 1’Avant Garde Socialiste, and the Organisation Socialiste du Travail (OST), which
later became the Workers’ Party (PT).262 Besides the synergies, the relationship between
emerging associations and clandestine political parties was also ridden with conflicts:
Back then, at the time we constituted the Association des Enfants de Martyres, with
hundreds o f people, women and former war veterans, certainly we had contacts with
parties, mainly with leftwing groups. They were mainly personal links. Because the 
difference between them and us was that they operated secretly. We rejected that. At the 
beginning people did not want to get out o f Tizi, but in six months we had already 
organised 6 wilayas. The movement was completely self-financed, totally on a voluntary 
basis. For us it was evident that the associative movement had to be against the pouvoir, 
and that the result was inevitably jail. But our strength was to have invaded the public 
sphere, to be on the street. All the parties that tried to use the organisation were excluded.
For instance, Louisa Hanoune started distributing leaflets o f  the party (PT) during our 
meetings and demonstrations, so we excluded her and her friends.263
Highlighting the degree of conflict pervading the first stages of party-association interaction 
is important to understand how their relationship evolved. Seemingly continuing the kind of 
partisan-associative interactions which liberal theory attributes to the early stages of 
democratisation, the years between the October 1988 riots and the cancellation of the second 
electoral round in 1992 marked a turning point in the relationship between parties and 
associations. In the atmosphere of exuberance due to the demise of the single-party state, 
newly created (or recognised) parties kept engaging with the associative sphere to share 
ideological, financial and human resources. And when a friendly association could not be 
found, parties proceeded to create them outright. By explaining the reasons for her ousting 
from the RCD, Khalida Messaoudi hints at the approach taken by the new parties to the 
associative field in the post 1989 environment:
261 Introduction, section 3
262 Gadant, Monique et Harbi, Mohammed (1995) ‘Quel pole democratique ?’ Esprit n.208 Jan.
263 Interview with Ali-Fawzi Rebaine, President o f Ahd ’54, Algiers 15 January 2002
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When le Pouvoir decided to introduce multiparty politics, every party created its own 
association, its small ‘mass organisation’. They [the RCD] tried to control women’s 
associations, but they couldn’t ... they could not stand that I acted autonomously as the 
president o f a women’s association, in collaboration with other women MPs from different 
parties. So just before kicking me out they created their own women’s group. The single 
party leaves you with a single party mentality.264
The ascent of the FIS exemplifies the partisan origins of associational life in post-1989 
Algeria. Basing its initial electoral capacity on its linkages with the vast network of mosque 
building societies that had developed during the 1980s [Sgrena, 1997], in the aftermath of
the 1990 local elections the FIS proceeded to extend its mobilisational bases through a
nationwide associative network covering universities, factories, and neighbourhood
committees. The Islamic leagues - each one directed by a member of the FIS’ s executive
board -  the Majlis Ech-Choura -  controlled a multitude of affiliated associations created in 
those years, to form a para-political associative network that somewhat reflected the system 
of mass organisations linked to the FLN [Boukra, 2002: 104-109]. Since then, Algerian 
parties’ drive to create associations persisted all along ‘Algeria’s transition’, as shown by the 
reflections of a young candidate to the 2002 local elections for the Islamist party Islah:
Currently we do not have associations that we manage here in Bab el Oued, as Hamas 
does. Sure, we have a base in the mosques, but only informally. In our party it’s the leader 
that gives the direction, and that is what counts for the people. And our legitimacy comes 
from having always been in the opposition, never involved in their shady deals. Soon we’ll 
also have our own associations, it’s just a matter o f tim e.265
Far from being limited to the Islamist sphere, and despite the fact that Algerian Law prevents 
civic associations from entertaining relationships with political parties, the partisan bases of 
associations are the rule across the whole political spectrum.266 In addition to confirming 
(and at the same time qualifying) Khalida Messaoudi’s view of the RCD’s attempts to 
control women associations, the modalities by which RACHDA was bom show how the 
creation of associations is aimed at enhancing the parties’ perceived mobilisation capacity 
rather than at building a veritable social base.
264 Interview with Khalida Messaoudi, President o f RACHDA and AITDF. Former RCD vice 
president, subsequently counsellor to the President, Algiers, 23 January 2002
265 Interview with Yazid, Islah Supporter, Algiers, 5 October 2002
266 Article 11 law 1990-31: associations are distinct in their objectives, denomination and functioning 
from any political association. They cannot entertain any relationship with political associations 
whether organic or structural, nor receive subsidies, gifts or funds nor participate to their functioning. 
The normative framework o f Algerian associational life is described in detail in chapter 2.
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Around November 1996 we organised the ‘National Conference o f  Democratic Women’.
We took the lists o f the RCD and sent buses to pick them up in Tizi, B6jai*a, Boumerdes, 
etc. We said there were 312 women at the Hotel El Aurassi that day, but we pumped the 
figure up a bit. Three quarters o f the women in the hall had come by bus. At that time it 
was great that the RCD could demonstrate its existence on the terrain, to show that we 
could gather so many people. The Congress somewhat constituted the General Assembly 
for the establishment o f RACHDA. But the vote took place at the RCD headquarters in El 
Biar. She [Messaoudi] did not want to stand for president, and so we insisted, knowing that 
at that time she represented Algerian women’s fight. So she accepted, but only while 
saying that we needed to put up another three or four candidates, because she did not want 
to stand alone. I stood as candidate together with Djamila Oufrout and another who left 
immediately. The facade was there for the press, other associations, and the ‘resource 
persons’ as she called them, people like Miloud Brahimi or Issad Rebrab for instance. Mr 
Rebrab paid for the whole thing, conference facilities at the hotel, transport and 
everything.267
In addition to the need to prove their mobilisation capacities, a second and equally important 
reason for parties to create their own associations is access to material resources:
Since Bouteflika [came to power] there’s a new system, which attributes subsidies to parties 
according to their parliamentary representation. Before, the financing o f parties happened 
informally -  kind of by fax - with money transferred directly from the treasury to the 
current accounts o f the parties themselves. The state was never really generous with us, of 
course, while most other parties are on the pouvoir's payroll. As far as we are concerned the 
books are there, anybody can come and check. Our party functions mainly through the 
contribution o f private founders. And Verdict -  the association that we created to shed light 
on the presence o f harkis inside the state ‘apparatus’ - will help raise funds for the next 
electoral campaign.268
Besides parties’ institutional needs to establish real or fictional mobilisation bases and 
raising funds, the links between party and associative sphere are very much driven by 
individuals’ strategies. As seen in chapter three, Algerian associations are strongly focused 
on a central ‘totemic’ figure, often incarnated by the association’s President. Besides 
pervading the associative realm, zaim ism , i.e. the central role of the zaim , the leader, is 
widespread within Algerian parties too [Willis, 2002]. Because of the strongly centralised 
structure of parties, political entrepreneurs seek to carve out a role for themselves in the
267 Interview with Ouardia Harhad, former secretary-general o f RACHDA, Rassemblement 
Algerien contre la Hogra et pour la Democratic, Algiers, 10 October 2002.
268 Interview with M. Chellal, Secretary General o f Ahd '54, Algiers 14 January 2002
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associative realm, without the need to break completely with their party activity. Shortly 
after her appointment as President of the women’s association she had herself created, Noura 
Djaffar responded in this way to a question about its links with a party representative of the 
nationalist family, the RND:
It does not matter if  I’m a RND member or not. And I am no exception, you know? In one way 
or another, we [MPs] are all attached to some association or other. This is a normal country, 
and in normal countries MPs maintain links to the associative movement.269
Once again, the financial opportunities offered by associational life also lure party members 
to move to the associative field, as made clear by Rabah Hamitouche, a consultant for the 
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung:
I’ve been in the FFS for 12 years, and held functions in the directing committee in 1989 until 
2001, when I got out because o f political differences. My place is inside the associative 
movement now. 1 believe it is about time the associative movement were considered as a real 
employer. A union activist receives a salary? Well, the same has to be done with the 
associations. The thousands of cadres who work with us don’t get anything, as not all o f them 
can work as associations trainers. The gift o f time has to be remunerated 270
Besides permitting autonomous spaces for action, and material opportunities, the straddling 
of partisan and associative sphere allows individuals in parties an insurance against the risks 
of political life. According to Arab Izarouken, this was a clear calculation of those strata 
responsible for the emergence of clandestine associations in the 1980s:
Most women’s groups and secular associations were set up by people belonging to the 
PAGS. In 1989, when it was the time to decide where to stand, most o f them decided to stay 
in both camps: the parties and the associations. Staying in both camps was intrinsic to their 
political culture, they had done it before: with the pouvoir and in the opposition. When the 
first becomes too sensitive, one can retreat to the second.271
269 Nouara Djaffar, MP, RND member, President o f Women’s Rights Association, Algiers, December 
2001 .
270 Interview with Rabah Hamitouche, Formateur Associatif Algiers, 14 October 2002.
271 Interview with Arab Izarouken, Head of European Commission Project Management Unit, 
and former member of Family Planning Association, Oran, 7 February 2002.
131
Party Bypass
As political affiliations can damage one’s credibility, it is not rare to find associations’ 
representatives that strive to keep away from party politics, as in the case of the president of 
SOS Culture Bab El Oued:
We in the association share the same political convictions, but they remain personal, they 
do not take over our work. In 1997 Belkacem [then SOS’s former president] was offered 
the opportunity to run for the MDS (ex-Ettahaddi272) at the APC elections, but we decided 
against. Here [in Bab el Oued] over the years we have built up a reputation. We are known 
as ouled al houma, (sons o f the neighbourhood), and if  we start messing with politics the 
reputation o f SOS Culture will go. People here in Bab el Oued do not vote. Everybody 
says that they have had enough o f politics. These people, these petty parties that spring up 
10 days before the elections, it’s the Pouvoir. Even the FFS has a foot in the opposition, 
and one in the system”273
The case of Jam‘iyyat al-Irshad wa ‘1-Islah (the Association for Guidance and Reform) - a 
religious association created by Mahfoud Nahnah in 1988 - exemplifies the distance that the 
associative sphere tries to maintain from the parties. Only two years after creating Irshad, 
Nahnah constituted the Movement for an Islamic Society (Al-Harakat li Mujtama ‘ Islami, 
HAMAS), renamed Movement of Society for Peace (MSP,) in 1996. Irshad became 
identified as the association supplying HAMAS and later the MSP with financial resources 
by exploiting a vast network of benefactors spread across the entire country, as well as 
providing the training environment for future party cadres. From the beginning, Irshad’s 
organic links with the political sphere proved dangerous, and remained problematic later on:
In 1992 the association claimed 240,000 members and 20,000 activists, but nowadays they 
are less. After 1992 the members o f the association started to be targeted by the terrorists.
Two o f its presidents were killed, and in some parts o f the country they were forced to slow 
down the activities because o f the threats they received. Now things are going back to 
normality. But there are some inside the association that want it to be less involved in 
politics, they say that politics brings discredit to Irshad. They claim that the party is draining 
money and skilled people from the association.274
272 Headed by Hachemi Cherif, the Mouvement Democratique et Social (MDS) was not much more 
than a renaming o f Ettahaddi (the Defiance), itself bom out o f a splinter o f the PAGS at its Congress 
in December 1992. See Roberts, 2003b.
273 Interview with Nacer, president, SOS Culture, Algiers, 4 October 2002.
274 Interview with Slimane Chenine, former member o f Jam'iyyat al-lrshad wa ‘1-Islah, MSP 
Head o f Communication, Algiers 12 September 2001.
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Far from unique, the stance of Irshad wa ’1-Islah towards HAMAS-MSP is paradigmatic of 
the increasing uneasiness of the associative movement in keeping strong links with the party 
sphere, as confirmed by the president of ‘SOS Femme en Detresse’:
For a party like the RCD it is important to be linked to an association like ours. We were the 
showcase o f  women’s rights in Algeria (on etait la vitrine des droit des femmes en Algerie).
We were also one o f  wealthiest association in the country. But our members were not all 
members o f  the RCD, some were linked to the FFS. So Khalida Messaoudi and others o f the 
RCD convinced the president to have a general assembly and faked a split between the 
members. The President o f El Biar RCD section put the room for the general assembly. I tell 
you, in that occasion the RCD displayed the same methods o f  the FLN. Because if  it is true 
that the FLN and the RND offered us a number of things (to side with them), it is also true 
that the RCD was not waiting for a better opportunity to dishonour us. After we organised a 
counter-assembly they accused us of being des gens du pouvoir, au solde de la securite 
militaire. Associations need to be apolitical, firstly because the law says so, secondly because 
inside the association members have different political sensibilities: we have learned that if  
we were to do politics, the association would break up.275
These accounts shed some light on the trajectory of party-association relationships in Algeria 
since the introduction of political pluralism. After an initial stage when the clandestine 
nature of parties and associations brought them together in opposing the state’s monopoly of 
political power, the relationship evolved first into one of dependency of associations on 
parties, and then into one of increasing distance. If, on the one hand, parties’ initial attempts 
at creating an associative basis were common to the entire political spectrum, so later on was 
the tendency of broad sectors of the associative movement to distance themselves from party 
politics. Far from pointing to a general movement towards the separation of civic and 
political spheres, this tendency calls for a better understanding of the role played by the 
associative movement since 1989, and particularly in the period following the decrease of 
violence and the authorities’ increased efforts at normalising the country’s political situation, 
epitomized by Touati’s young officers’ concerns. The comments made by the President of 
Djazairouna regarding the demise of the CNOT (Comite Nationale contre l’Oubli et la 
Trahison) -  an alliance of associations and parties aiming at defending the rights of the 
victims of the violence276 - show that for associations acquiring distance from party control 
does not necessarily mean giving up politics: “We have decided not to associate ourselves 
with political parties of whatever tendency any longer. I don’t want to have any political
275 Interview with Maryam Bellala, President SOS Femmes en Ddtresse, Algiers, 5 December 2001
276 ‘Le mouvement des disparus s'essouffle’ ; www.algerie-interface.com 19 October .2001
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colouring. The political aspects of our dossier are our responsibility. And we’ll take care of 
them ourselves”. As we shall see, associations’ desire to be involved in politics while 
remaining autonomous from the parties found an encouraging interlocutor in the state.
Associations and the state: from opposition to collusion
The trajectory of Algeria’s associative sphere’s relationship to the state can be thought of as 
the inverse of the one it has entertained with the party sphere. Already in the 1980s, at the 
very beginnings of Algeria’s ‘associative spring’, the state’s reaction to the emergence of 
Algeria’s associative sphere was far from straightforward. Besides a number of repressive 
measures, ranging from withholding official recognition to outright dissolution, the 
authorities countered the opposition coming from clandestine associations by co-opting their 
discourse. The mass organisations were its initial tools to this end. To counter the emerging 
women’s groups, the state proceeded to regain the support of the Union Nationale des 
Femmes Algeriennes (UNFA), which had constituted a source of conflict for the government 
as much as a tool for mobilising women’s support. In turn, the UGTA set up its own 
women’s section, as did the Union Nationale des Etudiants.
When the mass organisations ceased to be of much use, the authorities proceeded to the 
outright creation of friendly groups, often in an effort to stifle hostile ones. The creation of 
the two leagues of human rights is a case in point. A first human rights association was 
formed out of the initiative of a small group of individuals meeting in Tizi Ouzou in 1985, 
many of whom were also active in other groups, including women’s organisations, and 
particularly the Association des Enfants des Chouhadas [Harbi, 1989; Chaker, 1985]. This 
first League was immediately banned and some of its leading members incarcerated, 
including its president, Ali Yahia Abdennour. With the tacit backing of the authorities, a 
splinter group led by Miloud Brahimi took over the initiative and appropriated the 
association’s name - Algerian League of Human Rights (Ligue Algerienne des Droits de 
l’Homme, LADH). Only after the 1989 Freedom of Association Law was the first League 
granted recognition under the name of Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights 
(Ligue Algdrienne de Defense des Droits de l’Homme, LADDH) [Chaker, 1985; 
Karem,1995].
The fact that the emerging associative field gave the authorities the opportunity to engage in 
the same divide and rule strategy that later became a distinctive feature of the state’s attitude
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to political parties is far from accidental, particularly if we consider the extent to which the 
associative field ended up reflecting the divisions at the very core of the state emerging at the 
time. As ssen in chapter 2, despite being formally motivated as a means to smooth state 
disengagement from the burden of health, education and cultural service provision in the 
wake of the 1980s fiscal crisis, the introduction of the 1987 law allowing for a relaxation of 
the 1971 rules on the formation of associations had more political aims. Besides attributing 
to associations the role of service providers, 277 the Minister of Interior presented the bill to 
the National Assembly as a way “to seriously guarantee the deepening of the democratic 
process engaged by our country”. In fact, the start of the debate on freedom of association 
coincided with the years in which the FLN came to experience heavy pressures on its 
monopoly of political representation [Harbi, 1989]. The crisis was structured the division 
between the reformers (grouped around the President’s cabinet) and the conservatives 
(clustered in the party of the FLN). With the 1987 law, the President aimed at allowing the 
growth of an associational field controlled by the administration, but completely autonomous 
from the FLN.278
Occurring already more than a year before the riots of October 1988 pushed the authorities to 
open the political system, the introduction of the 1987 bill revealed the first clear attempt by 
the state to use the associative sector for political purposes. From then on, the relationship of 
the state to the associative sphere mutated irreversibly from one of confrontation to 
negotiated partnership. Fearing to lose the political capital that accrued from the privileges 
and connections and the monopoly in the utilisation of its satellite organisations, the FLN 
succeeded in voiding the bill of its more liberal features. The law maintained the requirement 
of the double recognition procedure, thus effectively blocking the opening up of the 
corporatist system to new associations, and quite possibly, preventing the demise of the 
FLN. This meant that the scores of associations that had appeared during the mid 1980s kept 
operating in constant tension with the state, in a legal limbo that made their existence 
dependent upon the mood of the authorities, until they finally found official recognition in
1990. By then, though, the attitude of the most vocal associations had changed considerably. 
The advent on the political stage of the FIS turned the hostility that the more secular strata of 
Algerian society felt for the state into a desire for protection. The oppositional nature of the 
associative movement changed correspondingly. Besides women’s groups, which had long 
fought against the Islamist threat, a range of other associations emerged in opposition to the
277 See Chapter 3
278 On the state’s strategy to broaden (or switch) its social bases from the rural to the urban strata see 
the interview with Nacer Djabi in Chapter 5
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Islamist associative movement, some of them aiming to fight on the same fields of social 
service provision and youth mobilisation:
It was clear that we were playing [the authorities’] game, that we were doing them a favour.
But why do you think that in that period we were always granted the authorisation to 
organise parties and concerts. We had to play their game, we didn’t have a choice. People 
forget that the biggest gathering ever organised by the FIS was held here, in Bab El Oued, in
1991. It was Ben Hadj, Adami was there too but did not speak. The place was packed. This is 
the reason why we set up SOS. For Kacem, Djamila and myself, the main purpose o f the 
association was to counter the Islamists on their own terrain, here in Bab El Oued, by 
working with the youth o f the neighbourhood. And our strategy was the same. Every time a 
bomb exploded in the neighbourhood, we organised a party. At one point in Bab El Oued, 
one day it was a bomb, and the next a concert.279
Whilst forcing the more secular elements of the associative movement to side with the 
authorities, the FIS’s network of affiliated associations reinforced the state’s perception of 
the political nature of the associative movement. In very little time, the Islamic Labour 
Union (Syndicat Islamique du Travail -  SIT) managed to become a dominant force of 
organised labour thus managing to seriously threaten the UGTA’s position. Rachid Malaoui, 
President of the National Autonomous Union of Public Administration Personnel - Syndicat 
national autonome des personnels de I ’administration publique (SNAPAP) - remembers how 
the state’s early strategy to counter the rise of the SIT -  once again based on divide and rule 
-  failed, provoking the realignment of the UGTA -  which had distanced itself from the 
authorities’ strategy of political opening:
We had the law [on unions] through marches and demonstrations because even if  initially 
[the authorities] included la liberte syndicate in the constitution, they later did not want to 
implement it. And then they did not give us recognition, because you know, the Algerian 
Pouvoir does not grant recognition if  inside they haven’t got somebody they can 
manipulate as they like. With the SIT the Pouvoir required the sectoriality criteria to be 
respected: but the Islamists set up different unions, and then without the agreement they 
declared themselves united in the SIT, and de facto the SIT became the Islamists union.
Now what people do not know is that they drained all the workers from the public 
economic sector off the UGTA: and this is why the UGTA backed the army in 1992, 
because with the Islamists there, not necessarily in power, but simply there, its destiny was 
doomed. Today, since the law forbids the dissolution o f a union, the Islamic Leagues are
279 Interview with Nacer, President o f SOS Bab el Oued, Algiers 29 November 2004
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disbanded by decree every 6 months...and now the workers o f the public and private 
economic sector are left only with the UGTA.280
If the confrontation between Islamist and secular forces made civic associations a new actor 
in the Algerian political system alongside parties, the official confirmation of associations’ 
political role came with the 1992 coup interrupting the national elections, exactly when, for 
the first time, the party sphere demonstrated its shortcomings as the vehicle for political 
change. Vast sectors of Algeria’s emergent associative movement backed and subsequently 
ratified the coup by adhering to a newly created institutional setting that channelled and 
amplified the grassroots’ secularist and moderate voices. Several organisations, more or less 
tied to sectors of the state,281 created a “Salvation Committee” for Algeria, lobbying for the 
suspension of the elections [Garon, 1996:153]. A number of official consultative bodies set 
up after the coup saw an over-representation of professional, cultural, women and youth 
associations. The High State Committee met with the most active elements among the 
various associations that had come to occupy the social and professional landscape of 
Algeria since 1988. These included leaders of the national union of public enterprises, the 
federation of the Associations of local public enterprises, the Association of the Friends of 
Algiers, the Protection of the Casbah association, the Culture and Progress Circle, the 
National syndicate of Algerian Jurists, the Lawyers National Order, the Islamic supreme 
council, the national association of Imams, the National Association of Zaouias, etc. 
According to Rouzeik, among other foremost institutions which included associations’ 
representatives were the National Dialogue Commission, in which associations were allowed 
a vast number of seats (while political parties were excluded), the Conference for National 
Dialogue, where “the presence of the associative movement was remarkable: its 
representatives took more than half of the seats”; the National Transition Council, to which 
associations were given 85 seats over a total of 200; and the National Economic and Social 
Council “composed of 180 members including various representatives of the economic and 
social sectors” [Rouzeik, 1994].
280 Interview with M. Rachid Malaoui, SNAPAP president, Algiers, 24 October 2002
281 Among these associations was the Ligue Algerienne des Droits de I'Homme (LADH). Created 
immediately after the promulgation o f the 1987 law allowing freedom of association, the LADH 
appeared immediately as an ally o f the Presidential cabinet inside ‘civil society’: “while any 
association usually had to wait for at least a month before acquiring the recognition, the LADH only 
waited for a few days” (Babadji, 1989: 240). Babadji, together with Kapil (1990: 520) and Harbi 
(1989) show how the Presidency and the Government not only found a strategic ally in the LADH in 
the fight against the FLN, but later fostered personal ties with it, ties that became important with the 
coup. The Interior Minister Khediri (reformer, former head o f the security services DGSN) was 
“personally linked to the founders o f the LADH de Miloud Brahimi” [Harbi,1989].
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All along the years of violence, the state did not cease to fight the battle against the Islamists 
by intervening in the associative realm by supporting ‘friendly associations’. Created in 
October 2000 with the aim of aiding orphans and old people, the Association de 
Bienfaisance Machaal El Yatim, received “the blessing of the Ministry of Solidarity”. As 
Mme Saad, its president, says, the association’s “numerous projects aim to help people in 
need, thus countering the work of associations of Islamic tendency. We aim to provide 
training to young boys and girls in areas like woodcraft, hairdressing and tailoring. These are 
activities usually carried out by Islamic Associations. El Yatim association is planning to 
organise an omra for the hadj”.282
As political parties did at the beginning of the liberalisation period, the administration also 
proceeded to the direct creation of associations:
It was in 1996. At the time in Blida we had separate buses for men and for women. Blida 
was “une zone c h a u d e even the women working inside the wilaya had to wear the scarf.
But between 1996 and 1997 the army seemed to be getting a grip and winning the war.
The director of the DJS (Directorate for Youth and Sports) at the wilaya at the time was 
not from Blida, but from Tizi (Ouzou): these people wanted to break that atmosphere; they 
wanted to send a message. So the DJS decided to set up a sport association. As my aunt 
worked there as a physical education specialist, they asked her i f  she wanted to manage the 
association, as secretary general, while keeping her job and salary. My aunt accepted and 
she brought in a friend of hers, who used to work as an aerobic teacher. The president was 
someone who used to be a football coach in his spare time; he knew the head o f the DJS 
and the DRAG secretary general.283 1 also got in through my aunt. So we started off with a 
football team and aerobic classes, and then we created a cycling section. We were starting 
to expand and after the first subsidy o f AD 20,000, in 1997 the wilaya gave us more 
money. The ministry also created a co-ordination o f Sport Leagues, and we became part o f  
it.284
The state’s attempt to rally support in the battle against the Islamist through the associative 
field was far from always being consistent. SOS Bab el Oued’s experience shows how 
different sectors of the bureaucracy can have different attitudes to the same association:
282 El Moudjahid 11 October 2000
283 DRAG: Directorate for General Relations and Affairs (Direction des Relations et Affaires 
Generates). The secretary general is the number two at wilaya hierarchy. They hold a considerable 
amount o f power. In general, while walis are nominated and thus come and go, secretary generals 
develop their careers inside the same administration, and thus are able to constitute a stable power 
base.
284 Interview with Ouathek, B. Khalifa Airways Steward. El Biar, Algiers 18 January 2002.
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You see they’re setting up those pavements, they were too high with respect to the road... 
and, well, it was an initiative o f  the association. But i f  we did not have contacts inside the 
wilayas, acquaintances, at personal level, people who share our same values, the same 
spirit, people on the same wave length as us vis-a-vis the Islamists, this wouldn’t happen.
[...] But since 1997 the APC has always been against us. First they asked us to work with 
them, as we refused, they boycotted every single initiative. We received funds from the 
APW on specific projects, but none from the APC. It was the APC who sent the DRS to 
investigate me and Kacem. [...] O f course I’ve got contacts at the APC. And what do you 
think? The day after the elections when the FLN will have won, I’ll go up there and 
congratulate the new mayor. I need to work with him, and they have an interest in working 
with me. They know we are a force in Bab el Oued, that we have an influence on the 
opinion o f young people here.285
Rather than simply pointing to an incoherent stance towards the associative field, the 
different treatment reserved to SOS Bab el Oued by the local and regional authorities reveals 
the factionalised nature of the Algerian state, and the fact that the associative movement, like 
the party sphere, developed into one of the battlefields where this factional conflict is played 
out, as originally designed by Chadli’s reformers. Factional divides explain why Algeria 
counts a National Organisation of Children of Martyrs (Organisation Nationale des Enfants 
de Chouhada (ONEC) and a National Coordination of Children of Martyrs (CNEC):
The CNEC was formed by people dissatisfied with the Organisation Nationale des Enfants 
de Chouhada (ONEC). The ONEC was Hamrouche’s idea in the first place. They wanted 
to have their own group. First a co-ordination at the national level was set up in Algiers, 
composed o f 21 members. Then we looked for someone in each wilaya that could set up a 
coordination and that could ask for recognition at the level o f the prefecture, and so forth 
down to each daira and commune...at the end we had 7000 members, a high number for 
an organisation that developed so quickly.286
Factional divides also explain why Algeria has experienced a multiplication of business 
associations’ which have long been perceived as one of civil society’s driving forces towards 
the liberalisation of the political system [Dillman, 2000]:
The reason why there is a multiplication o f business associations is not that each is an 
extension of a party. It’s because they’re all turned to the government, waiting for favours 
from their friends. It started in 1989 with the granting o f import licenses and the scarcity o f  
foreign exchange. It kept on being that way. That’s why we created the FORUM and that’s
285 Interview with Nacer, SOS Bab el Oued President, Algiers, 4 October 2002
286 Interview with M. Taibi, CNEC Member, Algiers, 3 February 2002
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why we only include entrepreneurs o f a certain calibre: we want the government to listen 
to us, and not the other way around.287
Normally characterised by more overt opposition to the state, the independent unions did not 
escape the factional nature of the regime and its corollary of divide and rule strategies. The 
split of the SATEF (Algerian Syndicate of Education and Training Workers) -  an 
independent union that often took strong positions towards the government - is an example. 
On 28 and 29 of June, two simultaneous SATEF congresses were held in two different 
towns. The representative of the first SATEF, accused the secessionists of “being in the 
hands of the pouvoir”, that granted local facilities to the rival faction in order to hold their 
congress.288
The increasing relevance attributed by the state to the associative sector is also demonstrated 
by the progressive re-emergence of the old mass organisations. Although the demise of the 
single party system initially distanced these organisations from the state, marking a 
corresponding decline in their membership and influence, with the return of the FLN to the 
state’s ranks, old mass organisations like the National Union of Algerian Women (UNFA), 
and the National War Veterans’ Organisation (ONM) have reacquired a prominent, if not 
always overt, role. The UGTA remains the only interlocutor recognised by the state to 
represent workers’ interests. Other former mass organisations are known to play a central 
role in vital decision making processes, such as those intervening in the spoil system 
regulating the selection of ministers and wali and other high levels positions in the national 
bureaucracy. 289 More importantly, since 1992 the organisations belonging to the ‘nationalist 
family’ -  such as the War Veterans’ Organisation - have increased in number, through the 
appearance of a plethora of smaller groups such as the National Organisation for the Youth 
(Organisation Nationale des associations pour la Sauvegarde de la Jeunesse - ONASJ).
As the reappearance on the political field of the mass organisation showed the state’s 
willingness to enlarge the boundaries of Algeria’s ‘official civil society’, the ever stricter 
regulation of the associative field during the 1990s signalled the authorities’ need to put it to 
use.
287 Interview with Reda Hamiani, FORUM member, businessman, former minister o f SMEs, 
Algiers, 17 December 2001.
288 A. Lemili ‘Un Satef bicephale’ LeJeune lndependant 22 October 2001.
289 Information received by Redouane Boudjemaa, former Journalist El Youm.
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Managing associative pluralism
While the literature on the state’s strategies to control the party-political sphere abounds, 
there is to this day no account of the way the state controls the associative movement. This is 
unfortunate, as control of the associative movement has been an integral part of the state’s 
broader strategic goal of manufacturing political pluralism, as well as the main reason why 
the associative sphere has progressively withdrawn its support to political parties. To 
understand how, one has to start from the series of legal and bureaucratic codes which 
provide the state with subtle ways to stifle or encourage associations.
As seen in chapter two, the evolution of Algerian law on associative freedom has gradually 
introduced a more liberal environment for associational life. Yet, despite being considered as 
a considerable improvement on the previous legal framework, the current legislation (based 
on law 1990-31) leaves the government with ample discretionary powers to interfere in 
associations’ functioning and activities. The first concerns recognition. Besides introducing 
the obstacle of double recognition (ministry of interior and relevant ministry for national 
associations and wilaya directorate for local associations), the 1971 ordinance did not 
establish any time limit for the authorities to accept or reject the request for recognition, an 
ambiguity that remained with the 1987 law.290 Although the 1990 law on associative freedom 
introduced a 30 days time limit after which official recognition is to be considered granted, 
the administration’s practices, and its interpretation of the law, did not change. Following the 
introduction of the state of emergency in 1992, every police commissariat set up a special 
office charged with investigating newly created associations as soon as official recognition 
was sought, reconstituting de facto one of the main elements of the restrictive environment 
established under the 1971 ordinance. These practices have been gradually abandoned with 
the relaxation of the security situation, but can still be used discretionarily. In fact, with the 
growth in the number of associations in the country, it seems that the procedures for 
recognition have become progressively stricter, as the president of SOS Femme en D&resse 
testifies:
In the beginning it was easier: one had to apply as national association, and then
members had to register in each of the 15 wilayas. That’s how we got our agreement.
Now you have to have a list o f members in different wilayas from the start, otherwise
290 A few months after the promulgation o f the law, a commentator asked: “how much time do the 
authorities have to give or refuse recognition, after the submission o f the documents? And what legal 
ways can an association pursue if no answer has been provided? If the objectives o f these associations 
are not illicit, why are they not receiving any answer? This remains a question for the legislator”. A. 
Ben Alam, ‘Les delais et les lois’, Algerie Actualite, 1120,2-8 April 1987.
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they do not even consider the application. In the bill (to reform the 90:31 law) that the 
parliam ent is discussing, this restriction will be made explicit, and a number o f  
associations will be declared illegal.291
Commenting on the changes in the recognition procedures, the mayor o f  the A lgiers’ 
commune o f  Sidi M ’hamed - herself a member o f  RACHDA, the prominent w om en’s group 
- makes clear that the progressive hardening o f  the administration’s stance on associations 
corresponds to a deliberate policy:
If  they stopped the agreem ents it’s because there is a great attention to selecting 
associations recently. Lately the police enquiry takes more and more time. Maybe 
there’s also the desire o f a ‘clean-up’ o f the sector.292
O f the 150 associations based at the Maison des Associations o f  the A lgiers’ district o f  
Bologhine, in 2002 only twenty-two had received official recognition. For those that had 
received it, the time necessary varied considerably [Table 6.1].
Figure 6.1. Slow recognition
0  100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
T im e e la p sed  b etw een  registration and receipt of recognition  (d ays)
A ssocia tion  S olidarity , E spoir, Travail
C lub d'A lger d e s  Arts Martiaux
A sso cia tio n  d e  S o lidarity  aux  M alades de  SIDA
A ssocia tion  'EL A zam  El Kheiri pour le s  H a n d ic a p 's  M oteurs
A ssocia tion  S o lidarity  au x  H a n d ic a p 's
A ssocia tion  E ssa la m  H am m a m e t
A ssocia tion  E spo ir d 'Avenir
A ssocia tion  'E m ra u d e ' E cologie
A ssocia tion  pour la P rom otion d e  la C ap ita ls
A ssocia tion  A lgarienne d e s  H em ophiles
A ssocia tion  El A m el Loisirs p o u r I'E nfance
A ssocia tion  N ationale d 'E c h a n g e s  e n tre  le s  J e u n e s
A ssocia tion  C ulturelle e t  A rtistique pour la R eintegration d e s  J e u n e s
A ssocia tion  E spo ir A lger C ap itale
A ssocia tion  C on tre  le s  M yopathies
A ssocia tion  pour le D eveloppem ent d e  la C ulture d e  I'Enfant
A ssocia tion ,E nnad ia t d 'a id e a u x  d em u n ies  et s a n s  dom icile fixe 
A ssocia tion  Lakndar p o u rru m o n  d e s  am is  e t p aren ts  av ecT es inap fes
, A sso cia t? o m )es H a n d ic ao e s  M oteurs 'Ih sen e ' 
A ssocia tion  A lgfenenne pour le D eveloppem en t d e  la  re ch erch e  en
S c ie n c e s  S ^ c i g A * ^  ^  C |ub  d,A(gef
A ssocia tion  C ulturelle M ezghana 
A ssocia tion  p o u r la C on tinu ity  Culturelle
A verage
Source: A ssociations’ registration dossiers, Maison des Association de Bologhine, Algiers, 2001
This state o f  affairs constrains the operations o f  associations considerably. Although the law  
states that associations can start operating one month after submitting their applications, a
291 Maryam Bellala, President o f SOS Femmes en Detresse 7 October 2002
292 Interview with Badia Sator, Presidente APC Sidi M ’hamed, RACHDA vice-president, member 
RCD, doctor (GP) 6 October 2002.
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number of by-laws, ordinances etc effectively install hurdles to associational functioning, 
preventing an association that has asked for but not received official recognition from 
renting an office, opening a current account, or seeking permission to hold a meeting or 
demonstration.
On the one hand, the changes in the recognition procedures have allowed the state to limit 
the leeway of certain associations, or categories of associations, that constituted a more 
direct threat for the regime, such as for instance the independent unions. In 1999, the state 
blocked the creation of the National Syndicate of Autonomous workers (Syndicat national 
autonome des travailleurs algeriens - SNATA,) and the Algerian Confederation of 
Autonomous Syndicates (Confederation algfrienne des syndicats autonomes (CASA) in 
2001.293 But at the same time it has encouraged the development of linkages between the 
administration and the associative field. Here is how the deputy director of the Maison des 
Associations in Bologhine interprets the bureaucracy’s fuzzy procedures for associations’ 
recognition:
If you meet the director o f the DRAG (Directorate for General Relations and Affairs), take a 
look at his desk. The piles o f papers you’ll see are all requests for official recognition. Most 
o f them will never be looked at. A contact at the wilaya is the best chance o f getting things 
moving for most [associations].294
Public funding of associations has played a similar role. Commenting on the influence of 
funding on the stance of cultural associations vis-a-vis the state, the daily La Tribune writes: 
“since law 90-31 of December 1990 ...associations sprang up like mushrooms... everywhere 
one could see associations bom for all sorts of purposes. Cultural affairs, like all other 
sectors, saw its own army of associations bom with an equally challenging, denunciating and 
assertive vigour. But since then the strategy of the majority of associations vis-a-vis the state 
[has shifted] towards one of allegiance, and they do everything to prove they are worthy of 
public subsidies”.295 Indeed, the availability of public funding for associations is far from 
being kept secret and, according to a Ministry of Solidarity employee, widespread:
The only associations that do not come here begging for subsidies are religious 
associations; they are real associations: as they are well organised and their members
293 More on Independent Unions, and the involvement o f the International Labour Organisation (ILO)
in Chapter 7.
294 Interview with Nabil Mekhzam, 36 year old, MAB acting Director, Bologhine, Algiers, 14 
September 2001.
295 Hassan Gherab : ‘Le mouvement associatif mis sous perfusion et en veilleuse : la subvention, nerf 
des associations culturelles’, La Tribune, 20 October 2005.
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actively participate, they look for funds outside the state, and thus they can preserve their 
autonomy”296
As Ould Abbes’s October 2001 parliamentary statement concerning funding to associations 
made clear,297 although access to state resources is certainly encouraged, it is also made 
clearly conditional on political ‘compliance’. 298 According to one of the Ministers’ aides:
What the minister said in parliament is not abnormal: everywhere in the world associations 
know that in order to get funding they cannot criticise the source o f  funds: Algeria is just 
the same. But in Algeria this sounds strange, because one is not supposed to speak openly: 
well, because o f  the circumstances we were forced to come out with a very strong 
message. The minister did not aim at the associations. We believe in the associative 
movement. He aimed at those parties that through more or less autonomous associations 
attack the government.299
When recognition has already been granted and offers of public funding prove ineffective, 
the executive can authoritatively decide to suspend or dissolve an association. Suspension or 
dissolution can be due to internal conflicts among members (of which the immediate arbiter 
is the Ministry of Interior, or its delegates at wilaya level, not civil tribunals)300 or, more 
often, to corruption and embezzlement of funds. In 2001 for instance more than 102 cultural 
and social associations in the Ouargla region faced the possibility of dissolution due to
1A1
financial mismanagement. Sometimes, though, the disbandment of an association has 
more political aims, as when the association concerned rejects an alignment with the state302. 
The dissolution of the Association Islamique de Bienfaisance headed by Shemseddine 
Bouroubi is a case in point.303 After 13 years of activity, the A1B launched a fundraising 
campaign for a ‘National Marriage Fund’ promising to help young couples with the 
organisation and the financing of their wedding celebrations. The association was dissolved
296 Interview with Djamila S. Assistant to Yazid Sai'di MASSN Director of Communication, 
Algiers 24 January 2002
297 Mohamed Nai'li ‘Pas de subventions aux associations qui nous critiquent’, Le Jeune Independent, 
23 October 2001. The Ould Abbes’s statement is analysed in chapter 5
298 Ziad Salah : ‘L’argent des associations’, E l Watan, 17 May 1999.
299 Yazid Sai'di, head o f  Communication o f the Ministry for Social Action and National Solidarity, 
interview 14 January 2002. The parties Sai'di referred to were Hamas and Ennahda at the time part o f  
the government coalition, and the RCD, in the opposition.
300 As in the case o f the ruling over SOS Femmes en Detresse.
301 La Tribune, 20 October 2001.
302 The Division Chief o f Security o f  the Wilaya d’Oran for instace, asked the wali to disband the 
Association for the Promotion o f Student Tourism, because its president Rachid Maalaoui, also 
SNAPAP’s secretary general, held a press conference without authorisation, criticising the 
government’s action. Ministere de I’Interieur, Direction General de la Surete de la Wilaya d’Oran, 
communication 6934 o f 24 November 2001.
303 The Belcourt-based Association Islamique de Bienfaisance is analysed in Chapter 4.
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by the Administrative Chamber of Algiers, on the grounds of “gift collection without 
authorisation, and the launch of a “publicity campaign by means of press [...] By proceeding 
to repeated fundraising, the association has exceeded its prerogatives without demanding the 
necessary authorization from the authorities: this grave transgression lets us suppose that the 
association aspires to a status of state institution”.304 An acquaintance of Shemseddine, who 
was well informed of the workings of the state, confirmed that some of the reasons behind 
the AIB’s dissolution lay in its attempts at ‘outdoing’ public services:
Shemseddine has worked too much, really. And now it is Ramadan, you should see how  
many people he assembles during Ramadan, too many. And apparently he was expanding to 
other wilayas. He does not want to work with the authorities, and at the same time he shows 
them up. So they decided to shut him down, for 6 months...in 6 months we’ll have already 
had the elections and Shemseddine will be able to work again.305
Commenting on the dissolution of the AIB, another observer argues that Shemseddine’s 
main fault has been to lack links to the state:
Le pouvoir is not opaque, it’s diffident, confused. The question it always asks is: who are they? 
An association like RAJ, at least they know what it is. It is when you do not have a label that you 
become obscure, thus dangerous. Shemseddine’s problem was exactly this. In order to work you 
have to have a political allegiance, or at least make it up. If your allegiance is to the government, 
even better.306
Particularly since the late 1990s, the need to distinguish friends from foes in the burgeoning 
associative sector pushed the state to sponsor the creation of a number of public bodies with 
a consultative status, charged with the task of providing authorities with advice on contested 
issues such as the family code, human rights, or the Berber question. Beside co-opting 
prominent members of associations by appointing them to their boards, organisations such as 
the High Commissariat for Berber Affairs {Haul Commissariat pout 
I ’Amazighite’Am azi^ite - HCA), or the National Observatory on Human Rights 
(Observatoire National des Droits de I ’Homme -  ONDH, later transformed into the National 
Consultative Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights) function as 
relays between the state and the associative movement. In the words of its president, Nouara 
Djaffar, one of the aims of the Human Rights commission is to encourage “the components
304 Y .R .: ‘L’association de bienfaisance de Belcourt suspendue’, Le Matin, 2970 27 November 2001.
305 Chenine Slimane, MSP communication manager, Hamas headquarters, El Biar, Algiers, 1 
December 2001.
306 Interview with M. KIES, EU MEDA team leader, Algiers 20 October 2001
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of the associative movement whose objectives coincide [with those] of the commission”.307 
This encouragement, which often translates into access to public funds, in turn contributes to 
the emergence of new, and state-friendly, associations. Because of its links with the Human 
Rights Commission, the birth of the Independent League for the Defence of Human Rights in 
Algeria (LIDDH) in October 2001 immediately raised doubts surrounding its stated 
independence from the authorities.308
Typical of the state’s tendency to enhance ‘the legibility of society’ in order to better control 
it [Scott, 1998], organisations like the HCA or the Human Rights commission are not only 
central pillars of the strategy to control the associative movement. They also provide a way 
to bring highly political matters such as the Berber question, the women’s status and human 
rights issues into the associative realm and away from the party-political sphere, thus 
reducing the ability of the parties to make them the basis of their political agendas. Bringing 
together more than 540 associations in the Oran area, the High Council for Youth and 
National Unity is an example of this process. According to Brak Farouk, the High Council’s 
President, the creation of the organisation aimed to “influence political decisions 
[concerning youth] from outside the partisan framework [... ] and become “a form of 
alternative to the Algerian experience of political parties, which has clearly shown its 
limits”.309
The tendency towards the ‘departification’ 3,0 of political issues, and the increasing role of 
the associative sector in dealing with them, finds its corollary in the number of associative 
representatives within government and parliament. Elected on the list of the RND, 
Noureddine Benbraham justifies his presence in Parliament in these terms:
My role here is to defend the interest o f the associative movement. At the moment my only 
concern is making sure that there’s enough money for associations in next year’s budget. I was 
chosen because I represent these interests and sensitivities, I’m not an expression o f the [RND] 
party, my history is not in the party, it’s in the associative movement.311
Despite its past opposition to the authorities, RACHDA is one association that has been 
particularly successful in providing the state with cadres. In addition to its president, Khalida
307 ‘De l’ONDH a la Commission de droits humains’, Quotidien d ’Oran, 10 October 2001.
308 S .H .: ‘Naissance d’une ligue independante?’, Jeune Independant, 14 October 2001.
309 ‘Rassemblement de la Soci&e Civile: une autre enseigne’ El Watan 18 February 2001
310 For a previous instance o f the use of the term ‘departification’ applied to Russia’s political system 
under Boris Yeltin see Moser, 2002
311 Interview with Nourddine Benbraham, RND member and MP, President of the Algerian Muslim 
Scouts, Algiers, 17 January 2001
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Messaoudi, who after leaving her party -  the RCD - was appointed as Communication 
Minister and then Minister for Cultural Affairs, RACHDA’s vice president also entered the 
administration, albeit at a lower level:
Khalida Messaoudi left me in charge as caretaker, as one cannot be minister and president o f an 
association at the same time. She still is president, but I do the job now, and probably will in the 
future. I’ve done it from here (as mayor o f the Sidi M. commune APC) for quite a long time, I’ll 
still be able to do it with the stethoscope in my hands.312
Despite her stated plans though, Badia Sator did not go back to her old medical profession 
after her position as mayor of Sidi M’Hamed. She was appointed head of Cultural Affairs at 
the wilayas of Algiers’ reporting directly to the Minister, and former President of her 
association.313 Far from being limited to associations enjoying national and international 
renown like RACHDA or the Muslim Scouts, the appointment of associative representatives 
to official posts concerns smaller associations. Despite its vocal stance towards the 
government, SOS Bab el Oued was also involved in the authorities’ selection of public 
officials from the ranks of the associative field:
Two people from the secret services came to see me. Apparently the way I confronted 
Nourani (the wali o f Algiers) when he came to Bab El Oued after the flooding 
impressed them.314 It’s true that 1 stood between him and a crowd o f young people that 
would have easily killed him. But I was frank with him that day. And they know the 
way we work, they respect us for the work we’ve done during the worst years. So they 
asked me if  I wanted to stand for mayor of Bab el Oued. I say that I’m not in any party, 
and certainly don’t want to be associated with the FLN or the RND. They said I would 
stand as an independent, as a representative o f civil society. To be honest I’ve been 
thinking about it quite a lot. But it’s too early. People here would not understand. And 
anyway I have to find somebody else to entrust SOS to first.315
The strategies deployed by the state to steer the development of the associative field share a 
number of similarities with those used to control parties. As with parties, public funding is 
central in encouraging the multiplication of associations, while at the same time legal and 
bureaucratic codes allow the government to favour ‘friendly’ organisations and bar more
312 Interview with Badia Sator, president o f the Sidi M ’hamed APC, RACHDA vice-president, 
General Practitioner, Algiers. 6 October 2002
313 Bouteflika / Interpretations politiques’ El Watan, 17 April 2003.
314 The flooding o f Bab El Oued, in November 2001 is described in chapter 3.
315 Interview with Nacer, President, SOS Culture Bab El Oued, Algiers, 5 December 2004.
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autonomous ones. Partly because of the easiness of controlling associations, the state has 
progressively perceived the associative sector has as an alternative to the party sphere. Like 
political parties, associations often emerge in response to the need of different factions of the 
regime in need of a social representation and relays in society. Besides turning into a realm 
where factional divides are played out, throughout the years the associative field has become 
a reservoir where the state can co-opt individuals and appoint them to public office, without 
having to rely on parties affected by mounting discredit.
But the interference of the associative sphere into the realm of the party-political does not 
end here. The possibility to compete for power to determine who governs is a crucial 
characteristic distinguishing political parties’ and associations’ nature [Diamond, 1994]. In 
the Algerian state’s strategy of managing political pluralism, even the electoral game was 
not spared from the progressive expansion of associational life’s political role.
From electoral committees to civic associations, and back
In the summer of 2001, a raging crowd stormed the headquarters of the Bejai'a Citizens 
Association (Association Citoyenne de Bejai'a, ACB), pillaged its offices and set them on 
fire. The reasons behind the ACB’s sacking date back to Algeria’s 1999 presidential 
elections and more specifically to the modalities of Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s electoral 
campaign.
The ACB was bom as one of Bouteflika’s Comites de Soutien - campaign supporters’ 
committees hastily created in the few weeks preceding the elections. Besides individuals 
close to Bouteflika’s immediate circle, including Kamel Adjeriou,316the ACB’s president, as 
well as Lahcene Seriak and Rachid Ai'ssat (two of Bouteflika’s closest counsellors), it is 
widely believed that sectors of the state were involved in the decision to create a network of 
caucuses.317 The supporters’ committees marked a clear change in the regime’s approach to 
sponsoring the election of its chosen man for the Presidency, which had previously gone 
through the exclusive support of the parties.318 The rationale behind the creation of a network 
of electoral committees rested precisely in Bouteflika’s need to convey a distinctively non­
partisan image. Being perceived as the Pouvoir’s nominee, Bouteflika presented himself as 
the ‘consensus candidate’ and avoided potentially ‘divisive’ links to political parties. This 
allowed him to elude the widespread discredit affecting the whole party sphere, but more
316 Kamal Adjriou had formerly held the position o f wilaya security superintendent in Skikda.
317 ‘Les Services au centre de luttes de SeraiP, Algeria-Jnterface, Algiers 1 November 2001
318 On the role o f parties in the selection o f Algeria’s President by Les Decideurs, see Addi [2003]
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specifically those parties which traditionally supported the government -  like the FLN and 
the RND. Bouteflika’s feelings vis-a-vis political parties were made clear a few months after 
his election. During a press conference organised in the occasion of Hosni Mubarak’s visit, 
the President echoed Touati’s young officers’ view of the role of political parties by 
declaring: ‘Algeria faces a complex situation caused by problems of regionalism, tribalism, 
and intolerance, and worsened by political pluralism.’319
Following Bouteflika’s election, instead of sticking to their political mandate most of the 
electoral committees rebuffed their electoral roots and mutated into civic associations.
Even before the elections we had thought about creating an association and we were the first 
committee to apply for official recognition. I guess we intended it as a sort o f reward for the 
work we’d done during the electoral campaign. They must have liked our idea, because in 
“Oran it was Bouteflika’s brother himself who supported the creation o f a similar 
association. My dad and my cousin were really proud. We soon tried to expand the 
membership by creating a branch in every dai'ra, commune and district o f the wilaya. I 
myself set up the university branch of the association.320
The positive response at the highest levels of the state endowed the ACB with financial and 
material resources. From electoral campaigning, the ACB turned itself to social work and 
events organisation, such as fund raising for anti-AIDS campaigns, or giving receptions for 
foreign NGOs representatives during their visit in Algeria. Membership included a few well- 
connected notables, public sector cadres and a considerable number of lower rank public 
employees, which gave the association immunity from the sort of administrative 
impediments normally faced by associations. Indeed, the association’s collaboration with the 
local authorities, and particularly with some wilaya departments321, was so wide-ranging that 
for outsiders it was difficult to distinguish whether the administration or the association were 
responsible for the organisation of ACB-labelled events,322 to the extent that, at one point, 
the ACB Secretary general had to stress the distinction between the two, by highlighting that 
“the association never existed to replace the commitment of men and women working at the 
wilaya”/ 23
319 Quoted in La Tribune, 13 June 1999
320 Interview Kolli Al Ghani, IT professional, 25 years old, former ACB member, Algiers 4 February 
2002
321 Specifically, the departments of Youth and Sport (DJS) and Health (DSP).
322 See for instance Slimani, M. ‘ Bejaia: Un radiothon et des interferences’, El Watan 12 February 
2001 .
323 Kamel Medjdoub : ‘L’ACB s’autodissout’ El Watan, 28 October 2001.
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The administration’s support to the ACB was matched by indifference, or indeed scorn, from 
BejaTa’s population. After its creation, the ACB’s founders decided to extend its structure 
and deepen the association’s reach at local level to better involve the citizenry. In a 
development common to other associations sharing the same origins, the ACB set up a 
number of local ACB offices at commune and village level. At one point, the Association 
Citoyenne de Tizi Ouzou - the ACB’s twin sister -  counted more than 280 local associations 
and 90 village committees.324 Nevertheless, this ‘grass-rooting’ efforts were soon to show 
their limits:
Our aim was to include more people, but in the end it did not work. We thought people at the 
lower levels would be active, and provide feedback. But after they received the [IT] equipment 
and the funds nothing happened: nobody was there to recruit other people or organise things. 
But certainly it’s also our fault. Even though we were active on many fronts, every time 
someone o f the Pouvoir came to Bejaia it was up to us to organise the reception. So we ended up 
being labelled as the ‘events association’.325
In reality, despite its members’ attempts to endow it with a more civic outlook, the ACB 
never emancipated itself from its political origins. Already a few months after Bouteflika’s 
election, together with associations from other parts of the country, the ACB ended up under 
the ‘National Co-ordination of Associations supporting the Presidential Platform,326 an 
umbrella organisation supporting the President’s policy agenda,327 under the leadership of 
Amar SaTdani, formerly known as a member of the FLN’s Central Committee. That the 
demonstrators should have burned down the ACB’s headquarters during the riots which 
erupted in Kabylia in 2001 - together with tax offices, APCs and parties’ offices - shows the 
degree to which the population had recognised the political role played by the associative 
field, and was willing to sanction it accordingly.328
Yet, the Kabyle riots did not mark the end of the associative sphere’s journey into the realm 
of the party-political. Already in January 2001 (four month before the riots actually started), 
SaTdani’s Coordination had met up to discuss the possibility of transforming the structure 
into a party/29 This would have effectively constituted a remake of the creation of the RND 
four years before to support Liamine Zeroual’s presidency:
324 Assia T .: ‘Que vise le gel des subventions?’ where ?, 3 April 2000.
325 Interview with Kolli A1 Ghani, Algiers 4 February 2002
326 La Coordination des Associations a  Soutien de la  Plate-forme Presidentielle.
327 Particularly Bouteflika’s civil concord initiative.
328 Dj. A . : ‘Bouteflika a-t-il perdu ses relais en Kabylie ?’, Le Matin, 28 October 2001.
329 Hassan Zerrouki: ‘A chaque President, sa constitution et son Parti?’ Le M a tin , 24 January 2002.
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Without the help o f the secret services Bouteflika would not have been able to set up his 
support committees. Already during the elections there were rumours that these support 
committees were going to be transformed in a political parly. But this would have only meant 
taking away the RND from the political game to introduce another party. And also, for 
Bouteflika the com ites de soutien had been a winning formula.330
Indeed, Bouteflika’s scornful view of Algerian parties was confirmed by the evolution of the 
National Coordination. At the Congress organised to decide the Coordination’s future, its 
representatives voted against the conversion into a party, opting instead for a national 
association covering the whole country through “the setting up of regional co-ordinations 
and bureaux at the levels of the communes and dairas, and regional coordinators”.331 In the 
words of one commentator332, this choice was due to the fact that “in the eyes of SaTdani and 
his friends, the anarchy that reigns in the country is symptomatic of the ineptitude of political 
parties. Without a strong popular legitimacy, power cannot be exercised in the country, and 
this cannot be obtained from the ‘social body’ unless civil society is organised”. Sai'dani’s 
view -  continues the article - is that the solution to the “perversion of parties [...] consists in 
a new adjustment of the associative movement” and that “other associations need to be 
disciplined and subscribe to the presidential programme, or choose to be simply swept away 
for cause of public uselessness”.
SaTdani’s view of the role of the associative movement found its actual realisation during the 
campaign for Bouteflika’s re-election. Foreign academics, media and governments saluted 
the result of the 2004 presidential elections as ‘largely free and fair’. The few dissonant 
voices highlighted the unfair means used by Bouteflika to undermine his main rival -  former 
prime minister and FLN Secretary General, Ali Benflis -  and secure a second term. These 
included “his abuse of state finances, his control of the media and his influence over a 
notoriously weak-willed judiciary.” [EIU, 2004]. Yet, although more informed observers 
described the election as a “study in contemporary Algerian politics [...as] it lacked clear 
platforms or genuine parties”,333 the large-scale deployment of civic associations by the 
executive during the campaign passed completely unobserved.
Quite interestingly, as in 1987, it was the FLN that signalled the failure of the party-political 
sphere to properly second the designs of the regime, thus sparking the overt entry of the
330 Interview with Baya Gacemi, Freelance journalist, Algiers 17 September 2001.
331 Djamel b. ‘Le Mouvement Cherche une Suite’, Le Quotidien d ’Oran, 23 January 2002.
332 Lemili, A. “Les Comites de Soutien a Bouteflika reactives”, El Watan, 31 January 2002.
333 Robert Malley and Hugh Roberts: ‘Algeria’s next move after the voting’, International H erald  
Tribune, 17 April, 2004.
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associative field into the political game. The resignation of the FLN’s Secretary General Ali 
Benflis from his position as Prime Minister in the weeks following the party’s March 2003 
Congress confirmed his long rumoured intention to stand as candidate in the 2004 
presidential elections against Bouteflika. As the FLN effectively turned from being the 
largest party of the ruling coalition to the first of the opposition, its membership split 
between pro-Benflis and pro-Bouteflika supporters, rallied under the leadership of Foreign 
Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem, thus complying once again to the rules of the factional 
game.
Besides attempting to tame the FLN’s challenge by dividing it into two camps and igniting 
an internecine crisis that would effectively prevent it from enjoying its traditional appeal as 
the party of national unity,334 the President and his allies launched their response through the 
associative field, actively promoting the re-appearance of pro-Bouteflika associations. After 
a “period of hibernation”,335 SaTdani’s National Coordination was “reactivated”, and was 
involved in a year long nationwide campaign in support for the incumbent candidate,336 as 
well as in various attempts at gaining control of several FLN offices in the Western regions 
through the use of physical force.337 The run up to the April 2004 elections saw the 
emergence of several other umbrella organisations grouping hundreds of associations 
supporting the incumbent candidate. The Alliance of Associations of the Centre (Alliance 
des Associations du Centre, AAC)338 provides a good example of the mobilisation capacity 
of these bodies. Bom on 4 of March 2004 and led by Houira Bouhired -  architect, MP and 
daughter of the war heroine Djamila Bouhired -  the AAC gathered more than 600 
associations, including the national artists association, the national association of school 
children parents, the national associations of Algerian farmers etc.339
The associative realm became once again one of the main arenas where the factional struggle 
revolving around the electoral game was conducted. The Benflis camp responded by setting 
up its own associative relays. By the time of the election, it could boast more than 2500
334 ‘La rivalit^ entre MM. Bouteflika et Benflis provoque une crise au FLN’, Agence France Presse, 
Algiers, 9 September 2003.
335 Yasmine Ferroukhi:‘Les comites de soutien au President s’agitent’, Le Matin, 16 April 2003; Nouri 
N .: ‘Manoeuvres autour de la presidentielle a Constantine: Les relais du President s'agitent’, Le 
M a tin , 14 May 2003.
336 ‘Dans la perspective de 1’election presidentielle Saadani «lance» la campagne’, El Watan 13 May 
2003.
337 ‘Tentative d’occupation de certains locaux FLN : A qui profite la confusion ?’, El Watan, 8 June
2003.
338 ‘Centre’ here as a geographical rather than political connotation, meaning ‘the centre’ o f the 
country
339 C P .: ‘Houria Bouhired anime un meeting a Rouiba’, El Moudjahid, 31 March 2004.
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support committees, as well as the backing of a number of associations.340 The anti-party 
discourse of these organisations made clear their mission to fight the electoral battle outside 
the discredited party-political sphere. While noting the emergence of pro-Benflis 
associations in the Oran area as a “boomerang effect” caused by Bouteflika’s use of the 
associative field, Le Matin described them as a “worthy initiative framed outside the parties’ 
official structures”.341 The National Coordinator of the Committees supporting Benflis 
stated: “we are a group of ordinary citizens with no political links who decided to organise 
themselves to support their chosen candidate”.342 The position of the CNEC exemplifies the 
extent of the polarisation of the associative field in the run up to the election. After having 
initially expressed its support to Bouteflika’s re-election together with other organisations of 
the “famille revolutionnaire” such as the ONM, the UGTA and minor organisations like the 
General Union of Traders and Craftsman,343 the CNEC members deposed its pro-Boutelika 
president and switched to Benflis’s side, in turn producing a split within the organisation.344 
In a similar development, after publicly expressing its support to Bouteflika’s candidature, 
the Forum of the Entrepreneurs lost a number of its most prominent members, including 
Issad Rebrab and Reda Hamiani.
What made the real difference between the mobilisation capacities of the two camps was the 
administration’s discriminatory attitude. The 2004 election provided the clearest example of 
how the executive’s leeway in stifling or encouraging associations’ activities was put to 
political use. Already in May 2003, during parliamentary questions, an FLN MP asked the 
Minister of Interior why he had agreed to “grant several cultural associations the 
authorisation to hold political meetings specifically aimed at attacking a political party, and 
specifically the FLN”. He obtained no response.345 A few months later El Watan wrote: the 
challenge to Benflis [...] is ensured through the manifold associations operating under the 
good will of the Ministry of Interior [...] which is far from maintaining the neutrality 
required”.346 In addition to obstructing the activities of associations from the opponent’s 
camp, the bureaucracy was instrumental in transforming pro-Bouteflika’s associations into 
the transmission belts for the incumbent’s financial largesse. Whilst the associations 
supporting Benflis denounced the blockage of all public funding,347 Bouteflika’s campaign
340 Nadir Benseba, ‘Benflis : « Bouteflika ne passera pas » Le Matin 13 March 2004.
341 A. S. Ahcene : ‘Oran : l’effet boomerang’, Le Matin, 7 July 2003.
342 M. S . : ‘Comit6 de soutien a Benflis a Bejaia’, El Watan, 22 October 2003.
343 APS 4 and 5 February 2004
344 ‘CNEC: Retrait de confiance a Bounedjma et soutien a Benflis’, Le Soir d ’A lgerie, 20 March
2004.
345 Nabila Amir : ‘Parlement: L’indifference de Zerhouni’, El Watan, 10 May 2003.
346 Ali Bahmane : ‘L’Algerie entre dans une periode electoral a haute risque’, El Watan 2 September 
2003.
347 A. S. Ahcene : ‘Oran : l’effet boomerang’, Le Matin, 7 July 2003.
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was characterised by the allocation of large financial transfers to the wilayas, which, by 
means of the walis’ financial autonomy, percolated to Algerians through the network of
•  • 348supportive associations.
Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s 2004 election constitutes one of the most accomplished chapters in 
the state’s long-lasting effort to manage Algeria’s political pluralism. Almost two decades 
after the introduction of the 1987 freedom of association law349, which as seen in chapter 
two was “a move apparently recommended by the army and approved by the presidency” - 
the associative field provided once again the state with a tool to bypass Algeria’s unruly 
political parties or, if seen through Touati’s young officers’ eyes, their demonstrated 
ineffectiveness in implementing the country’s political institutionalisation process.
The long-term effect that this will have on the nature of Algerian political pluralism remains 
to be seen. What is certain is that the situation of hyperpluralism induced by the political 
ascendancy of the associative field had an immediate effect on the parties’ vigour. As 
noticed by the national press, the start of Bouteflika’s second term marked a period of 
“struggle for political parties in opposition as well as in government [...] caused by their 
mediocre performance during the presidential elections [and] characterised by their difficulty 
in translating society’s expectations [and] representing citizens’ demands”.350 Meanwhile, a 
number of associative structures with clearly political agendas have kept emerging, 
confirming once again the extent of overlap between the executive and the associative 
sphere, and the latter’s intention to fill the vacuum left by political parties’ inertia.351 The 
‘National Alliance of the Associative Movement and Civil Society’ - part of the plethora of 
associations rallying behind Bouteflika’s National Reconciliation initiative -  is a good 
example. Headed by Djamel Ould Abbes - the Minister of National Solidarity -  in the 
capacity of national coordinator, and built on a group of wilaya coordinators based in Algiers 
linked to a network of offices over the whole country, the National Alliance made its 
appearance by claiming to be “open to include other associations to support and realise the 
programme of the President” under the slogan of ‘peace, solidarity, reconciliation’352. 
According to Said Benabdallah -  the Alliance coordinator for the Oran region and former 
wali of Mostaganem -  the Alliance’s mission coincides with a new challenge for the
348 Salima Tlem?ani: ‘Bouteflika :22 milliards de dinars aux walis’, El Watan, 22 July 2003; 
F .M .: ‘Bouteflika a Djelfa : Generosity electoraliste’, El Watan , 23 July 2003. The 2004 increase in 
public funding to associations is shown in Table 5.4
349 Law 87-15, 21 July 1987
350 Z .C .: ‘Les partis dysertent la politique’, El Watan, 9 August 2004.
351 AA : ‘Soutien au President dela Republique’, El Moudjahid, 27 August 2004.
352 ‘Rencontre nationale du mouvement associatif: de nouvelles perspectives et un role important 
attendu pour les associations’, La Tribune 25 December 2004.
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authorities: “organising the associative movement and adapt it to its increasingly important 
role”.353
Conclusions: associational life and the departification o f Algerian politics
Research on the role of civic associations in political transition processes often points to 
antithetic conclusions. On the one hand, authors focusing on the distinction between political 
and civic spheres often stress the latter’s overpoliticisation and lack of autonomy from the 
state [Witkorowocz, 2002], On the other, liberal theory’s focus on the role of the associative 
sphere in democracy is sometimes accused of suggesting a model of the polity in which the 
central issue of power is diluted in the antipolitics of a civil, but fundamentally apolitical, 
society [Fisher, 1997].
Algeria’s process of political change shows that, by blending civic activism and political 
objectives, the associative sphere can be central to sidestepping the institutions fundamental 
to democratic politics. After the failure of its strategy centred on using political parties to 
meet its legitimacy needs, the state found in the proliferation of civic associations more 
flexible forms of political (dis)organisation. At least formally, associations enhanced the 
pluralistic nature of Algeria’s political system, but also contributed to further destabilise the 
political parties’ role. A by-product of this was the weakening of the institutional apparatus 
centred on the parties - the legislature - and the increasing centralisation of power within an 
executive able to control the associative sphere through legal codes and bureaucratic 
practices warping the application of the country’s liberal legislation on associative freedom. 
Within the executive sphere, the Presidency benefited the most from this process. Starting 
already during the Chadli years, the instrumental use of the associative realm found its apex 
under Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s two terms in office. After allowing Bouteflika-The Candidate 
to present himself above the discredited party sphere, the associative field provided 
Bouteflika-The President with non-party-political channels for conveying his policy agenda, 
and then with a network of electoral relays that contributed to thwart the threat brought by 
the FLN -  at the time, still the strongest party on the political spectrum.
This story may have broader implications for the future of Algeria’s political system. If, as it 
seems, Bouteflika’s re-election really marked a fundamental step in the emancipation of the 
Presidency from the control of the army, the political involvement of Algeria’s associative 
sector can be credited with playing a role in enabling Algerian politics to make the transition
353 ‘Les associations des Aures : II n’existe pas d’autre alternative’, El Moudjahid, 16 August 2005; 
Adlene M eddi: ‘Soutien totale de la CNEC a la Charte’, El Watan, 23 August 2005.
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from the opacity surrounding the military’s higher ranks to the more open realm of civilian 
decision-making. Yet, it is worth asking to what extent Algerian associations have really 
contributed to a form of political consolidation -  the “process through which organisations 
and procedures acquire value and stability” [Huntington, 1968:12]. Despite the warm 
welcome given by foreign observers to the outcome of the 2004 Presidential election, the 
procedures leading to its result raise doubts that go beyond the country’s democratisation 
prospects. As shown by the case of the ACB, in addition to undermining political parties and 
reducing Parliament’s role vis-a-vis the executive, the use of associations for political 
purposes has damaged the credibility of associational life and associative freedom as 
juridical concepts and institutional practices. The dynamics of creative destruction 
characterising Algeria’s institutional framework cast a long shadow on the political stability 
of the country, so dear not only to Touati’s young officers, but also to the international 
community at large.
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Chapter 7. Civic engagement: Algeria’s associative sphere and the international 
arena
Introduction
During a discussion on the position of Algeria vis-a-vis France and the United States at his 
house on the hill hosting the American Embassy in Algiers, Osman Bencherif - then 
teacher of English at the Lycee Descartes -  recalled his past days as Algeria’s ambassador 
in Washington:
Being woken up by a call from Algiers every other night was really not my thing. The 
constant pressure from Amnesty and Co. was almost the only thing I dealt with. Every 
time they came out with a report or a press release it was hell. And o f course it was 
normal. The government was holding back all sorts o f possible information, the number 
o f those killed, their identity. The same with the ‘disappeared’. And the argument of  
these guys at the time was very strong: you’re fighting somebody who won the 
elections. As to me personally, the pressure was too high, and 1 eventually had to 
quit.354
By his own account, Mr Bencherif apparently suffered from the emergence of what some 
analysts refer to as transnational civil society.355
Since the 1980s, the global expansion of non-state actors taking place in developed and 
developing countries alike has encouraged a concomitant surge in international civic 
interactions, often fuelled by increasing volumes of development aid. This has led to a 
reconsideration of the way international relations are conducted. As a subset of the 
liberal/idealist branches of International Relations studies, transnational civil society 
theory sees the associative sphere as a realm of social practice, material resources and 
power relationships, which transcends the boundaries of its host country to influence the 
latter’s relationship with foreign partners. In its more normative variants, these 
perspectives stress the positive functions of transnational civic ties, by highlighting their 
role in promoting the upholding of human rights [Dunne & Wheeler, 1999; Risse, 2000], 
the spreading of environmental culture and standards [Lipschutz & Mayer, 1996], the
354 Interview with Osman Bencherif, Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary o f  Algeria to 
the United States, January 1995-June 1996, Algiers, 28 January 2002
355 Price [2003] defines transnational civil society as self-organized advocacy groups that undertake 
voluntary collective action across state borders in pursuit o f what they deem the wider public 
interest.
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avoidance of the use of force in the resolution of international conflict [Kaldor, 2003] and 
the furthering of the democratisation prospects of authoritarian regimes.
This has in turn encouraged examinations of the impact of transnational civic networks on 
the role of the state in the international system [Price, 2003]. The rise of transnational 
civic interactions is increasingly seen as the emergence of a ‘Third force’ in world politics 
[Fiorini, 2000], highlighting a trend towards the de-territorialization of polities and the 
economies, and a progressive loss of state sovereignty, particularly in policy areas where 
international NGOs play a distinctive role, such as human rights, corruption and the 
environment. It is often noted that grassroots and NGOs are today capable of altering the 
international position of a country and enhancing its isolation by, for instance, 
highlighting human rights abuses, public sector corruption, and authoritarian practices and 
bringing these to the attention of international public opinion. The opposite though is less 
often noted: examples of situations where the NGO sector has been instrumental in 
reducing a country’s isolation are not as commonly reported.
Algeria provides an as yet unnoticed exception to this rule. To understand the impact of 
the associative sphere on the country’s political development, we need to go beyond its 
strictly domestic implications and embrace one additional dimension: that of the functions 
played by the associative sector in shaping the country’s foreign relations during and 
beyond the crisis years. In Algeria too, the joint role of domestic and international NGOs 
and international organisations has been seen as a driving force towards democratic 
change in the country, particularly in comparison to that played by foreign governments. 
Akacem, [2005:163] writes: “it is ironic that non-state actors may have had a greater 
impact on [Algeria’s] internal developments than powerful states with substantial 
economic leverage”. This view needs to be qualified, both in relation to the alleged impact 
of international actors on Algeria’s democratisation, as well as the presumed separation 
between the action of state and non state actors.
During the crisis the associative sphere constituted one of the main channels of 
information used by foreign actors within and outside Algeria to understand and at the 
same time portray the dynamics of the conflict and the country’s evolving politics. In 
becoming a main element of the separate and, at the same time, astonishingly consistent 
discourses about Algeria put forward by media, academia and foreign donors, the 
associative sector ended up being the vehicle for those elements of Algerian society and 
the Algerian state most interested in reaching out to the international arena to provide their 
version of the events. During and after the Algerian crisis, the associative sphere turned
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into one of the realms where the relationship between the government and its international 
partners could be progressively restored. Whilst remaining a channel of political 
information contributing to limit Algeria’s isolation, the associative field become a 
bargaining tool through which the authorities could engage with each other, mend their 
relationship, reconcile positions, and accommodate their mutual interests and needs. 
Formally intended to support and encourage Algeria’s society’s demand for democracy, 
donors’ support for the country’s associative sector helped the authorities make the 
institutionalisation of liberalised autocracy accepted at international level, and supported 
foreign governments’ diplomatic efforts at portraying themselves as partners of a regime 
en route towards democracy.
Threatened civility: associations in the international limelight
Since 9/11, Algeria has mainly entered the pages of international newspapers through the 
scores of Algerian nationals hunted, arrested and tried all over the world on terrorism 
charges. Though far from being good publicity, this represents a definite improvement on 
the type of coverage received prior to the 2001 events, when Algeria made the news 
through varying statements reporting the total numbers of victims caused by its decade 
long conflict and new allegations of army involvement in the atrocities. This type of 
coverage coincided with a period during which, according to domestic observers, Algeria 
was “boycotted, isolated, quarantined, kept away from the international scene for a whole 
decade by its own internal crisis’.356
In truth, the configuration of Algeria’s foreign relations had long been undergoing a 
period of flux. The death of President Houari Boumediene marked the end of Algeria’s 
position as a leading member of the non-aligned movement and the Organisation of 
African Unity - a position further questioned when the economic and financial crisis hit 
the country in the mid 1980s [Zoubir, 1999: 15-29]. The 1992 coup and the start of the 
violence sparked an additional fracture in Algeria’s foreign relations. In the space of a few 
months, Algeria moved from being the first country in the Arab world to express a 
potential for democratic change to the clearest example of democratisation failure and its 
risky consequences. After the first round of elections had raised the prospect of a landslide
356 Abdelkader Khemri: ‘Une diplomatic qui rayonne a nouveau’, Afrique Asie 149, February 
2002. On the internationalisation of the Algerian question during the crisis, see Roberts, 1998.
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for the FIS, and the emergence of an Islamic state on the Southern shores of the 
Mediterranean, the interruption of the political liberalisation process led to the explosion 
of wide-scale domestic violence with global spill-over effects. These included refugees 
flows concerning primarily Europe, as well as the danger of an internationalisation of the 
conflict, which became a clear possibility with the hijacking of an Air France airbus in 
December 1994, a series of terror attacks in France in 1995 and the parallel killings of 
foreigners in Algerian territory, culminating in the assassination of a group of French 
monks in 1996. In 1994, Western governments closed their embassies in the country and 
the number of visas granted to Algerians fell dramatically. Foreign press agencies ordered 
their correspondents to leave and the main airlines cancelled all flights towards Algeria.
The perception of Algeria as “a time-bomb” by the international community dates back to 
this period [Testas, 2002], as does the sudden realisation of the military nature of the 
Algerian regime. If Algerians suddenly felt ‘under embargo’ [Stora, 2001: 23], it was also 
because their government had become a far less respectable partner to deal with. This was 
not simply related to the interruption of the electoral process, which, despite the vocal 
reaction of elements of Western public opinion to the ‘official intrusion’ of the military in 
public life; was tacitly or overtly considered a ‘lesser evil’ compared to a possible FIS 
electoral victory. The Algerian authorities’ position became even shakier when rumours 
alleging the implementation of a state terror policy started reverberating in the 
international arena. The international community found itself in a position of “double 
distance” vis-a-vis Algeria given its rejection on the one hand of the FIS, and on the other 
of a corrupt, ineffective and authoritarian government possibly involved in perpetuating 
the conflict [Martinez, 2000].
Three factors are usually cited to explain how Algeria emerged from this period of 
international isolation. First, the almost total defeat of the Islamist guerrillas, together with 
the reconciliation policy implemented by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, led to an 
amelioration of the security situation, and contributed to stifle questions regarding the 
practices used by the army. Second, the rise of the hydrocarbon prices once again made 
Algeria an unavoidable partner of an oil-starved West, as signalled by the strings of 
Western oil and gas companies queuing up to strike a deal with the government. Third, 
9/11 itself made the Algerian military a privileged partner of Western governments eager 
to learn from its decade long experience in fighting Islamic insurgents and tap the 
intelligence gathered by the country’s secret services.
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Much less consideration is usually given to the strategy deployed by the Algerian 
authorities to break the country’s isolation, which to this day remains to be told. If the 
more overt elements of this strategy - such as the authorities’ attempts, starting with the 
election of Liamine Zeroual as president in 1995, to put the country back on the rails of 
democratic change (or at least to portray it as if it was) -  are well known, the more 
obscure ones remain based on allegations. During the summer of 1993, the government’s 
response to the Islamists appeared to change from one based on containment and 
repression, including the arrest and internment of suspects in camps and counter guerrillas 
activities, to a more active one which involved the establishing of a climate of fear in the 
country, through practices allegedly including assassinations, the ‘disappearance’ of 
terrorist suspects and prisoners, which culminated in widespread rumours concerning the 
involvement of the military in the massacres which took place in the villages of Rais, Beni 
Messous and Bentalha during the late summer of 1997.
If only a fraction of such allegations was corroborated, the policy of terror implemented 
by the military and aimed at ‘making fear change sides’-  to use the words of Redha 
Malek, Algeria’s prime minister in 1993-1994 -  would provide one of the largest and 
most dreadful examples of disinformation campaigns in the history of the country and 
beyond. What is certain is that in addition to quelling the population’s support for the 
Islamist guerrilla movements, the regime desperately needed to convince international 
public opinion of its legitimacy by showing that accepting the coup and the emergency 
measures did indeed mean accepting a ‘lesser evil’, because at stake were far more than 
democratic ideals. Certainly, this policy achieved some very mixed results. If the 
exacerbation of the violence did enhance perceptions of the threat posed by political Islam 
domestically and abroad, it also complicated a clear-cut understanding by international 
public opinion of the dynamics of the conflict. The emergence of the question ‘who’s 
killing whom in Algeria?’ (qui tue qui?) after the massacres and its long lasting echoes 
through the international arena are evidence of the extent to which the army’s strategy 
might have backfired.357
What is certain is that, in addition to complicating any understanding of the Algerian 
situation, the amplification of the climate of violence enhanced the attention which the 
international community paid to Algeria. Only a relatively small share of Algerians living 
in the 1990s had experienced their country solely during a time of armed conflict. On the
357 The peak o f these allegations came with Souaidia’s La Salle Guerre and Yous’s Qui a  tue a  
Bentalha which contained allegations on the army’s involvement in the massacres and in 
conducting a ‘dirty war’.
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other hand, for much of the West, the violence became the main prism through which 
Algeria was watched and known. The fact that one of the most popular analyses of the 
country [Martinez, 2000] has as its fundamental hypothesis the relevance of a “war- 
oriented imaginaire” characterising Algerians’ social relations -  an imaginative frame of 
reference where violence is the key to social and political success - is telling in this 
respect. But although the pervasiveness of the violence in media portrayals of Algeria 
during the 1990s is understandable, its consequences are not to be taken for granted. In 
commenting how the conflict completely altered the global perception of her country, 
Fatma Oussedik wrote: “It is under the pressure of [...] violence and armed conflict that 
[Algeria] has become more familiar, less secretive for the Western watcher”. With the 
start of the violence -  Oussedik continues -  “the page of orientalism has been turned: the 
“new cliche” in the Western perception of Algerians consists of “a relationship of 
compassion” [Oussedik, 1998:117-118].
A by-product of this ‘new orientalism of compassion’ investing Algeria was the propelling 
onto the international stage of what was perceived to be a more positive side of a country 
rife with violence, such as its emerging associative sphere. As we have seen, the 
emergence of Algeria’s associative sphere dates back to the end of the 1980s. 358 Already 
in the very early 1990s the country was registering astonishing rates of associative growth. 
But only after the beginning of the conflict, with violence ravaging the country and the 
prospect of the collapse of the Algerian state surfacing amongst diplomatic and academic 
circles [Zartman, 1995] did interest in civil society enter Algerian studies prominently. To 
use Slyomovics’s words [1995:11] “the focus on a social order in which violence had 
become pervasive produced the interest in ‘civil society’”. Zoubir’s statements provide an 
example: “the tragedy in Algeria is that the manifold crisis also bolstered movements of 
rage or violent nativist responses to failure [...] in parallel to the emergence of civil 
society and a vibrant associational life” [1999: 39].
The image of a civil society under threat became especially relevant for analyses dealing 
with the condition of Algerian women and the human rights situation [Sgrena, 1997]. 
Writing about women’s organisations, Lloyd states: “women’s right to public action has 
been fundamentally challenged in this virtual civil war, and they have been at the forefront 
of resistance to violence, in different forms of political action and at different levels of 
society [1999: 479]. Increasingly perceived as representing the capacity of Algerians to 
cope with the crisis, ‘as gene carriers of the good society -  microclimates for developing
358 Algeria’s associative sphere before 1989 is explored in chapter 2.
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values like tolerance and cooperation, and the skills required for living a democratic life”. 
[Edwards, 2004], under Western eyes associations appeared to be growing as the conflict 
was intensifying, as a form of ‘social antibodies’ to the violence. Through portrayals 
depicting ‘a civil society [as a] victim of the confrontation between state and Islam’ 
[Termeulen, 1999] associational life became equated to an immunity system developed by 
a society under strain:
In full confrontation with fundamentalism and the regime, the grouping o f Algerian 
women into associations has backed a profound reorganisation o f civil society. As 
these women, engineers, architects, young people and businessmen, Algeria is 
undergoing a period o f associative effervescence. Numerous Algerians see in this 
swarming the terrain for a reconstruction o f society.359
As clarified by Mossa and Beaudet: “the themes that concern the associative movement 
are those at the heart of society’s survival, [...civil society] is obliged to fight for its 
survival in very harsh conditions” [1995: 8].
From the realm of academic scholarship and media portrayals, this image percolated down 
in the more concrete realm of the aid industry. So in a document setting out the main lines 
of cooperation with North African NGOs, the Coordination Committee for 
European/Maghrebi NGO relations described the need to work with Algerian civil society 
in these terms: “in Algeria despite the harsh conditions...not a day goes by without the 
birth of a new association. The motives vary: mobilisation to defend people’s rights, civic 
fight for women’s emancipation, etc. It is first of all a fight for democracy and citizenship. 
Despite the strong tensions and the crisis, the development of associational life in Algeria 
is an element of hope”.360 In November 2000, the website of the Ecumenical Service for 
Self-help stated: “Algeria’s associative movement is proving its dynamism and vitality. 
Moreover, the events in the country show how it is more and more indispensable to make 
sure that a civil society take root in the country, to inject a dynamic of peace, fraternity 
and responsible citizenship. In the context of a grave economic, social and political crisis, 
the associative milieu represents a hope”.361
359 Dominique de Laage : ‘Par le courage des Femmes’, France Sud Ouest, 5 May 1998
360 ‘Suivi des activity du Comity de Coordination des ONG Europe/Maghreb.’ Liasion Info 
Bulletin des ONG de 1’UE engages dans Faction Nord-Sud, n. 29, July-August 1997.
361 http://www.cimade.org/ssi/001/htm
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In search of civic voices
As with most other elements of the regime’s disinformation campaign during the conflict, 
its use of the national and foreign media to restore international credibility remains largely 
understudied. Stora’s dissection of the restrictive environment imposed by the authorities 
on the national press after 1992 [2001: 23-30], Lise Garon’s analysis of the position taken 
by the media [1998], and Ait-Embarek’s analysis of the rhetoric of terror used by the 
military provide notable exceptions [1996].362 For several years, the international media 
found in the Algerian drama, with its spectacularly dreadful images and uncertain ending, 
an immense source of coverage able to scare, bewilder and entertain its Western watcher. 
To this effect, the media faced two obstacles. The first was to provide the audience with 
an interpretative framework capable of making Algeria’s unfathomable crisis 
understandable to the Western audience. To overcome the first obstacle, the media 
proceeded to the oldest and most effective storytelling tool: portraying the conflict through 
a binary dramatisation of the events: the guerrillas and the army were cast as the main 
characters of the conflict, while in the less enticing episodes concerning the country’s 
political development, the adversaries were the Islamist and the secularists. The second 
obstacle was to make use -  or to be seen as making use — of reliable, trustworthy 
information. In addressing this second issue, the media made some of the characters of 
Algeria’s polarised drama also one of the main sources of the script.
As the conflict developed, Algeria’s associative sphere ceased to be the mere object of the 
attention of international public opinion to become a realm populated by actors able to 
convey information on Algeria and from Algeria, and more importantly, considered 
trustworthy of doing so by the international onlooker. In her account of the West’s 
evolving relationship towards Algeria during the crisis, Oussedik highlights that although 
since colonial times “the production of orientalist perceptions on Algeria had continued to 
be carried out in France”, the advent of the violence helped the inclusion of Algerians 
themselves in the production of media and academic discourse [1998:117]. Clearly, by 
referring to the category of Algerians “tres mediatises” Oussedik does not have in mind 
the ordinary members of the Algerian diaspora living in France, but rather prominent 
Algerian personalities with an audience in France, such as members of the country’s ‘civil 
society’. Her allusion to Algerian women as “Debout” (standing up) is an implicit 
reference to Khalida Messaoudi -  probably the most renowned Algerian women’s rights
362 See also Benjamin Stora’s analysis [2001]
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activist outside Algeria, and author of the widely translated book titled Une Algerienne 
Debout363 [1998:117].
As the organisation of trustworthy, reliable Algerian voices was becoming increasingly 
crucial to the West’s understanding of political developments in the country, what the 
international discourse generally called movement associatif also became clearer, 
revealing an entrenched bias in both media and academic portrayals to equate the 
associative sphere to only its secular, modernist components. Once again, this was 
especially evident with the issue of women. As Munoz pointed out “almost exclusive 
attention is given to Westernised women in Arabic and Islamic countries, or those from 
‘modernist’ circles. The secular-feminist sector, according to the Western model, is 
undoubtedly the most familiar source of information (in fact the only one) to the reporter, 
although it is not the most representative of these societies” [Munoz, 2002]. The 
modernist bias in the treatment of the women’s issue in Algeria was specifically 
underscored by Salima Ghezali, a prominent Algerian journalist who pointed out that ‘the 
foreign observer tends too often to consider modernist women as the sole expression of 
female emancipation whose message is understood in the West’ [El Pais, 30 April 1995, 
quoted in Munoz, 2002].
Media attention to Algeria’s associative movement in turn translated into a plethora of 
initiatives where associative representatives were given the opportunity to describe, 
explain and provide advice on the Algerian crisis, initiatives often praised as the 
possibility for ‘Algeria’ to reach out to the global sphere [Lloyd, 1999]. The number of 
examples is quite extensive. When, for instance, five Algerian asylum seekers in France 
were invited to a meeting organised by the Toulouse-based association Ay da to explain 
the dynamics of the conflict, they were introduced as ‘representatives of that civil society 
which rejects the FIS, [and which] without weapons to defend itself, is organising the 
resistance clandestinely through its large associative networks”.364 At an academic 
conference organised at Georgetown University on 30 January 1998, after highlighting the 
lack of information concerning the human rights situation, the representative from Human 
Rights Watch stressed the need to reach out to the existing human rights organisations in 
the country. At another conference,365 the only ‘witness’ from Algeria invited was Malika
363 The title o f the English version ofMessaoudi’s book is Unbound
364Jean-Pierre Tamisier : ‘La voix des democrates algerJens’, France Sud Ouest, 17 March 2005.
365 Conference organised by the University o f Michigan Center for Middle Eastern Studies and the 
Johns Hopkins Bologna Center, held on 14-15 May 1999 in Bologna, Italy, titled Algeria and 
Europe: Algerian/Maghrebi Voices Abroad and European Reactions
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Remaoun of the Oran based Association of Women for Personal Emancipation and 
Citizenship - AFEPEC) to speak about women’s rights in Algeria.
Far from being limited to the media, the mutating portrayal of Algeria’s civil society’s 
supposedly endangered existence into a definition of the associative movement restricted 
to its more secularist components became the standard in academic discourse too. [Sgrena, 
1997; Moussa and Beaudat, 1995; Entelis, 1994, 1996; Lloyd, 1998]. This of course is not 
specific to the Algerian context. Not the least of the difficulties faced by the literature 
discussing the development of civil society in the Middle East is due to the role of 
religion.366 With Islamic NGOs often being characterised as not responding to democratic 
principles, it is not surprising if academic discourse on civil society in the Middle East 
tends to exclude them from working definitions. In the Algerian context though, the 
uneasiness on the part of authors writing on the country’s associational life about 
including Islamic organisations is even more understandable. Islamic charities were a 
pillar of the rise of the FIS as major political player on the national scene, and as such, 
they remain inextricably associated with perceptions of an obscurantist fundamentalist 
threat to Algerian society [Munoz, 1999].367
The issue in the selective way through which Algerian civil society was defined abroad is 
not so much due to the fact that neglecting religion-oriented associations meant leaving 
aside a number of Islamic charities which actually opposed the violence -  sometimes 
paying a price for it -  as, for instance, Irshad el Islah. It has to do with the role the 
associative sphere played in shaping Algeria’s international position. As seen above, the 
fascination with the burgeoning associative movement abroad was partly due to the 
international community’s discomfort with having to put up with ‘a lesser evil’ - an 
authoritarian military regime tainted by allegations of horrific human rights abuses. The 
focus on civil society as Algeria’s only chance for a resolution o f  the political stalemate 
allowed the international arena to keep engaging with the country and avert the 
uncomfortable issue of the legitimacy of the state.
This approach brushed off the fact that, long before the perception of a struggle between 
‘civil and uncivil societies’ enhanced the international profile of the more secularist,
366For a stance on the incompatibility o f civil society and Islam see Gellner [1994] Lewis, 1995; 
Hawthorne, 2004
367 This perspective ignores the fact that excluding religion-oriented organisations means excluding 
a vast number o f Islamic charities which opposed the Islamic guerrillas’ violence and paid a price 
for it.
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westernised and pro-eradicators368 elements of the associative sphere, these same groups 
had already entered the national political stage to back the 1992 interruption of the 
electoral process and the banning of the FIS.369 By the time the international arena’s need 
to address the lack of reliable, detailed information on Algeria’s drama had found in civil 
society a supposedly trustworthy source, and media and academic discourses on Algeria’s 
associational life converged in a more or less tacit definition of the associative sector as 
restricted to its more Westernised elements, Algeria’s associative sphere had become a 
major player in the internationalisation of the Algerian question. This became 
progressively clear to those actors, in Algeria and abroad, concerned with the international 
legitimacy of the Algerian state.
Grassroots legitimacy
During and after the worst episodes of the Algerian crisis, Western governments’ 
persistent reluctance to probe deeper into the darker aspects of the conflict, particularly 
those involving alleged instances of grave misconduct by the state in its efforts to restore 
order, has been interpreted as an example of their incapacity for action on the international 
stage, and in the case of France, of collusion [Youngs, 2005]. In response to an 
increasingly outraged Western public opinion, at three stages the international community 
gave the impression of being willing to question the Algerian authorities’ version of the 
events. On January 19 and 20, 1998, the European Union sent an official delegation of 
three foreign ministers from Luxembourg, Britain, and Austria, with the purpose of 
convincing the authorities to allow a special United Nations rapporteur on human rights 
to look into the circumstances surrounding the atrocities. Three weeks later, another 
delegation of nine European MPs, led by EMP Andre Soulier spent four days in Algeria, 
with the declared aim of shedding light on the massacres. And finally, on 22 July-4 
August 1998 a UN delegation of eminent persons, led by former Portuguese President 
Mario Soares, was dispatched to Algeria to “gather information” and report to the UN 
Secretary General. During each of these visits, foreign observers met with representatives 
of the country’s associative movement. At no point did any of these delegations question 
the representativeness of the associations they met or the views these relayed, despite 
warnings to this effect.370 Part of the reasons lie in the fact that in itself, meeting with civil
368 The term ‘eradicators’ (eradicateurs) identifies those components o f the Algerian regime 
opposed to any type o f dialogue or settlement with the Islamists, favoured by the ‘conciliators’.
369 This is examined in chapter 6
370 In an open letter to the Members o f the delegation published in the days before the mission, 
several personalities including Patrick Baudoin, Pierre Bourdieu, Francois Geze, Pierre Vidal- 
Naquet pointed out that « the delegation will meet with representatives o f ‘civil society’ as well,
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society members was meant to provide legitimacy to their fact-finding missions, and their 
ensuing conclusions.
Reporting back to the European Parliament on the results of the Mission, Mr Soulier 
discarded any allegations of “allegiance with Algiers” by pointing out that “EMPs are not 
supporting the Algerian government nor its opposition...we remain open and alert. We 
support democracy”. “The consultations -  he continued - have been broadened to a vast 
spectrum of actors, including civil society organisations...nobody says that the military- 
industrial regime in place is a good one: let’s step back from the notion that in Algeria 
everybody agrees with the government...but nobody has questioned the role of the army 
[in the massacres]”.371 From the columns of the Figaro, the words of Helene Carrere 
d’Encausse, another member of the Soulier mission, exemplify how the view of Algerian 
associations as ‘social antibodies’ taming the devastation of Algerian society translated 
into their legitimisation as sources of information capable of providing the international 
community with a clear-cut interpretation of the dynamics of the violence: “we hear 
sometimes, here and there, that the Algerian government has been complicit in this horror 
for dark reasons of power, or to comfort its legitimacy. With only one exception,372 all the 
interlocutors we met (i.e. all legal political parties, and the associations of civil society) 
say that this is false. Having heard them, having heard those women whose husbands have 
died from the terrorists’ bullets, it is evident that the question 'qui tue qui?' does not need 
to be asked ever again”.373
The only international organisations willing to probe deeper into the different facets of the 
crisis, and question the dichotomic images of a conflict between good 
(authorities/secularists) and evil (insurgents/Islamists) were the main international human 
rights NGOs.374 Since 1997, when the state seemed to regain the upper hand in its battle 
against the Islamists, Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International (AI) and the
with associations of women, public sector employees, businessmen and trade union members. The 
delegation will certainly be impressed by their opinions, including their attacks to the authorities, 
and by their courage in the face o f Islamist terror. But if  the members o f the UN mission limit 
themselves to these meetings, they will certainly leave Algeria with the sentiment that despite still 
living difficult moments, the country is on the road o f a true democracy, as witnessed by the 
plurality o f  the interlocutors met. And yet, these represent only a small portion o f society.)) 
www.algeria-watch.org/farticle/un/misionu.htm
371 ‘UE/Algerie : la mission parlementaire milite pour le dialogue avec Alger’, Europolitique, 21 
fevrier 1998.
372 The only exception was the Algerian League for the Defence o f  Human Rights (LADDH), 
which vocally questioned the authorities’ version o f the events. During a press conference in 
Algeria, Andre Solier publicly tore up a letter given to him personally by the LADDH’s president, 
Ali Yahia Abdennour.
373 H. Carrere d’Encausse : ‘La Terreur Islamiste’, Le Figaro, 16 fevrier 1998.
374 See for instance HRW Report Algeria: ‘Neither among the living nor the dead: state-sponsored 
disappearances in Algeria.’ February 1998, vol.10(2)
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International Federation of Human Rights (IFHR) started investigating the allegations of 
assassinations, kidnappings, and massacres surrounding the army’s counter-guerrilla 
practices. In fact it was largely through these organisations, that the qui tue qui? question, 
firstly relayed by the media, retained international resonance. And it was exactly on these 
issues that Algeria’s military leaders perceived “the risks of the internationalisation of the 
Algerian question as a major threat” [Martinez, 2000: 46]; proving these allegations would 
have raised the possibility of army members being tried in international courts.375
This is how Osman Bencherif, who, as we have seen, had had first-hand experience of the 
influence of international NGOs, described the role of Algeria’s associative sector in 
fencing them off:
The lack o f information played a very bad role in the legitimacy o f the pouvoir, when 
there is no information only the bad news has resonance. I think that, in that period, 
women’s associations and all those organisations in the associative movement that 
stood up to the position o f international NGOs did a great job. Somehow they provided 
the information that the state did not provide, they communicated what the war really 
was.376
At more than one point, the domestic response to the human rights NGOs was organised 
through the associative sphere. Already in 1997, for instance, shortly after the publication 
of an AI report on human rights in Algeria, Hafsa Koudil a prominent women’s activist, 
criticised “the unacceptable blackmailing” operated by these organisations [Charef, 185- 
187]. This type of attack intensified in the following years. After being prevented from 
accessing the country to investigate the various allegations concerning the army’s 
involvement in the violence, Amnesty International was officially invited by President 
Bouteflika to visit Algeria in May 2000. AI demanded to meet with the army’s high 
ranking officers, to no avail. Instead, a plethora of civil society groups came forward to 
testify, including some of the most renowned women’s and human rights associations like 
Rachda, the Algerian League of Human Rights (LADH), the Organisation of the Victims 
of Terrorism (ONVT) and Soumoud?11 This is how Donatella Rovera, a member of the 
AI delegation, reacted to their spontaneous offers of help:
375 The sudden flight o f  General Nezzar, former Minister o f Defence and president o f the High 
State Council from Paris on 26 April 2001, following the official filing of accusations o f torture 
against him in the French capital during his visit, illustrates the degree to which high ranks army 
officers feared such accusations.
376 Interview with Osman Bencherif, Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary o f  Algeria to 
the United States, January 1995-June 1996, Algiers, 28 January 2002
377 Soumoud (“steadfastness" in Arabic) is an association o f  the families o f  the disappeared during 
the violence.
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What are these associations, and what do they represent? Honestly I don’t know. Rather 
than asking who’s inside these associations, one should ask who’s behind them.378
The reason for Rovera’s attitude is that all along Al’s visit, these associations put up a 
common front against its main rationale, namely probing deeper into the allegations of 
human rights abuses.379 On the last day of Al’s visit, several other groups joined the 
representatives of these associations in the organisation of a joint meeting to denounce the 
“logic and the perspective” adopted by AI, and the “exhumation of the ‘who kills whom’ 
paradigm”.380 The position of these organisations was then restated in an open letter sent 
to AI during the following days by seven associations, to denounce the organisation’s 
attitude to “Algeria’s reality, which has been marked since the beginning of the conflict, 
by a chilling scepticism when it was a matter of condemning Islamic terrorism”.381 The 
same dynamic of confrontation between international NGOs and local associations took 
place when the IFHR came to Algeria -  again at the invitation of the President -  to 
investigate the same allegations.382
The role played by this set of associations “sent by the authorities” to counter the 
accusations launched by Amnesty, HRW and IFHR led Hocine Ait Ahmed (leader of the 
Front des Forces Socialistes) to declare that “Algeria’s international relations are no 
longer the monopoly of the state”. 383 Far from subscribing to the idea that the increasing 
role of the associative movement on the international arena corresponded to a decline of 
the state’s weight, Alt Ahmed’s words highlight the degree to which, in the eyes of 
Algerian observers, the associative sphere was part of the regime’s channels of parallel 
diplomacy aimed at re-establishing its legitimacy.
378 Interview with Donatella Rovera, Amnesty International, Middle East and North Africa 
Programme, London, April 2001
379 Sarnia Lokmane : ‘Soumoud et le collectif des femmes democrates a AI : vous avez failli a votre 
mission’, Liberte, 13 May 2000.
380 Salim Tamani: ‘Meeting a la Salle Ibn Khaldun : non a la demarche de Amnesty’, Liberte, 11 
May 2000.
381 The associations included: the Association for the Defence and the Promotion o f women’s rights 
(Adpdf), National committee against forgetting and treason (CNOT), Djaza'irouna, the Independent 
Associations for the Triumph of Women’s Rights, (Aitdf), The Algerian Rally o f  Democratic 
Women, Soumoud, and Tharwa Fatma n’Soumer. ‘Sept associations ecrivent a Amnesty’, La 
Nouvelle Republique 11 May 2000; ‘Sept associations interpellant les ONG de Defense des Droits 
de 1’Homme’ : L’lntegrisme n’est pas un groupe d’Opposition’ Liberte 12 May 2000.
382 Also see other articles in Le Matin, La Tribune and Liberte between 1 and 4 June 2000. It is 
interesting, at this point o f the analysis, to note that during the same press conference, Merabet 
declared that, whilst expressing his disappointment in the meetings with AI and the IFHRs, he was 
“very satisfied with the meetings with the representatives o f Human Rights Watch”. Feriel H. 
‘Soumoud fait le bilan de ses rencontres avec les ONGs’ Liberte, 5 June 2000.
3$3E/ Watan 22 March 1999
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In 2002 Abdelkader Tigha -  a former member of Algeria’s military intelligence (Direction 
des Renseignements et de la Securite, DRS) - broke his six years’ silence and revealed 
what he knew about the involvement of the Algerian secret services in the assassination of 
seven Trappist monks on 21 May 1996, officially attributed to the Armed Islamic Groups 
(GIA). The affair had constituted one of the darkest moments in the Algeria-France 
relationship due to allegations that the Algerian military had devised the plan to kidnap 
and then assassinate the monks in order to shake France off its ‘double distance’ position 
vis-a-vis Algeria and induce it to back the governments’ efforts against the terrorists.384 
The authorities responded to the resurfacing of the accusations with a deafening silence, 
broken only by the voices of the associative movement. So, a few days after Liberation 
had published Tigha’s accusations, the government’s newspaper El Moudjahid reported 
that
[GJathered in Algiers for a national meeting, the associative movement has expressed in 
a communique its indefectible support to the Popular National Army, and all the 
security forces, for their fight against terrorism. The associative movement denounced 
the manipulations by Algeria’s enemies to re-launch a thesis long dead, that o f the ‘qui 
tue quV, asking why every time that an attempt to bring the Algerian and French people 
closer is started, some voices are raised to stop and paralyse it.385
The most visible aspect of this strategy is evident in General Nezzar’s reliance on 
associations’ representatives to defend him from the allegations brought against him by 
Habib Souai'dia, a former army officer and author of La Sale Guerre -  a book containing 
direct and detailed accusations concerning the army’s involvement in the massacres, 
which sold thousands of copies in France and which is illegally distributed in Algeria:
Members o f  the Comit6 National contre I’Oubli et la Trahison (CNOT) were asked [by 
General Nezzar] to support him in his defence against the accusations of Saoui'dia.386 
Apparently the CNOT has accepted, and so has Djazai'rouna.387
384 Amaud Dubus: ‘Les sept moines de Tibehirine enlev^s sur ordre d'Alger’, Liberation, 23 
December 2002.
385 ‘Les sept moines trapistes ont 6t6 tue par le GIA’,£7 Moudjahid, 28 December 2002
386 Ex-army officer and author o f La Sale Guerre -  a book containing direct and detailed 
accusations concerning the army’s involvement in the massacres, which sold thousands o f copies in 
France and which is illegally distributed in Algeria.
387 Interview with Mme Malika SaTdani, [14 October, 2001] Algiers. The CNOT publicly attacked 
Souaidia’s books in the newspaper Le Matin, calling it a ‘diatribe’ (brulot) aiming at exonerating 
Islamism o f all the barbaric crimes it had perpetrated, Le Matin, 18 February 2001.
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In addition to fencing off the accusations of human rights abuses, the state used the 
associative movement to dispute claims of a stalled democratisation process. This is clear 
from the way the authorities manipulated the figures on the number of associations in the 
country. In July 1999, few weeks after his confirmation as President, Abdelaziz Bouteflika 
stated that the conflict in Algeria had claimed 100,000 dead. The following year, the 
government affirmed that since the political opening Algeria had seen the birth of 55,000 
associations -  a ratio of one grassroots organisation for every two dead. Far from being a 
senseless statistic, the idea that associative growth was somewhat correlated with the 
intensity of the conflict was being officially reinforced by Algerian authorities themselves. 
Throughout the 1990s the authorities have used the growth of the associative field to show 
the healthy state of civil liberties in the country and thus to prove that the process of 
political transition was continuing. According to Algeria’s 1995 official report to the UN 
Commission of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights “only 9 national associations have 
been recognised between 1976 and 1988, in contrast to 678 in the following 6 years”, 
proving “that freedom of association is now an irrefutable reality in Algeria” and that “the 
associative movement is one of the prime actors of the country’s social, scientific and 
cultural life”.388 In September 2000, in a communication on the status of civil freedoms to 
Amnesty International, the Ministry of Interior noted that “while only 200 associations 
had been formed by 1991, by 2000 they had grown to a staggering 55,000”.389 In at least 
two ways, this ministerial statement constituted a conscious misconstruction of the 
development and state of the associative movement. As we have seen,390 by 1991 Algerian 
associations already numbered 13,000. In making 1991 the official year of the start of the 
associative euphoria in the country, the authorities seconded the paralleling of associative 
development with the development of the conflict operated at international level. 
Moreover, the image of a vibrant associative sector developing in the country in fact 
contrasted with the opinion that the government had of its real importance. As already 
made clear,391 in 2000 the authorities were well aware that most of the tens of thousands 
of associations in the country existed on paper only.
The state’s instrumental use of the associative sector is clear if one compares the different 
way the authorities treated associations’ requests for recognition domestically and abroad. 
On the one hand, the government failed to provide any response to the large number of 
associations’ requests for official recognition. On the other, the authorities used the 
number of demands for recognition to demonstrate the width of the associative field to
388 Le Quotidien d ’Oran 14 November 1995
389 El Moudjahid 11 November 2000
390 See chapter 2
391 See chapter 4
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outside observers, in order to prove, as Algeria’s official report to the UN Committee on 
economic, social and cultural rights shows, that ‘associative freedom constitute^], with 
political parties, one of the most dynamic and unavoidable realities of scientific, cultural 
and economic life in the country”. The speech given by Ahmed Attaf - Algeria’s foreign 
minister -  to the 54th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights provides an 
example of the authorities’ use of “the outstanding development of the associative 
movement” to fend off questions about human rights abuses:
The difficult conjuncture due to the terrorist factor has not altered the authorities’ will 
for transparency. Do we need to recall that at international level, the visit o f  foreign 
parliamentary delegations, eminent public figures, and the visits during the last 10 
months o f more than a thousand journalists have allowed the international community to 
correctly understand Algeria’s reality? A reality that some, to achieve unspoken goals 
under the fallacious concern o f the defence o f  human rights, are still trying to deform, 
practising a new and irresponsible form o f ‘negationism’. ...At national level, the 
freedom and diversity o f  the national press, parliamentary debates, and the dynamism of  
54,000 associations active in Algeria are further elements guaranteeing this 
transparency. The creation o f a National Observatory o f  Human Rights, the installation 
o f alternative dispute mediators and a Mediator of the Republic, as well as a national 
associative movement in full growth, constitute the indication of my country’s will to be 
a society in line with the times, fully integrated in the globalisation process, completely 
distant from events negating human progress. ... The development of the associative 
movement and the blossoming in civil society o f  thousands of NGOs [...] testifies to the 
collective work towards the protection and promotion o f human rights.392
The discursive use of the associative sphere for external consumption was also evident at a 
conference of Arab Interior ministers held in Algiers less than two years later. The hosting 
authorities distinguished themselves by giving a communication on ‘Managing voluntary 
associations’, when the issues on the agenda dealt solely with internal security, terrorism 
and drug trafficking. After duly enumerating the growth of voluntary associations in 
different sectors, the speech remarked:
[T]he clear vitality o f the associative movement in [the] country” which “expresses the 
re-appropriation o f our traditions and values o f mutual aid and solidarity. Faced with 
the exigencies o f modernity and democracy, nothing more normal for Algeria to 
reintegrate these ancestral experiences in the framework o f  civil society’s need for
392 Speech given by Ahmed Attaf to the 54th Session of the UN Commission o f Human Rights, 
Geneva, 18 March 1998
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expression...offering individuals the ideal framework for participation on the basis o f  
common affinities and interests.393
The authorities’ official backing of the ‘social antibodies’ view of the associative 
movement put forward by foreign observers abroad paid off in terms of new opportunities 
for engagement between Algeria and its partners. Thus Bernard Stasi -  European MP, and 
president of the Association France-Algerie - asserted that “in Algeria there is a civil 
society that deserves to be supported. We need to make clear that in France we believe 
Algeria can be a democratic country”.394 In advocating the necessity to get out of a 
position of ‘double distance’ vis-a-vis Algeria, Le Figaro found in the associative 
movement a ‘Third Way’ for France’s engagement with Algeria: “civil society, even if 
this term can sound strange in a country at war, has not disappeared in Algeria. It resists, 
by doing its job, in its place, as it is. Let’s link up, let’s twin. Not simply city to city, or 
town to town, in a traditional way, but association with association. Who could possibly 
oppose this kind of contacts, this kind of practices? One more time, let me voice this 
appeal: may the democrats help the democrats”.395 On 1 May, passing from words to 
actions, Bernard Stasi arrived in Algeria in his triple capacity of EMP, Mediator of the 
French Republic and President of the French association ‘Cites Unies’, to meet with “his 
Algerian counterparts’ from the associative movement to establish links between the two 
sides of the Mediterranean”.396 Just a few weeks earlier, the French government had made 
it clear that ‘the re-establishment of a open, natural and constructive dialogue’ with 
Algeria by means of the civil society channel was official French policy. In describing the 
parliamentary speech by Hubert Vedrine -  France’s foreign minister -  in response to a 
question by a socialist MP on France’s attitude towards Algeria and his focus on the 
associative movement, Maghreb Confidentiel wrote: by inciting the launch of relations 
with Algerian civil society (a task entrusted to the French Ambassador, Jean Audibert) 
Paris evidently no longer has any particular feeling [etat d'ame] vis-a-vis the Algerian 
regime”.397 Donors’ promotion of Algeria’s associative sector had officially started.
393 Ministry o f Interior, ‘La Gestion des Associations’, Communication given at the 17th Meeting 
o f  the Arab Interior Ministers' Council, held in Algiers on January 29-31 2000
394 Bernard Stasi’s declaration appeared in a joint article reporting the views o f  a number of  
European intellectuals with ties to Algeria and entitled: ‘We shall not let the Algerians down’, in La 
Croix, 7 February 1997. The other contributors were Jules Roy, Alain Michel, Benjamin Stora, 
Marco Impagliazzo, Yves Bonnet, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, Mireille Elmalan.
395 Jean-Fran9ois Deniau : ‘Fin d’un ramadan sanglant. Algerie : pour une troisieme voix’, Le 
Figaro, 10 February 1997.
396 Maghreb Confidentiel, 30 April 1998.
397 Maghreb Confidentiel, 9 February 1998.
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Democracy promotion between stability and change
During the 1990s the promotion of democracy became a major objective of international 
aid donors and one of the main elements of political conditionality attached to foreign aid 
[Carothers, 1999; Burnell, 2000]. Democracy assistance -  loosely defined as “aid 
designed to foster opening in a non-democratic country or to further a democratic 
transition in a country that has experienced a democratic opening” [Carothers, 1999: 6] -  
is a broad label covering a variety of aid packages targeting different elements of a 
country’s political system. These can be divided into projects and programmes taking a 
top-down approach to democratisation - aiming directly at the transformation of those 
elements of the country’s institutional apparatus responsible for ‘democracy supply’- such 
as the executive, Parliament and the Judiciary - and those that aspire to facilitate 
democratic change from the bottom up, by encouraging society’s ‘demand for 
democracy’, such as those targeting civil society organisations [Denoux, 2004].
From an initial focus on fostering community development, socio-economic equality and 
human rights [Van Rooy, 1999] donors such as the EU and USAID have increasingly 
framed their civil society support packages within the broader objective of promoting 
democracy through a variety of strategies including strengthening advocacy organisations 
that push for specific democratic reforms or help the development of a civic, democratic 
culture through citizen education programmes. However, as the presence of a dense 
network of civic associations and grassroots groups has come to be regarded as a 
precondition of democracy, regardless of their specific mission and activities, in the eyes 
of donors ‘civil society’ has increasingly been seen as “an end in itself’ [Sabbatini, 
2002:8].
In recent years however, the emergence of ‘the end of the transition paradigm’398 has 
swiftly taken root in a development industry hard pressed to demonstrate results on the 
ground and has led to serious questioning of the results of democracy assistance, to the 
extent that some authors termed the beginning of the 2000s “a century of diminishing 
expectations” for democracy assistance [Santiso, 2001].399
As a subset of democracy assistance, civil society support has not escaped these 
criticisms. After falling pray to the age of "civil society romanticism" [Carothers, 1999a:
398 See introduction, section 3
399 For a discussion o f  how the disenchantment with democracy promotion included media, 
academics and practitioners alike see Carapico [2005: 2-4].
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248; Carothers & Ottoway, 2000], the academic community has expressed increasingly 
sceptical views on civil society support as means to fostering democracy in authoritarian 
settings. With respect to the Arab world, these qualifications stem more from the allegedly 
inherent incompatibility of Muslim society with democracy [Gellner, 1994; Lewis, 1995; 
Hawthorne, 2004] than from doubts about the effectiveness of aid support programmes to 
civic associations in breaking the coercive apparatuses of Arab regimes [Carapico, 2002; 
Beilin, 2004]. More crucially, only very rarely have critics of civil society assistance 
programmes questioned the role of donors and identified them as a cause of the problem, 
rather than a solution [Sabatini, 2002; Challand, 2005]. Part of the reason for this bias is 
the fact that all too often the disenchantment with civil society assistance programmes was 
not matched by parallel efforts to understand their full rationale. If, as elsewhere, support 
for Arab associational life has often fallen short of expectations, why does the 
development establishment continue to generate hundreds of civil society interventions?
Any public policy -  including aid directed at fostering associational life in Southern 
countries - can be, and usually is, multifunctional, in as much as it may serve multiple 
objectives, not all of which are always expressively stated or even contemplated by the 
governments and development agencies responsible for their design and implementation. 
As James Ferguson demonstrated [1990], the significance of development interventions 
goes beyond their declared objectives to include tacit and unintended functions which 
shape, expose or veil the political reality on which they impinge. These considerations 
apply with even more vigour to the perceived failure of democracy promotion 
programmes, which, as it is all too often forgotten, might not always be entirely geared 
towards success. Since its beginning, the Western enterprise of promoting democracy in the 
developing world was allegedly one of enlightened self interest, primarily focused on 
economic and security goals [Carapico, 2005:5]. Robinson [1996] for instance showed that 
to international actors, the accomplishment of ‘low intensity democracy’ in developing 
countries -  what could also go under the name of semi-authoritarianism [Carothers, 1999], 
or liberalised autocracy [Brumberg, 2003] -  can be functional, due to its capacity to quell 
domestic opposition and mitigate political instability through a form of ‘consensual 
domination’ made possible by 'the hegemony of the democratic ideal’.400
The application of this neo-Gramscian perspective to international democracy assistance 
programmes facilitates an understanding of how donors reconcile the apparently diverging 
aims of promoting political change and encouraging political stability [Hawthorne, 2001],
400 See Youngs, 2005: 212
176
Civic Engagement
a challenge typically confronting donors in the Middle East and North Africa [Entelis, 
2005: 8], This challenge is even more significant when donors face the need to engage 
with failing or failed states or ‘difficult partners’ - environments where the political 
system is unstable due to political turmoil, economic crisis, and outright conflict or where 
donors’ engagement with domestic authorities is made problematic either due to their 
unwillingness to cooperate, or to the ‘inconvenient’ nature and actions of the regime, as 
when the government is characterised by authoritarianism and scarred by a negative 
[government’s] human rights record [OECD, 2001a; 2001b], In such cases, democracy 
assistance also helps donors’ domestic need to sell the engagement with an authoritarian 
state to public opinion.
For the better part of the 1990s, Algeria provided one such environment. Besides fear and 
incomprehension, the West’s relationship with Algeria since 1989 has been one ridden by 
guilt. In addition to the fall in living standards following the collapse of oil and gas prices 
in 1985, and popular dissatisfaction with the Chadli regime [Roberts, 2001b] the riots 
which shook Algeria in October 1988 and pushed the regime into turmoil were 
encouraged by price rises induced by import restrictions in line with the IMF stabilization 
plan [Moore, 1994:13].401 One of the results of the regime’s need to comply with its 
Western partners was its detachment from what had so far constituted of its main interface 
of political representation -  the party of the FLN - and the introduction of multi-party 
politics [Roberts, 2005:9]. The result marked the beginning of Algeria’s crisis.
Since then, the approach taken by Western governments to Algeria’s financial and 
political stability has been a somewhat more cautious one. No foreign government 
condemned the revocation of the 1992 elections or military action. Indeed, according to 
Youngs, the European Union offered a fourfold increase in development aid making 
“Algeria one of the biggest gainers, in both proportionate and absolute terms, in the 
distribution of European aid during the early 1990s” [Youngs, 2005: 96].402 In addition to 
increasing aid, the EU proceeded to a rescheduling of over $20 billion of Algeria’s official 
debt, paving the way to two Paris Club debt reschedulings [1994-1995] supported by a 
one year IMF stand-by loan and followed by a three year enlarged financing facility in 
1995, which, as Martinez suggests, helped release financial resources necessary to
401 While formally declining IMF advice and assistance, the Chadli government started a 
liberalisation process to open the economy to the market, including import restrictions, in line with 
IMF recommendations.
402 Based on data from Crawford [1997 : 97] See also Young, 2005:227, fii.l Youngs’s analysis o f  
EU’s support to Algeria conflicts with Roberts’s view that EU’s position was dictated by the goal 
o f compelling Algeria to undertake the structural adjustment program under IMF rules, condition 
upon which all financial and aid support was granted, or rather suspended [2002c: 109-111].
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upgrade the army’s outdated weaponry in the struggle against the armed militias 
[Martinez, 2000:152],
Only since the end of the 1990s, the amelioration of the security situation pushed 
Algeria’s Western partners to develop longer term foreign policy guidelines which 
explicitly included the objective of democratic change in the country. But the 
longstanding concern with stability did not fade away. Consider the EU for instance. As in 
other European foreign policy documents, in the EU Mediterranean Democracy 
Programme (MEDA), the issue of “democracy, good governance, and human rights” is 
framed in two distinct ways. On the one hand, it is an instrument of political 
conditionality, or a condition for cooperation in other areas. On the other, it is parallel to 
other overarching policy goals, primarily ensuring stability. Analyses of how the EU 
democracy promotion has been implemented show that its conditionality function often 
suffers from the conflicting goals of improving and institutionalizing relations with the 
neighbouring countries [Schimmelfennig, 2005].
This applies to Algeria’s case too. The EU has never tried to force any consistent political 
conditionality prior to signing its association agreement with Algeria. Indeed, none of 
Algeria’s Western partners has ever addressed the issue of the persisting weakness of 
Parliament, nor of the shaky grounds on which the rule of law rests [Roberts, 2005]. As a 
matter of fact, with the only possible exception of the EU mission’s recommendation to 
reinforce the institutional role of the presidency (and, implicitly, to correspondingly 
reduce that of the military), the Algerian authorities have constantly opposed any type of 
donor’s intervention, or even suggestion, aimed at targeting the country’s institutional 
structure. The dismissal in June 2003 of Paolo Lembo - the UN resident coordinator - as 
‘persona non grata’ helps understand the authorities’ opposition to any foreign 
interference with the domestic process of institutional development. Allegedly motivated 
by UNDP’s ‘hyper activity’ in the aftermath of the earthquake which devastated the 
Algerois region in may 2003,403, and the visibility acquired by the Mr Lembo, his removal 
was in fact due to:
his stubborn willingness to work in the area of institutional reform. Obviously we were 
aware o f the opposition we faced externally. But maybe we underrated the opposition 
inside the [Algiers’] office. It cost me my job too, as I was the one who drafted the 
project for supporting the Judiciary. And 1 don’t regret it. Because what we were
403 Jose Gar?on : ‘Un geneur onusien non grata a Alger’ Liberation, 26 June 2003. Salima 
TIemcani: ‘L’ Algerie demande le depart de Paolo Lembo’ El Watan, 26 June 2003.
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working on was more than the usual capacity building project: in the long term it aimed 
at transforming procedures. The same with the project targeting the Assembly. They 
couldn’t wait for the opportunity to say that we did too much after the earthquake, and 
that we overshadowed the government.404
Foregoing any attempt at encouraging ‘democratic supply’, donors have instead 
concentrated on promoting ‘democratic demand’. Since then, donors have portrayed the 
country’s nascent associative sector as the realm where Algerian democracy could still 
have a chance to flourish [Dillman, 2002]. Already in 1997, in advising US policy-makers 
and diplomats on the US relationship with Algeria, Mona Yacoubian -  a member of the 
US Council on Foreign Relations -  made clear the expectations placed by foreign 
observers in the associative sphere towards the solution of the Algerian crisis:
The great emphasis should be placed on building a strong civil society, an essential key 
stone for a stable democracy. US policy-makers should focus on Algerian non­
governmental organisations (NGOs) as important players who offer the greatest hope 
for a peaceful future. Several Algerian NGOs working in areas as diverse as AIDS 
prevention and treatment, the environment and women’s rights continue to operate 
despite the ongoing violence. By helping to facilitate a “culture of participation” these 
and other NGOs can play a key role in fostering Algerian civil society. Their work 
should be strongly encouraged.
... US diplomats should maintain contact with these groups, foster exchanges with 
their American counterparts, and facilitate the work o f  American NGOs attempting to 
support Algerian groups. In their meetings with senior Algerian officials, US diplomats 
should emphasize the important contribution NGOs can make toward establishing 
lasting peace in Algeria. They should encourage the Algerian government to allow 
these groups to operate freely and without government restraint. [Yacoubian, 1997:18]
Speaking at the Georgetown University conference on the Algerian crisis on 30 January, 
1998, Yacoubian clarified the type of diplomatic strategy to be used by the US in 
intervening in Algeria. Considering the limited leverage of the U.S. on Algeria, Yacoubian 
suggested that the U.S. influence the events through “behind-the-scenes efforts”, by 
developing outlets for moderate groups to “express their concerns. The North African 
specialist John Entelis extended Yacoubian’s advice to France’s policy makers, suggesting 
that “the French government needs to go beyond working with the Algerian government
404 Telephone interview with Giuseppe Perricone, former assistant to the UN Resident 
Representative, 17 July 2004
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and also work with Algerian civil society”.405 As a matter of fact, these analyses were very 
much in line with French and US governments thinking at the time. As seen above, 
already in early 1998 France considered civil society as the appropriate channel for 
conducting relations with its former colony. For the US on the other hand, it was a means 
to foster political change. Speaking to the Congress International Relations Committee in 
February 1998, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Ronald E 
Neumann, declared that:
Labour organizations, professional associations, women's groups, human rights groups, a 
free press and humanitarian organizations already active in Algeria are also agents for 
constructive change and for the rule o f law. These things exist. They are a tribute to the 
Algerian people and hold the hope o f the fiiture. And they are all fragile. We are working 
to promote these burgeoning organizations and the growth o f civil society in Algeria. We 
continue to encourage improvements in civil society, including strengthening the rule of 
law and furthering freedom o f the press.406
Since then, ‘civil society’ was raised to the status of panacea to solve a range of Algeria’s 
ills. In its 2000 report, the International Crisis Group recommended the EU “to support the 
political reconstruction process in the country, by fostering a dialogue with the Islamist 
and accepting the Barcelona charter of deeper integration, and [...] support the growth of 
civil society” [ICG, 2000]. In the wake of the signing of the EU-Association Agreement, 
the International Federation of Human Rights encouraged the EU to support human rights 
and civil society.407 In its 2003 Global Corruption Report, Transparency International 
highlighted the endemic levels of corruption at all level of the public sector made worse 
by the expansion of the black economy, identifying in “an increased role of civil society” 
a possible alternative to the government’s reluctance to properly tackle the problem.408 
Indeed, until at least the end of the 1990s, the degree of attention raised by Algeria’s 
emerging civil society groups started irritating the Algerian authorities. This is how 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika responded to a question on the subject by Middle East Insight 
magazine in the months preceding its first presidential election:
4°5 Algerian Crisis: International Implications and Reactions” 30 January 1998, Georgetown 
University, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Washington DC
406 Statement o f Deputy Assistant Secretary o f  State for Near Eastern Affairs Ronald E Neumann 
before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Africa, 5 February, 1998 
http://www.umich.edu/~iinet/cm enas/algeria/Volumel/statement.html
407 EU-Algeria Euro Parliament Vote on the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement with 
Algeria 30 September 2001
408 Sarnia Lokmane : ‘L’Algerie, un etat pourri ? Transparency International divulgue les pratiques 
en cours dans notre pays’, Liberie, 14 July 2003.
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MEI. What is the best way for the international community and the United States in 
particular, to encourage development o f civil society in Algeria?
A. B. First o f all, why speak o f  civil society and not the Algerian people as a whole? I 
find it difficult to accept that in Algeria, there could be individuals who are more 
Algerian than the rest o f us. We need to shield civil society against sterile polemics. It 
should become able to contribute efficiently to the effort o f  national reconstruction, 
because it has wasted too much time. We now need to deal with what is fundamental 
and avoid wasting time on endless diversions created by those who, here or abroad, 
have used to their own ends the tragedy o f the Algerian people. Today, Algerian society 
has enormous social needs which resulted from damages inflicted by terrorism to the 
economy. Everything needs to be built, particularly in socio-educational sectors. The 
victims o f our tragedy also need concrete and meaningful help from the national and 
international communities. But, anyway, since you are focusing on civil society, I think 
that the United States would make a great contribution to Algeria, if  they provided an 
assistance that is loyal, devoid o f any selfish considerations, and respectful o f  our 
position o f not tolerating any interference in our domestic affairs. As I said, so long as 
the conditions I mentioned are respected, we would welcome any kind of assistance.
But while consistently rejecting projects and proposals affecting the balance of power 
between different elements of the political system, the Algerian authorities never rejected 
programmes aimed at supporting civil society. It is to the reasons for this behaviour that 
we now turn.
T h e anti-politics o f  civil society  su pp ort
Almost no international actors have ever questioned the real degree of development of 
Algeria’s associative sector, or the extent to which it could actually be an element of 
political change. Once again, Amnesty International provides the notable exception. In its 
response to the government’s report concerning the state of human rights and freedom of 
expression, AI “was pleased to note the considerable increase in the number of Algerian 
associations and NGOS, but remains concerned that, of the 55,000 in operation in the 
country, the few which have been critical of the government continue to face considerable 
problems and restrictions.”409
409Amnesty International memorandum to the Algerian government o f 23 August 2000, published 
in ElMoudjahid,\%  September 2000.
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In truth, by the late 1990s the donor community in Algeria was well aware of the many 
shortcomings of the associative sector. An unpublished study commissioned by UNDP in 
1998 on environmental associations found not only a lack of managerial competence and 
financial resources necessary to accomplish associations’ stated objectives, but also 
widespread undemocratic practices within an associative field in which most organisations 
are at best heavily centred on the president, and at worst limited to one or two people.410 It 
also hinted at the wide degree of state control of the associative sphere, by stressing 
particularly the arbitrary recognition procedures and capricious granting of the status of 
public utility.411 In 2000, the Ministry of National Solidarity invited INTRAC, a UK based 
NGO training outfit, to provide advice on how to reinforce the NGO sector involved in 
poverty reduction activities. Again, the report highlighted the democratic deficit within 
associations coupled with capacity concerns. Moreover, the study raised doubts about the 
boasted dynamism of Algerian civil society by overtly questioning government’s figures 
concerning the size of the associative sector, which at the time was claiming that a 
staggering 55,000 associations were active in the country. This time the report was not 
only left unpublished, it was also classified by the government. In January 2002, an EU 
evaluation mission which was supposed to come to Algeria “in order to meet 
representatives of Algeria’s civil society and identify independent associations and 
organisations for allocating significant financial aid” was cancelled, as the Algerian 
embassy in Brussels denied issuing the consultants’ visa. According to rumours relayed by 
the press, and taken up by the opposition, the incident was due to ‘the regime’s fear of an 
authentic diagnosis of political and civil liberties in the country’.412 The same year, the 
World Bank and the EU were considering how to create ‘an enabling environment’ for 
associational life by ‘encouraging’ the government to modify the 1990 associations law 
and reduce the administration’s leeway in controlling the associative sector.413 To this 
stage, despite much talk over the years about impending legislative amendments, no result 
has been reached.
The international euphoria over Algeria’s associative sector soon turned into a 
proliferation of civil society assistance programmes ensued, administered by official aid 
agencies, international NGOs and foundations, aimed at encouraging Algeria’s 
democracy. Their rationale appeared vindicated in the wake of April 2004 Presidential 
elections, which were saluted as the country’s most transparent yet and the first veritable
410 UNDP [1998] ‘Le Mouvement Associatif et l ’environnement’, Algiers, unpublished document. 
See chapter 4.
411 On the state’s arbitrary practices in granting public recognition, see chapters 5 and 6.
4,2 Djamel B . : ‘Le FFS ecrit aux parlementaires du vieux continent’, Le Matin, 6 February 2002.
413 M. Kies, EU Delegation Staff, personal communication, Algiers, 28 January 2002.
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sign of Algeria’s being back on the democratisation track. Yet, few civil society support 
projects have been geared explicitly towards democracy. A deeper look at the way these 
programmes are conceived and administered shows that the promotion of democracy 
might not be the only, or indeed the prime, objective behind these interventions.
The EU provides once again a good example. The four priorities of the European Union's 
MEDA Democracy Programme which also includes Algeria, are the strengthening of 
democratic electoral procedures; the establishment of the rule of law and the upholding of 
human rights; encouraging peace and preventing conflict; and supporting a "pluralist, 
democratic civil society” [Karkutil & Buetzier, 1999]. Besides not taking any concrete 
steps towards the first two pillars of its strategy (elections, rule of law), EU aid to Algerian 
associations has never been geared towards democracy promotion, except very indirectly. 
Instead, four main themes emerge from the analysis of the civil society support initiatives 
sponsored by the EU and other donors.
The first concerns donors’ attempt to maintain international attention on Algerian 
associational life. The need to actively promote Algeria’s associative sphere abroad and 
the availability of aid money to this effect is made clear by the number of programmes 
including this as a main objective. Thus, for instance, the first phase of a EU initiative run 
in cooperation with the ARPEJ, an Algerian association, aimed at “installing a permanent 
cooperation between actors of Algeria’s and European civil society...to enhance 
reciprocal awareness.” Another project aimed at setting up a Euro-Algerian Forum of 
Associative partnerships aimed at identifying 30 associations on each side of the 
Mediterranean and organising events including actors of Algerian civil society with the 
aim of sensitising European public opinion to Algeria’s associational life.414 In November 
1998, a series of Algerian associations were invited to Europe by French NGOs, to join an 
initiative called the Caravane d ’Associations Democratiques Algeriennes -  described as 
an “associations parade, aimed at demonstrating the existence of a real associational life in 
Algeria, and starting a dynamic exchange with French associations’.415 A programme 
launched in 2005 involving 60 associations in Europe and Algeria was aimed at “a better 
awareness of the ‘Other’”.416
In promoting the existence of an active civic sphere in Algeria, these initiatives have often 
tended to portray an ebullient associative sector, without mentioning its well known
414 Programme Meda Democratic, 1998 ‘Sythese par Pays
415 Communic 'Actions -  Bulletin Departemental de Documentation Pedagogique de Charente 
Maritime n. 25 March 1999
416 Partenariat Euro-Med. Algerie, Programme Indicatif National 2005-2006 p. 21
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shortcomings. To palliate to what domestically appeared as stagnation and decay in 
associations’ activities and membership, in their programme proposals donors often 
include initiatives aimed at ‘federating civil society organisations’, ‘networking 
associations’ and encouraging the establishment o f‘associations of associations’. The EU, 
the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the National Democratic Institute and Caritas have all run 
initiatives aimed at making associations work together, usually with limited results. 
According to an official of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs:
on the one hand, there’s need for more efficiency. Networking associations is meant to 
encourage associations to identify and share expertise and resources. On the other, there 
are our needs, and here ‘partnerships’ also means enhancing the ‘visibility’ o f  the
• • 417associative movement.
A second clear trend consists in concentrating support towards development-oriented 
associations rather than advocacy organisations. Already in 1998, under the MEDA 
democracy programme, the EU granted roughly 500.000 Ecu to Touiza and ARPEJ - two 
Algerian associations well known abroad - for projects aimed at “the insertion of young 
marginalised people into society through their professional training”, and “the psycho- 
educational rehabilitation of young people”. The orientation of these funds did not change 
when the EU’s financial commitment to Algerian associations increased. If anything, the 
goal of democracy promotion was entirely dropped. The five million Euros allocated in 
the framework of the MEDA II programme were explicitly aimed at “reinforcing the role 
of civil society in Algeria’s development process...and will essentially support NGOs 
engaged in social development work, women’s rights, environmental protection, including 
archaeological domain, community development and sustainable development.418 In their 
civil society support programmes, most donors in Algeria have chosen the same route.
There exists a debate on whether the promotion of associations engaged in service 
delivery activities can promote democracy. Certain donors claim that supporting advocacy 
NGOs and community based, service delivery organisations instead of vocal advocacy 
associations can equally be considered as producing incremental steps during a usually 
long democratisation process, through the progressive inclusions of associations’ members 
and the target populations [Denoeux, 2004: 99-110]. What is certain is that, in choosing to
417 Mme Zervudacky, Directorate General for International Cooperation, Ministry o f Foreign 
Affairs (DGC1D), Paris, 10 November 2005
418 ‘5 Millions d’Euros pour le programme d’appui aux associations Alg6riennes de 
Developpement’, Synopsis Euromed, 3 December 1999. See Report form the Commision ‘Annual 
Report o f the MEDA Programme 1999’, Brussels, 20 December 2000 COM(2000) 472 Final
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sponsor development-oriented associations in implementing politically neutral projects, 
the international community has seconded the government’s attempts to confine the 
associative sphere’s realm of action to social exclusion and poverty reduction, thus not 
only limiting public acceptance of associations’ advocacy role, but also legitimising the 
state’s progressive retreat from public service delivery and its inclination, when needed, to 
outsource failure, as seen in the previous chapter.
This choice is linked to the third theme underlying civil society support programmes in 
Algeria, which revolves around a focus on strengthening the organisational, managerial 
and financial capability of Algerian associations. Since the mid 1990s, the EU started 
engaging in activities aiming at “reinforcing the capacity of the associative sector”, for 
instance through the activities run by the CIMADE (Ecumenical Service for Self-help) 
targeting a group of five associations. With the launch of the second phase of the 
programme supporting development-oriented NGOs, this became a prime objective. In its 
2005-2006 National Indicative Programme for Cooperation with Algeria, the EU suddenly 
recognises the “limits of the associative movement in Algeria”, whose roots can be 
identified in its “young age, inexperience....and the absence of any training to 
associations’ members and cadres’ which lies at the origin of the chronic instability of 
associations”. The programme therefore aims at “training associations cadres in project 
identification and management, communication techniques and financial management”.419
This emphasis on the ‘professionalism’ of Algerian associations was certainly not 
restricted to the EU. In 2001, Population Initiative for Peace (PIFP) a UK-based NGO, 
received financing from the EU to train 17 local associations from the Algiers, Ghardaia, 
Tlemcen, and Skikda regions in “management and communication” skills. During the 
workshops organised by PFIP, selected associations members were trained in planning, 
strategy, gender and development, communication, management of project cycles, 
evaluation and fundraising. “The representative of PIFP explained to Le Matin “we teach 
them how to manage from an optimal point of view their associations, i.e. targeting a 
specific project, acting strategically, and develop a communication system to better 
valorise the mission they defend and raise the interests of donors”.420
In 2006, in addition to the EU, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, and the US-funded 
National Democratic Institute ran similar activities, also including fundraising and donors’ 
targeting. Raising the interests of associations’ members around this type of activities is
419 http://www.cirnade.org/ssi/001/htm
420 R .N .: ‘Une ONG Anglaise forme dix-sept associations’, Le Matin, 11 January 2001.
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easy, as well as advantageous, for donors. As seen in chapter three, the emphasis on 
entrepreneurship, with its rhetoric centred on ‘efficiency and effectiveness’, is widespread 
within Algerian associations, which are often more similar to start-ups than charities, and 
increasingly more keen, to use Eade’s words, on “mobilising money over people” [2000: 
12]. In this sense, the overarching goal of professionalizing associations is reminiscent of 
the processes defined by Escobar [1995:48] as ‘institutionalising development’. The need 
of the donors to identify potential funding opportunities, disburse funds in a sustained 
way, and demonstrate results finally ends up compromising the role of associations as 
agents of change. In a process reminding of the ‘antipolitics machine’ of development aid 
described by Ferguson [1990], associations were turned into vectors of ‘technical’ 
solutions void of political content
Reaching out to the state
It is interesting to note that amongst the management training activities provided to 
Algerian associations, very few include advocacy, and none is oriented to increasing the 
membership of associations.421 As also highlighted in chapter three, foreign operators find 
the presidentialism and low participation levels characterising associations bewildering. In 
the months preceding its departure, the US Embassy official charged with managing 
relations with civil society admitted bitterly:
I’m not sure that after years in Algiers I know many associations. Sure I know a few 
people that claim to be heading one association. It’s always the same people who come 
to the receptions, and it’s always the same people who come asking for money.422
This leads to the fourth theme characterising foreign support to the associative movement, 
which revolves around donors’ relationship to the authorities. If restricted membership 
makes defining what an association is problematic, it does not necessarily disrupt donors’ 
work:
We work with a restricted number o f associations. You know, often it’s difficult to 
know who’s behind them. So in a way we tend to stick to those few characters 
introduced to the diplomatic community. They don’t miss a party or a national 
celebration, and believe me with more than 100 diplomatic missions here there’s one
421 In 2004, a project administered by the National Democratic Institute and including training in 
advocacy techniques provides the only exception.
422 Gregory Slotta, 1st Counsellor, US Embassy, Algiers, 29 January 2002
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every other week. So after a while we know the guys and tend to stick to them. Once 
you know them there’s not much else to know because often the association is nothing 
but them.423
In an interview in El Watan, the European MP Yasmine Boudjemah criticised donors’ 
practices in allocating funds to associations in these terms: “there are some associations in 
Algeria that don’t have access to these subsidies because they don’t know the right 
channels, the right people”.424 As shown by the representative of a reputed association, 
this is a story well known in Algeria, and one at the root of some resentment:
I do not understand how associations that do not even have an office can be given 
[MEDA] funds for the restructuring o f the Qsur.425 Until yesterday the man in Bechar 
was simply an architect, his association does not even have an office, and apparently 
they already had the money for the project anyway. And now they even made him ‘an 
associative trainer’, he’s supposed to teach us to draft project proposals and fill in the 
requests for money. Surely he must be good at it. They told us we were all at the same 
level in this. It seems that if  we were all together in this, apparently some are more 
‘together’ than the rest.426
If the impression of discrimination in aid funding puzzles also those associations widely 
reputed domestically and abroad, like SOS Femmes en Detresse, it is not refuted by the 
EU. Here are the motivations adduced by the officer charged with the MEDA associations 
support programme for the methods used in identifying beneficiaries.
Officially, there are around 60,000 associations in Algeria. Can you imagine if  we 
advertised the programme with a call for proposals? We’d receive thousands o f  
applications: it would take months to examine them all. So we have decided to follow a 
different path: partly basing our judgement cm our knowledge o f the associative 
movement and partly through contacts with the authorities we have established a 
preliminary group o f  associations that will be asked to submit projects’ proposals. 
That’s why we selected only 40 associations, so that we know who we’re dealing with.
And after all this is the group of associations that is really active: one in a thousand
423 Gregory Slotta, 1st Counsellor, US Embassy, Algiers, 29 January 2002
424 ‘La Cooperation vue par des deputes aux origines algfriennes’, El Watan, 15 June 2000.
425 Qsur is the plural o f  qsar, meaning a village consisting generally o f  attached houses, often 
sharing collective bam and other structures (mosque, bath, oven, shops), typical o f  the oasis areas 
o f North Africa.
426 Interview with Maryam Bellala, President, SOS Femme en Detresse, Algiers, 7 October 
2002
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makes it, the others remain at the level o f  ideas in head o f their president, until even 
they forget about them.427
Beside the need to focus on the good core of the burgeoning associative sector, the scant 
publicity given to associational life-support projects is also conducive to other aims. As a 
UN official put it:
it’s a story well known since Machiavelli. The Prince places men o f limited capacity 
abroad, to gather information. As they need to do their job, these small men rely on 
whatever opportunity comes up. In Algeria it’s the same thing. The interest around the 
associative movement is to be understood in the logic o f  geopolitical, financial and 
geostrategic positioning o f both individuals and governments 428
As typified by Dr. Khiati’s relationship with the foreign community (also described in 
chapter 6), donors find in associative representatives the purveyors of important and 
otherwise inaccessible information and contacts. This was particularly true during the 
1990s, when the Algerian government was affected by a ‘siege’ syndrome, and the foreign 
community was cautious about appearing to be establishing too close a relationship with 
an undemocratic regime backed by a military junta. In this sense, associative 
representatives play a similar function to that performed by administrative officials in the 
post-colonial period in connecting the capital to the countryside [Etienne, 1977b]. They 
broker information between the government and the foreign community. Those 
associations that cannot perform this function are often cut out from access to foreign 
funds:
It’s true that Bengana429 and Khiati get all the contracts. They have people who know how to 
write a project working for them, and yes, they belong to the same side o f the FLN...what are 
we supposed to do...we have to deal with the government.430
The fact that the associative sphere finds in the international community alternative 
sources of financing is sometimes believed to be conducive to its independence from the 
government [Bennefissa, 2004:10]. Despite donors’ stated aims (see above the goals of the 
EU evaluation mission), in Algeria this does not seem to be the case: although reticently, 
donors admit their failure to favour ‘independence’ over ‘connections’. In addition to the
427 Arab Izarouken, Head o f Programme, Programme Management Unit, Oran, 16 September 2001
428 Interview with LailaTadj, UNDP Programme Coordinator, Algiers, 17 January 2002
429 Head o f Conseil National d’Entraide pour la Jeunesse et 1’Enfance (CNEJE), an Algiers-based 
association with representative status at the UN.
430 Interview with M. Kies, EU Delegation Staff, Algiers, 29 January 2002.
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guarded attitude of the authorities, donors’ behaviour stems from the relationships they 
entertain with each other:
No, there is no coordination amongst [other] donors. Sure we meet regularly, but I 
wouldn’t talk o f coordination, or o f coherence. There’s an ambiguity, perhaps, between 
coordination and competition. Some think that we [the EU Commission] consider civil 
society under our sphere o f influence. Obviously it’s not true. But [Ambassador] 
Guerrato is a realist: he knows that it is either us or the others, that there’s an issue o f  
influence over this sector. But this ambiguity exists, particularly between the US and 
the Commission. The US doesn’t share information, and the Commission certainly does 
not take the initiative to do so. They have a lot to gain in terms o f image: what do we 
have to gain?431
Besides the need to ‘establish’ contacts, donors’ ambiguous competition in supporting the 
associative sphere also ends up making a statement concerning the political choices the 
authorities make. According to Craig and Porter, “the need to build legitimacy [...] has 
seen a new urgency on the part of [donors] in the engagement of civil society groups, 
which offer a surrogate political participation, and tend if excluded to be primary agents of 
dissent” [2003:62].The launch of the ‘European Initiative for Democracy and Human 
Rights’432 in Algeria provides an example:
This a novelty for Algeria, the Middle East, and the [EU] Commission too. Chris Patten 
qualified it as “subversive assistance’. It certainly involves risks. The Commission 
doesn’t want it to be seen as an award o f ‘good conduct’ for the authorities, nor a 
sanctioning mechanism. In the first long list there were two proposals which dealt with 
the victims o f terrorism. In the end the projects selected are not too politically sensitive: 
they mostly deal with gender, the handicapped, and children. The only exception is a 
project by an association that deals with human rights.433 And here too we had to be 
careful: their project proposal was way too critical [of the authorities]. It would have not 
gone down well with [Ambassador] Guerrato and, certainly not with the authorities. So 
we asked [the association] to make some amendments 434
What makes the operation of vetting project proposals and striking a balance between 
‘well connected’, ‘neutral’ and ‘dissenting’ associations difficult is that its results are
431 Interview with Gregory Kehailia, Algiers’ EU Delegation Staff, Algiers, 1 December 2004
432 http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/eidhr/index_en.htm
433 The association is the Algerian League for the Defense o f Human Rights (LAADH) Information 
provided by Redouane Boudjemaa, LADDH Treasurer, Private Communication Algiers, December
2004.
434 Interview with Gregory Kehailia, Algiers’ EU Delegation Staff, Algiers, 1 December 2004
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interpreted by the authorities as a signal of donors’ attitudes. Therefore, when certain 
issues are particularly sensitive, donors take an even more drastic approach, such as 
avoiding any type of intervention. In choosing to favour ‘democratic demand’ (civil 
society support) over ‘supply’ (parliament, elections, the rule of law), the donor 
community has entirely neglected the trade union movement. During the first years of the 
crisis, the number of strikes in Algeria followed a decreasing curve: from 2290 in 1989 to 
441 in 1996, a tendency accompanied by a decrease in the number of economic sectors 
concerned by strikes. The decrease in violence has reversed this trend. But the violence is 
not the only fact explaining the tame rate of industrial strikes. Part of the reason lies in the 
way the organisation of the trade unions sector is orchestrated by the regime.
The 1989 constitution introduced the right to strike and to form independent unions. These 
principles were further articulated in the law 90-14 of June 1990 as well as the law of 21 
December 1991, (which recognise the right of salaried workers in the private and public 
sectors to constitute themselves into autonomous unions distinct from political parties) 
and then reaffirmed in the 1996 constitution. Although the Algerian authorities have 
reaffirmed the implementation of these rights in various international forums,435 the reality 
in the country is different. Following the promulgation of these laws, a number of 
autonomous trade unions were created. Their activities remained almost inexistent during 
the worst years of the violence, only to explode with the relaxation of the security 
situation. Most of these unions, and particularly those representing public sector workers, 
started a vocal opposition to the economic liberalisation policies implemented since the 
mid-1990s, which have led to a rapid erosion of salaries and decline in living standards as 
well as increasing prospects of public sector layoffs.
Over the years, organisations such as the Autonomous National Union of Public 
Administration Staff (SNAPAP), the National Union of Higher Education (Syndicat 
National de I’Enseignement Superieur, SNES) and the Autonomous Union of Education 
and Training Workers (Syndicat Autonome des Travailleurs de VEducation et de la 
Formation, SATEF) have grown to boast hundreds of thousands of members which 
engage, almost on a weekly basis, in vocal demonstrations. As a result, without formally 
suppressing independent unions’ rights, the authorities have engaged in an unremitting
435 In a report on the state o f civil liberties to the UN Human Rights Committee related to the 
international pact on civil and political rights, the Algerian authorities stated that “if  collective 
negotiations fail, the utilisation of strike is a legal right, which if  exercised in the framework o f the 
law, benefits from constitutional protection. The utilisation o f  this right is ongoing and applied to 
all sectors o f activity, including the administration, the public sector and other state structures”. 
Deuxiemes rapports p6riodiques que les Etats parties devaient presenter en 1995: Algeria. 18 May 
1998. CCPR/C/101/Add. 1
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campaign to muzzle them. Besides refusing to include the unions in the tripartite dialogue 
between the government, business and labour, which remains exclusively represented by 
the UGTA since the days of the single party, this campaign has ranged from forbidding 
meetings and demonstrations, to preventing the creation of new trade unions and their 
structuring in confederations, including practices such as blackmailing and police 
harassment of activists.436
The rationale for democracy promotion policies has been linked by some authors to 
donors’ perception that social turmoil in authoritarian states undermined their interests, 
whilst low-intensity democracy could potentially provide a more legitimate and thus more 
effective means of disciplining labour [Robinson, 1996; Youngs, 2005:14]. If we consider 
the choices made by donors in their relationship to the country’s associative sphere, this 
argument could well apply to Algeria. Donors including Germany, the World Bank and 
the United Nations Agency for Industrial Development all run programmes to strengthen 
the plethora of business associations which are formally active in the country, devising 
ways to make them work together, and organising meetings with their western 
counterparts. Yet, despite the independent unions’ calls to the international community 
concerning the infringement of their rights, no donor has ever taken up the issue of their 
place in Algeria’s democratisation process. The repeated appeals made by several of them 
to the International Labour Organisation have been consistently ignored for years.437 The 
ILO representative in Algiers put things this way:
Quite straightforwardly, the only union we work with is the UGTA. For us it’s the only 
representative union. We tend to focus more on business associations. And in the end 
it’s not up to us, it’s [the ILO Headquarters in] Geneva that decides.438
Adding some depth to this statement, a representative of a different international 
organisation said:
The truth is that nobody wants to raise the issue [of the unions] here. We all have to 
play by the rules. Saying that they follow the inputs from Geneva is only half o f the 
story. Who’s in charge o f the dossier in Geneva? An Algerian o f course. And who put it
436 See the report by the International Federation of Human Rights ‘Algerie. Mission d'enquete sur 
les libertes syndicales’ Mission Internationale d’Enquete n.349 December 2002.
437 Only in 2005, the ILO has begun analysing the appeals made by the SNAPAP against the 
Algerian government, ruling in favour o f  the former. See ILO rulings: Case No(s). 2153, Reports 
No. 327,329, 333 and 336 (Algeria): Complaint against the Algerian Government filed by the 
Syndicat national autonome des personnels de 1’administration publique (SNAPAP). 12 November
2005.
438 Interview with M. Reda, ILO Programme Officer, Algiers, 24 November 2004
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there? The Algerian government o f course. The orders don’t come from Geneva, but 
from Algiers.439
In the enterprise of democracy promotion through civil society support, Algeria’s 
international partners have decided not to take a position with regard to the government’s 
view of which sectors of the associative movement are worthy of encouragement, neglect 
or repression. As it is often the case, not taking a position in the end amounts to taking 
one.
Conclusions
In an international system where democracy is an unquestioned value, authoritarianism 
has external costs. These accrue not only to increasingly isolated authoritarian 
governments, but also to uncomfortable democratic governments that for economic, 
geopolitical and strategic considerations need to keep engaging with authoritarian 
governments irrespective of their democratic record, thus facing the malaise of their 
public opinions at home. This chapter has tried to show how donors’ undertaking of 
democracy promotion through civil society support can help alleviate some of these costs. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the international community has found in Algeria’s 
associative sector ways to understand, portray and relate to a country ravaged by relentless 
violence and spiralling back into a military autocracy. This image was constructed through 
media, academic and donors’ portrayals converging in a discourse which equated civil 
society organisations to ‘social antibodies’ to the violence and the best hope for Algeria’s 
democratic future. This discourse was in turn reinforced by those elements in Algerian 
society and the Algerian state most interested in reaching out to the international arena to 
provide their version of the events, concerning the country’s democratic progress, the 
dynamics of the conflict and the potential threat to the West.
As Algeria’s violence progressively exited Western TV screens, and newspapers columns 
forgot about the doubts concerning the role of the military in the violence, the associative 
sphere emerged as one of donors’ privileged channel for conducting official relations with 
Algeria. From an opportunity for foreign donors to stimulate political change in the 
country, the associative sector emerged as a sphere where resources, information and trust 
could be exchanged, albeit indirectly, between donors and government. Cloaked in
439 Interview with Leila Tadj, UNDP Programme Officer, Algiers, 27 December 2004
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donors’ goals of promoting democratisation from the bottom up, this often translated into 
an understanding and consolidation of the choices coming from the top.
Instead of limiting state sovereignty, the country’s associative sphere contributed to 
breaking the isolation of the Algerian regime, and bringing it back as a full member of the 
international community. In this sense, far from being an accessory element of 
interpretation, the attention paid by the international community to the development of 
Algeria’s associations lies at the core of the prime hypothesis put forward by this book 
concerning the role played by the associative sphere in the country’s political 
development. Domestically, the associative sector was central to the survival of the 
Algerian state through a progressive ‘pluralisation without democratisation’ of its political 
system. Abroad, Algeria’s partners consolidated this process by providing it with an 
international fa5ade.
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Chapter 8. Conclusions
I believe I have demonstrated the risks of crediting Algeria’s associational life with a 
boundless democratising potential, and the dangers of limiting the analysis of its political 
impact to the issue of democratic change. Yet, recognising that the emergence of the 
associative sphere has so far failed to significantly contribute to the country’s democratisation 
does not necessarily equate to dismissing it as dysfunctional. In exposing the place taken by 
the associative sphere in the establishment of Algeria’s liberalised autocracy, I have tried to 
frame the functions it performs as part of a broader Hobbesian project, consisting of an 
articulated attempt by a weak state to reacquire legitimacy and reinforce its capacity to expect 
voluntary compliance to its rule, without resorting to coercion. These functions include the 
articulation of consent and the insulation from dissent; the preservation of a corporatist order 
based on rent distribution and patron-client networks; the co-optation of loyalty from core 
support groups located especially in and around the public sector; the management of a form 
of political pluralism which limits the role of parties and its institutional expression -  the 
legislature; and the restoration of the country’s international position through repeated appeals 
coming from within and outside Algeria to the regime’s civic legitimacy.
The perspective followed has placed this work in the path of that contemporary strand of 
empirically grounded research that, after scores of mainly theoretically based studies, which 
for nearly two decades have attributed democratising virtues to the multiplication of non 
governmental organisations in the South, is today casting a new light on their true impact on 
political development. Besides adding some further considerations to my main findings, this 
last section lays out some suggestions for taking this perspective forward through future 
research avenues, within and beyond the realm of Algerian studies.
Institutional cloaking versus political change
One of the suggestions put forward by this study is that, rather than a transformation of the 
main institutional arrangements lying at the heart of the state-society relationship, Algeria’s 
burgeoning associative sector has contributed to maintaining some of these arrangements 
whilst veiling them under brand new clothes. This is clear if one considers how the associative 
sphere - in becoming a central element of the institutionalisation of Algeria’s liberalised 
autocracy - has replicated some of the functions played by the FLN during the single party 
times, such as popular mobilisation, the conduct of external relations [Roberts, 1996] and the 
cooptation of individuals and groups through a patronage-based system. In this sense,
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although the associative sphere has helped to keep Algeria’s weak state afloat, it has not 
allowed for the transformation of its fundamentals, nor has it brought a lasting contribution to 
the legitimacy crisis affecting it.
In this light, some of the issues that future research on associations’ role in Algeria’s 
liberalised autocracy will need to address include the investigation of a) the extent to which 
the associative sphere will keep performing the functions examined above in the long term; 
and b) whether -  and how - the associative sphere can turn from being mainly an element of 
institutional conservation into a driver of political change - where for political change I intend 
the substantial strengthening of the Algerian state through a process of institutional renewal, 
rather than through makeshift arrangements that do not address the main causes of state 
weakness.
The answer to both questions lies in the degree to which actors at state level will continue to 
show an interest in the associative field, and their ability to keep the latter on a tight leash. 
Algeria’s associational life as we know it was bom out of an ostensibly democratising reform 
project started by a regime struggling with a gaping legitimacy deficit. Rather than true 
democratisation, such a project aimed at altering the institutional apparel of the single party- 
state by shedding the first part of its equation, the party of the FLN, in order to reaffirm the 
centrality of the presidency and the executive. As we have seen, nearly 20 years down the line, 
the associative sphere has clearly succeeded in this task. In line with Chadli’s reformers 
original design, so far, rather than “keeping the state in check”, the rise of associational life 
has seconded the centralisation of power in the executive branch and the presidentialisation of 
the Algerian political system. The issue here is to what extent Algeria’s future political 
developments will allow the associative sphere to maintain this role.
Shifts in the balance of power between army, presidency and parliament will be a deciding 
factor. President Bouteflika’s success in bringing about his national reconciliation initiatives 
has allowed him to score important points in the struggle between the presidency and the army 
that has long shaped Algerian politics. In his efforts to push the army to retreat from the 
political sphere, Bouteflika has repeatedly chosen to present himself to the electorate as a 
candidate with no particular partisan attachment - hence his reliance on the associative field as 
electoral and consensus building machine. This might change if the supremacy of the 
presidency over the army in civilian affairs is confirmed beyond Bouteflika’s second mandate. 
The country’s progressive emancipation from the army’s interference in politics is a 
precondition for a more effective role of political parties. If this were to happen, it would be 
reasonable to expect more limited interest in direct and overt involvement in electoral politics
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by the associative sphere than that required so far by the big political players. Far from leading 
to a depoliticisation of the associative field, this could open the way to the type of mutually 
supportive and yet separate role characterising the relationship between parties and 
associations in liberal democracies. This will however necessitate important changes in the 
regulatory framework. The law on freedom of association limits party-associations’ links and 
the maintenance of the emergency law in force since 1992 endows the administration with 
extraordinary discretionary powers to control and limit associations’ activities.
In addition to state actors’ shifting incentives in controlling the associative sphere, its future 
will depend on the regard that the population will have for it. The reality of political 
development shows that liberal theory’s unquestioned assumption about the legitimacy of 
‘civil society’ is misleading. The Algerian case demonstrates that popular support for 
associational life is intimately linked to how well it performs its functions, but not necessarily 
in a direct way. Indeed, in the political economy of Algeria’s liberalised autocracy, the 
associations that better perform the role assigned to them by the state are often the ones that 
end up with their credibility shattered in the eyes of Algerians.
Again, it can be useful to compare the associative sphere with the fate of the FLN before 
political liberalisation. At the end of the 1980s, while interpreting the fresh formation of 
associations as the emergence of an Algerian civil society, Bourenane [1989:111] noted that 
the crisis of the FLN was due to widespread perceptions that it was “nothing but a tool in the 
hands of a privileged minority using it as a means to progress through the hierarchy, to take up 
certain positions of power and/or have access to certain rare goods, in order to ensure a 
bargaining power or a way of quick self-enrichment by gaining access to a building lot, a 
property, a small business”. Today these same words could easily be applied to the associative 
sphere itself. They echo the daily attacks waged from realms as varied as the press, academia 
and the private sector on the way associations have become a source of enrichment for certain 
individuals and groups.
The progressive transformation of associations into conduits for the distribution of the 
hydrocarbon rent provides an example of how the foundations of Algeria’s liberalised 
autocracy rest on shaky ground. Far from changing the institutional structure of the state, the 
associative sphere has erected an institutional scaffolding that helps maintain previous 
arrangements and adapt them to new conditions, but always in a precarious equilibrium. As 
the expression of an imported juridical and political concept, ‘associations’ have grafted 
themselves - in Bertrand Badie’s sense [2000]- onto Algeria’s system of rent distribution 
actually widening its reach, despite the fact that during most of the period when associational
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life developed the oil and gas rent was actually stagnating. The extent to which the associative 
sphere will be able to keep performing this function will depend not so much on the 
fluctuations in the availability of the hydrocarbon rent itself, but on the sanctions inflicted by 
those excluded from the material benefits it dispenses.
The better associations perform their role in the eyes of the state, the more they become 
subject to criticism from those outside the associative sphere. This same dynamic stems not 
only from the patronage liaisons pervading the associative sphere, but also from the other 
functions performed by associations, such as their electoral activism. Associations’ overt 
involvement in politics subjects them to ordinary Algerians’ aversion for ‘everything political’ 
and taints them with the same discredit affecting political parties. The same applies when the 
associative sphere is used to insulate the state from its service delivery shortcomings, with 
government officials passing the buck of state failure to the ‘inexistent, inefficient associative 
movement’. Here one can see how the associative sphere’s actual rationale intrinsically 
engenders its own demise. If the role of the associations keeps on generating the type and 
amount of discontent it has in the past, its value for the state will decay, or rather it will be 
inverted. Actors within the presidency and the executive could decide to move from using 
associations as a legitimacy tool to joining the bandwagon of popular discontent, as happened 
in the 1980s with the smear campaign launched by the Chadli presidency against the FLN. As 
we have seen, this process has already started, nurtured by sectors of the government itself, 
first and foremost the Ministry of the Interior.440 If this were to happen, the fate and future role 
of the associative sphere will be left in the hands of those individuals and groups mainly 
responsible for creating associations, to which I now turn.
Sheltered grassroots, Faustian pacts?
One other question for future research concerns possible changes in the social bases of 
associational life and more importantly in these groups’ stance vis-a-vis the state. In 
attempting to make sense of the multiplication of associations, I have tried to avoid positing 
their relationship to the state purely according to a top-down instrumentalist perspective, 
whereby the associative sphere essentially remains a tool of state control. In revealing the 
conflictual nature of associational life, 1 have shown that associations serve not only the 
state’s survival strategies, but also those of individuals. I have highlighted the fact that, as
440 See Zahir M : ‘Enquete sure les finances des Associations: Zerhouni demande des comptes’ 
L’Expression, 23 June 2005
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associations’ internal politics yield winners and losers, at the aggregate level certain groups 
and professional categories -  mainly revolving around the public sector -  are outnumbering 
other social groups, both in providing the membership to, and acquiring the benefits of, 
associational life. This has led me to suggest that associational life constitutes a sphere where 
a political settlement is concluded between the state and members of the state middle class, in 
which side payments accrue to the latter as a form of compensation for its progressive decline 
in an era of economic reform.
In this sense, the associative sphere has been a realm where a tacit political pact has been 
struck that helps the state retain a form of loyalty and discourage collective defection within 
its main support group: a pact therefore not intended to lead to a transition to democracy in the 
sense of O’Donnell and Schmitter [1986] but to a reinstating of the configuration preceding 
political reforms. Rather than a transition pact, associational life provides the bases for a 
restoration pact. Whether this equation can be reversed -  whether the associative sphere will 
end up contributing to democratic change - depends on the set of opportunities and constraints 
shaping the outlook of the groups that today and tomorrow will populate the associative realm. 
In at least one important way, this question bears more significance fifteen years after those 
noticing the emergence of Algeria’s ‘civil society’ first asked it.
The mistake made by the literature on Algeria’s associational life in evoking Tocquevillian 
notions of civil society is that these respond to post-Hobbesian concerns: they apply when 
security is guaranteed and a national community is established. But the actual development of 
Algeria’s associative sphere unfolded as the country was breaking apart. It had, therefore, 
security concerns at its core - not only the material security of the disgraced public sector 
strata examined above, but also, and more importantly, the ideological and physical security of 
those groups menaced by the rise of the Islamist populism.
This is why, if we exclude the sector of religious associations, it would be wrong to conceive 
the violence in the 1990s simply as a hindrance to the development of associational life. The 
violence did in fact provide a rationale for the activity of associations. As I have shown, at 
different stages of the battle against Islamism, various sections of the associative movement 
joined forces with the state. This has been part of a broader collusive alliance between the 
authorities and those very groups that before the ascent of the Islamist threat constituted a 
thorn in the state’s side [Garon, 1998]. If at the end of the 1980s the birth of freedom of 
association reflected the central generational conflict between representatives of the new and 
old orders, the multiplication of associations through a decade of violence provided one of the
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fields where this conflict was, if not solved, at least tamed, thanks to a temporary truce aimed 
at defeating the Islamist threat.
It is in this sense that it is worth questioning the commonsensical view that the conflict has 
deterred associations’ independence from the state. The eruption of political violence 
enormously increased the weight of those sectors of the associative movement capable of 
influencing the perceptions conveyed into -and coming from - the international arena. The 
relationship between the state and the grassroots in this sense can be seen as reflecting a 
broader bargaining game between the army and secularist/bourgeois/ public sector groups -  
and particularly their internationally connected vanguards. This can be explained through 
different perceptions of threat. For the associational field the threat came from the guerrillas in 
the national periphery, while for the state it came from the official sanctioning of the 
international community. The former needed the latter to obtain protection from a pre- 
Hobbesian threat. The latter needed the former to recover international legitimacy. In the 
violence, a cosy affair was established.
In this light, can we say that Algerian civil society has struck a Faustian pact with the army, in 
which both profited from the conflict? In the analysis above I have tried to avoid attributing 
rational intentions to the actors involved. Conspiracy theories occasionally bear some validity, 
but Algeria is so awash with them that another one would probably not be very relevant 
[Silverman, 2000]. Rather than exposing a cynical liaison devised by actors “too close for 
comfort” [Edwards and Hulme, 1997] I have tried to highlight a set of opportunities and 
constraints which has entangled segments of the state and segments of associational life. The 
violence ignited a bargaining game between the state and these groups. Shelter from the 
Islamist threat on the one hand, and supporting legitimacy on the other, have been the 
commodities bartered in this trade.
This brings us back to our initial question: will the groups responsible for the ascent of 
Algeria’s associative field during the 1990s remain prominent in its future development? If the 
conflict has been a major source of the shaping and reproduction of the state -  associations 
relationship, how will this relationship evolve once the violence has been eradicated? The 
answer lies in the battle for values that Algeria will have to go through in the years to come. 
Such a battle will inevitably pervade the associative field. Predicting a decline in the political 
weight of the associative movement,441 at a time when the creation of religious associations is 
again on the rise following the multiplication of private mosque-building initiatives, in an
441 A. Benchabane: ‘L’Alg6rie associative en net declin : le raisons d’une faillite programmee’, El 
Waian, 14 January 2006.
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extraordinary repetition of the dynamic which was unfolding in the 1980s,442 seems if not 
implausible, at least premature.
Transformational diplomacy
One of the main omissions of this study has been the acknowledgment of the positive 
contribution that a variety of associations provide to Algeria’s social, political and economic 
landscape. It is not my intention to seek the opportunity here for a belated and fleeting attempt 
to correct this shortcoming. Since the beginning my aim has been to assess the impact that the 
associative field, as a realm of resources, practices and discourse, has had on the country’s 
political development. It is in this light that I have tried to show that, even when motivated by 
the best of intentions, associations cannot escape the structural constraints and the incentive 
system that shape their relationship with the state, and push them to perform their “legitimacy 
maintenance” functions.
This bears some significance for donors supporting civil society organisations, in Algeria and 
elsewhere. Although in recent years the academic euphoria around civil society has started to 
wane, this is far from being the case in donors’ quarters, where civil society support is 
increasingly intertwined with the rising attention that the foreign policy and donor community 
is giving to failing states. In describing the consequences of the State Department's recent 
adoption of ‘transformational diplomacy’ for the US development strategy, Andrew Natsios - 
USAID’s former administrator - stated “I can think of no text greater than de Tocqueville’s to 
inform us of the social foundations of healthy democracies and how local government and 
associational life are essential to democratic development” [2006: 138].
The Algerian case has policy implications for donors’ unbound faith in the benefits of 
operating through associative actors. It shows that donors’ efforts could benefit from ceasing 
to ascribe an unquestioned democratising role to the associative sphere. This applies even 
when the associative actors that donor support show clear democratic credentials, and degrees 
of autonomy and independence from the state: associations can function as drivers of 
conservation as much as drivers of change - depending on the environment in which they 
operate, and the actual aims of those supporting them, including the state, and the donors
442 Adlene M eddi: ‘ Mosquees, salles de priere, bien wakfs: les dinars de la foi’, El Watan, 16 March 
2006.
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themselves. In contexts where -  as in Algeria - the international community’s calls for 
democratisation are ultimately watered down by concerns about political stability, donors 
should also be wary of implementing civil society support activities carrying supposedly 
change oriented goals, which instead soon subject the donor community itself to the collusive 
dynamics of the state-associations. This is not only because in environments where the 
associative sphere is subject to wide popular discredit, engaging in civil society support 
activities can turn out to be a bad PR move for the donors. It is also because, in contexts where 
associational life is (accused of being) primarily driven by the quest for material benefits, 
donor support to associations -  often intended to bring associations together - ends up being 
an element making for further attrition and division within the associative field, and an 
additional dent in the reputation of the associative sphere in the eyes of domestic public 
opinion.
Far from being intended as a warning against donors’ active role in supporting Algerian 
associations in the future, these points are a simple call for a less dogmatic and ambiguous 
stance. Algeria’s associative sphere is in its initial phases of development, but has already 
gone through a lot. It has played an important role in taking the country through a decade of 
violent conflict and political turmoil, coming out of it in ragged shape, particularly in terms of 
its standing in the eyes of ordinary Algerians.
At the time these words are put to paper, the incentives for a different role of the associative 
sphere are still to take shape. Yet, as I tried to point out in this last section, this does not mean 
that in the future the functions played by the associative sphere will not change. For change to 
happen, the ruptures driving the development of liberalised autocracy in the country will need 
to heal: in one way or another, the future of Algeria’s associational life will remain linked to 
the quest for the legitimacy of the Algerian state.
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4. Ai't Larbi, Arezky, Journalist, Figaro
5. Alt Zai, Nadia, lawyer, Secretary general o f the Ai't Menguellet Association
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31. Chellal, Mr, Secretary General o f Ah d  ’54
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MSP
33. Chevalier, Eveline, CISP Project Officer
34. Christian P. Freelance Journalist
35. De Varennes, Chantal, First Counsellor at the Canadian Embassy and Canadian Consul
36. Derras, Omar, Sociologist
37. Djabi, Nacer, University Professor
38. Djaffar, Nouara, MP, RND member, President o f Women’s Rights Association
39. Djamila S. Assistant to Yazid Sai'di MASSN Director o f Communication, Algiers 24 January 2002
40. Djelfaoui, Abderahmane,Writer
41. Djerbal, Dajo, historian
42. Ebert, Mr,SME Project Leader, German Development Cooperation (GTZ)
43. El Bey, Abderrahmane, Association Clairvoyance
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46. Giansanti, Luca, First Counsellor, Italian Embassy
47. Gonzalez, Denis, Caritas, Algiers
48. Guerrato, Lucio, Head o f EU Delegation to Algeria
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52. Harhad, Ouardia, President of the Association Independante pour le Triomphe des Droits des 
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53. Harraz, Mehadj, UNIDO Staff, Algiers Office
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55. Izarouken, Arab, Head o f European Commission Project Management Unit, and former member of  
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56. Kabeili, Fatima, UN Information Coordinator
57. Kehailia, Gregory, Algiers’ EU Delegation Staff
58. Khatal, Mr, GTZ Consultant
59. Khelladi, Insaf, International Finance Corporation, Algiers Office
60. Khiati, Mohammed., President, FOREM
61. KIES, M., EU MEDA Programme team leader
62. Kouti, Zoubida, President Association Petit Lecteur
63. Larbaoui, Journalist at Liberte
64. Lardjane, Omar, Association AAdress
65. Malaoui, Rachid, SNAPAP president
66. Mecheri, Selim, SNAPAP Secretary General
67. Meghenine, Nacer, Secretary General (and later President) SOS Culture Bab El Oued
68. Mekhzani, Nabil acting Director, Maison des Associon o f Bologhine
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70. Merabet, N aw al,World Bank Staff, Algiers Office
71. Messaoudi, Khalida, President o f Rassemblement Algerien Contre la Hogra et la Trahison 
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72. Mohamed B.
73. Mouffouk, Omar, Secretary General, Imedyazen
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77. Nasim B. RAJ Member
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79. Oubagha, Hamid, President Imedyazen Association
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81. Parlatore, Sandro, Head o f UNIDO Algeria operations
82. Perricone, Giuseppe, Assistant to the UN Resident Representative
83. Ramazzotti, Marco, Head o f Algerian operations o f ‘Comitato Italiano di Solidarieta tra i Popoli
84. Rebaine, Ali-Fawzi, President oiA h d  ’54
85. Reda, M ., ILO Programme Officer
86. Remaoune, Malika, President AFEPEC
87. Rovera, Donatella, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Amnesty International Secretariat
88. Sahli, Zoubir, vice-president Touiza, charge du developpement solidaire and advisor to Minister o f  
Social Action and National Solidarity
89. Safda, 34 ans, Former Secretary at Sports Federation
90. Saidani, Malika, President o f ‘Actions Solidarity Femmes d’Alger’
91. SaYdi, Yazid -  Head of Communication, Algerian Ministry of Social Action and National Solidarty
92. Sator, Badia, President o f Sidi M ’hamed APC, RACHDA vice-president, member of 
Rassemblement for Culture and Democracy (RCD), General Practitioner
93. Sid Ali, photographer, Collectif d’Associations pour l’Aide a 1’Emploi (CAPE) employee
94. Skalweit, Peter, Director, Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Algeria
95. Slotta, Gregory, 1st Counsellor, US Embassy in Algiers
96. Spinola, Vittorio, Entrepreneur, Member o f the Italo -  Algerian Entrepreneurs Association
97. Tadj, Leila, UNDP Programme Officer
98. Taibi, M. CNEC Member
99. Takarlie, Annie, Cultural Cooperation, French Embassy in Algiers
100.Tariq S., Member, RAJ
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102.Varotto, Riccardo, Italian Embassy’s intern
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103.Yazid, Islah Supporter
104.Zaidi, Mr, Lawyer
105.Zervudacky, Mme Directorate General for International Cooperation (DGCID), French Ministry o f  
Foreign Affairs
106. Zitoune, Mile, Minister o f Interior and Local Government
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Annex B. Associations registered at the Maison des Associations in Bologhine, with cases 
of homonymy
Name of the Association Cases of Homonymy
Inside the Association’s Bureau Among normal members
Ass. pour la Continuity Culturelle 
A ss. pour la Sauvegarde et Valorisation du Pay sage  
Ass. S olidarity, Espoir, Travail 
A ss. Culturelle M ezghana 
Ass. Contre le s  M yopathies  
A ss. Ennour d eslm m u nod eficita ires  
A ss. A sthm atiques 
A ss. Yacht Club d’A lger  
Ass. O uled el Houm a  
A ss. Culturelle et Sportive El Sahel
A ss. A lg . pour le  D eveloppem ent de la recherche en S cien ces  S ocia les  
Ass. d es  H andicapes M oteurs H isene’
Ass. Trait d'U nion (S ection  - Solidarite’)
A ss. El Fedjr d'aide aux personnes atteinte de Cancer 
A ss. Culturelle P a tr im o in e- Artisanat
A ss. Lakhdar pour 1'union des am is et parents avec les inaptes mentaux 
Ass. Marah
A ss. d'aide aux m alades cardiaques
A ss. Ennadjat d'aide aux dem unies et sans dom icile fixe
Org. N ationale des V ictim es du Terrorism e et d es Ayant droits
A ss. N our Es-Salam
A ss. pour le  D eveloppem ent de la Culture de 1'Enfant 
A ss. N ationale de la Continuity entre le s  Generations  
A ss. Bahja
A ss. d es E checs d e B ologh ine  
A ss. Espoir A lger Capitate
Ass. Culturelle et Artistique pour la R eintegration des Jeunes 
A ss. Culture et Loisirs  
A ss. N ationale d'Echanges entre le s  Jeunes  
Ass. M ezghana M usique A ndalouse  
Ass. Kinder Rayan  
A ss. En N our pour la Culture et l’Art 
Ass. A rtistique C inem a -  Lumiere 
Ass. El A m el L oisirs pour l'Enfance 
Ass. Regards et Lumiere 
Ass. A lgerienne des H em ophiles  
A ss. pour le s  E changes entre Jeunes H andicapes M oteurs 
A ss. pour la Prom otion de la C apitale 
Ass. Jeunes et N o u v e lle s  Generations  
A ss. El Hayat pour les jeunes iso le s  et chom eurs 
A ss. 'El Foussane'
Ass. de la Prom otion de Travailleurs et Cadres de la Jeunesse  
A ss. 'Emraude' E co log ie
Ass. de la Jeunesse pour la sauvegarde de 1'enfance 
Ass. pour la prom otion de la jeu n esse  et 1’enfance 'Echo'
Ass. 'Nour' pour H andicapes moteurs 
Ass. Scientifique d'Informatique et de S ciences M edicales  
A ss. Espoir d'Avenir 
A ss. National du Produit algerien  
Ass. pour les Travaux Culturels et A rtisanaux 'El Manar'
A ss. A lgerienne des M alades C ardiaques 
A ss. Essalam  Ham m am et 
A s s . ' W afa’ Culture et Loisirs 
A ss. 'Djazira'
Ass. A m icale de Solidarity Juvenile  
Ass. des Fam ilies E xp u lsees du Logem ent (A .F .E .L .)
Ass. Solidarity aux H andicapys 
A ss. 'La Volonte'
Ass. 'El Am el'
Ass. Jeunesse Espoir et Solidarity  
Ass. 'La Vie'
Ass. 'Trait d'U nion’
Ass. 'El Marifa'
Ass. 'EL Azam  El Kheir' pour le s  H andicapes M oteurs 
Ass. 'As-Safir'
none
none
2 nd v ice  president share nam e with president
3 m em bers have sam e nam e
4  m em bers have the same nam e as the president
n/a 
none 
none  
none 
n/a 
none  
none 
n/a 
n/a 
none  
none 
none 
none 
n/a 
n/a 
none
V ice  president has sam e name as president 
none 
none 
n/a
Sec.G en. & Treasurer have sam e nam e as President
Treasurer’s sam e name as Presidt
Sec. Gen. H as sam e name as Presidt 
none
Treasurer has sam e nam e as presdt 
none  
none 
none  
none 
none
Treasurer has sam e name as presdt 
none 
none 
n/a 
n/a
T w o bureau m em bers have sam e name
Treasurer A djoint has sam e nam e as  Presdt 
none  
n/a 
none 
none 
none 
none 
none
Sec.G en. & Presdt share sam e name 
none 
none 
none  
none  
n/a
Treas. Share nam e with Presdt 
none 
n/a 
none 
none 
n/a 
none  
none 
none 
none
n one
none
n/a
n/a
2  m em bers with presidents’ name 
n/a
n/a
none
none
n/a
none
3 m em bers share fam ily nam e 
n/a
n/a
none
none
n/a
none
n/a
n/a
none
n/a
none
none
n/a
n/a
4 m em bers share nam e with Presdt
1 m em ber shares nam e with Presdt 
n/a
O ne share nam e w ith Presdt
n/a
n/a
none
none
none
none
none
2 m em bers share nam e with Presdt 
n/a
n/a
3 other m em bers share sam e nam e 
none
2 m em bers share nam e
1 m em ber share nam e with Presdt
n/a
none
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
none
none
T w o m em bers share sam e nam e
n/a
n/a
n/a
none
n/a
n/a
none
n/a
none
none
none
n/a
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A ss. U nion  Parents d’E leves de la W ilaya d'Alger 
A ss. Zahra
A ss. de Solidarity aux M alades de S ID A
A ss. 'El Kheria' A venir de la Jeunesse
A ss. ’B essm a' pour les M alades d'Hdm ophilie
Club d'A lger des Arts Martiaux
A ss. N ationale 'Espoir' pour la prom otion de la cite
n/a n/a
none none
Sec. G en. & Presdt share sam e nam e none
Sec. G en. &  V ice  Presdt share sam e nam e none
none none
Sec. G en. & Presdt share sam e nam e none
none none
N otes: W hen the research w as conducted, 150 associations w ere based at the M A B. B ecau se  o f  restrictions im posed by the m anagem ent o f  the M A B  
it w as only p ossib le to review  on ly  h a lf o f  the associations’ dossiers. In num erous dossiers, m em bers h ave not stated their fam ily name, 
thus m aking the analysis o f  the presence o f  fam ily m em bers inside a ssociations more problematic.
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